Month: April 2025

This video presentation compares the psychology and leadership of Vladimir Putin to that of 6 other long-lived dictators: the Soviet Union’s Josef Stalin, who was in power from 1924 until his death in 1953; France’s Napoleon Bonaparte, in power from 1799 – except for a short period — until he was defeated at Waterloo in 1814; Germany’s Adolf Hitler, in power from 1933 until his suicide in 1945; Italy’s Benito Mussolini, in power from 1922 until he was overthrown in 1943 and eventually killed in 1945; China’s Mao Zedong, in power from 1949 until his death in 1976, and Turkey’s Kemal Ataturk, in power from 1923 until his death in 1938.   

We start with a quote by Albert Speer, who worked closely with Adolf Hitler, and later wrote about leadership and dictatorship: “There is a special trap for every holder of power, whether the director of a company, the head of a state, or the ruler of a dictatorship. His favour is so desirable to his subordinates that they will sue for it by every means possible. Servility becomes endemic among his entourage, who compete among themselves in their show of devotion. This in turn exercises a sway upon the ruler, who becomes corrupted in his turn. The key to the quality of the man in power is how he reacts to this situation.”

We now consider Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine in February 2022. I was living in Russia at the time and noticed almost immediate increase in fear amongst the population.

General Caulaincourt, a former French Ambassador to Russia, advised Napoleon Bonaparte not to invade Russia 1812, as did Hermann Goering advise Adolf Hitler in 1941 as they thought the risks were too great. Both Caulaincourt and Goering, a famous WW1 fighter pilot and head of the German airforce, had friendly relations with their leader and considerable knowledge of military affairs. But, both were ignored!

We do not know if anyone close to Vladimir Putin advised him not to invade Ukraine in February 2022, but the hesitancy shown by several members in the televised Russian Security Council meeting before the invasion suggests there was a lack of enthusiasm. The most equivalent person to Caulaincourt and Goering in Putin’s official working office circle, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, had good relations with Putin but no direct significant military experience.

Putin’s conduct at the Security Council suggests that Napoleon’s childhood friend and first secretary, Louis Bourrienne, was right when he wrote that “intoxication which is occasioned by success produces in the heads of the ambitious a sort of cerebral congestion”.  

The successful annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the total consolidation of his power inside Russia would have significantly influenced Putin’s thought processes.

The conduct of Putin’s minions at the Security Council meeting also suggests that Albert Speer was right about the “subordinates” and their “servility”. One liberal orientated Russian newspaper reported afterwards that during the Security Council meeting these subordinates sat “with gloomy, tense faces and afraid to look at each other, paralyzed with fear” as they all said what they knew Putin wanted them to say.

How did such a situation arise? When Putin first came to power, he was described by some commentators as little more than an ex-KGB operative of moderate success who got lucky and had the leadership baton passed to him from Boris Yeltsin and then benefited from a favorable international scene and rising oil prices before progressing to a dictatorship because of his historical grievances.

Putin first became president of Russia in 2000 — twenty five years ago! If Putin was there only by appointment and was without talent he would have been replaced in some way years ago.

Describing Josef Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev stressed his superior ability: “He didn’t simply come with a sword and conquer our minds and bodies. No, he demonstrated his superior skill in subordinating and manipulating people.”

The Yugoslavian politician, Milovan Djilas, who had close dealings with Stalin and his lieutenants from 1944, observed that Stalin “sized up people quickly and was always particularly skilful in exploiting people’s weaknesses”.

In the same vein, Adolf Hitler was also a man of superior ability. Albert Speer noted that Hitler “knew men’s secret vices and desires, he knew what they thought to be their virtues, he knew the hidden ambitions and motives which lay behind their loves and hates, he knew where they could be flattered, where they were gullible, where they were strong and where they were weak; he knew all this by instinct and feeling, an intuition which in such matters never led him astray.”

While a young officer in KGB, Putin underwent further training and told one of his friends that he was “now an expert in human relations”. Whether it be by training or instinct – or, most likely a combination of the two – Putin has talent in this area.

Ilya Ponomarev, who was a Member of the Russian Duma until 2015 – and is now a very strong Putin critic – has described Putin as a “brilliant psychologist”, the “best I know”, and “the best communicator”: “When you are talking to him like this (face to face) you feel like finally you have found somebody who truly understands you better than your wife”.

Sergo Beria (son of Soviet police chief Lavrenti Beria) wrote that:

“Stalin was able to charm people, as I can testify from experience. He managed to give the people he was with the impression that Jupiter had come down from his Olympus for them, deigned to speak with them in a familiar tongue, and was taking an interest in their problems.” Stalin, he wrote, “left each person he spoke to anxious to see him again, with a sense that there was now a bond that linked them forever”; “that was his strength”

Andrei Illarionov, chief economic policy adviser to Putin from 2000 to end 2005, has told the story of how he came to this position despite telling Putin that his military actions in Chechnya were “criminal”. “Because he is a good psychologist, not academically, but intuitively, he said: ‘Stop. In future we will not talk about Chechnya.’ For 30 or 40 seconds he remained silent, forcing himself to calm down. Maybe it lasted a minute. Then he said: ‘Let’s talk about the economy’.” Putin suggested another meeting next day, but Illarionov only agreed after several more meetings to be Putin’s “economic adviser”. Illarionov later said: “He had outsmarted me.”

But there may be another factor in Putin’s leadership. Halide Edibe, a female Turkish political activist who generally admired Kemal Ataturk who became Turkey’s first president in 1923 after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, wrote about Ataturk:

“Of course, one knew all the time that there were men around him who were greatly superior in intellect, and far above him in culture and education. But though he (Ataturk) excelled them in neither refinement nor originality, not one of them could possibly cope with his vitality. Whatever their qualities, they were made on a more or less normal scale. In terms of vitality he wasn’t. And it was this alone that made him the dominant figure.”

“Vitality” may be defined as a highly developed combination of mental and physical vigor. Benito Mussolini successfully aimed to project such vitality in his Italian speeches and public appearances. Putin often aims to do the same in physical terms although he is much more restrained as a speaker.

Napoleon said that “there are two levers for moving men – interest and fear.” As far as “interest” is concerned, the main factor in Putin’s favour is that his Russia is – for the great majority of people – better than Yeltsin’s Russia in the 1990s; and this goes for both the general population and those with strong civic and nationalist feelings.

When the writer Emil Ludwig asked Stalin why “everybody” in his country feared him, Stalin responded:“Do you really believe a man could maintain his position of power for fourteen years merely by intimidation? Only by making people afraid?”

In 2020, journalist Masha Lipman said:

“The Putin of 2013 or Putin of 2012, when he started his third term after a four-year break, when Dmitry Medvedev had been President, was a different leader from the one that he was at the beginning of his Presidential career, in the two-thousands.” “Anybody who’s been in power for twenty years changes. So think of the experience that he has gained over time. During the twenty years that he has been in power, Russia went through terrorist attacks, the war in Chechnya, natural calamities, technological catastrophes, mass protests, and he coped with all those.” “I would say even somebody who does not approve of his policies cannot help marvelling at how he’s been in power for twenty years and enjoys an approval rating of about seventy per cent, and this without keeping his nation at large in fear.”

However, it is also the case that Putin displayed a ruthless and nasty side to his character right from the beginning of his time in power, and the promotion of fear has become a more important lever with time – and particularly after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine!

Ironically, the long-lasting dictator is himself fearful. As Albert Speer put it: “To the imagination of the outsider Hitler was a keen, quick, brutally governing dictator. It is difficult to believe that in reality he edged along hesitantly, almost fearfully. But that was the case.”

Some analysts of Russian affairs such as Mark Galeotti have claimed that Putin is “not a risk taker” and can be slow to make decisions. He has also written that Putin can initially “panic” when faced with an unexpected and threatening situation.

Adolf Hitler on occasion acted the same during the early stages of the Second World War. When Allied landings in Norway in April 1940 led to some heavy losses for the German navy, General Jodl, who was Hitler’s main military adviser, wrote in his diary that “the hysteria is frightful”, and that “every unfavourable piece of news makes the Fuhrer fear the worst”. Eventually, Jodl tapped the table:

“Mein Fuhrer, in every war there are times when the Supreme Commander must keep his nerve!”

The next month, Germany’s tanks got so far ahead of the infantry during the successful German invasion of France that on 17 May, General Halder wrote in his diary: “A really unpleasant day. The Fuhrer is terribly nervous. He is frightened by his own success, does not want to risk anything, and therefore would rather stop us.” From this point, however, to the disastrous loss at Stalingrad in early 1943, Hitler was generally able to savour success rather than be frightened of it; and, his self-belief was so buttressed that even as late as mid-1944, Hitler was boasting of his ‘unprecedentedly strong nerves’.

Putin biographer Philip Short has pointed out that one of Putin’s KGB recruiters thought Putin had a “lowered sense of danger” and Short thinks that Putin “knows he is prone to taking risks” and has thus “become very cautious – almost to the point of indecision.”

So, what drives Putin? What does he really want? All successful – that is, long lived – dictators are very self-centred. A British Ambassador wrote about the Italian dictator: “His first consideration is Mussolini, his second is the fascist regime, his third Italy”.

Italian King Victor Emmanuel was concerned about the political turbulence in Italy in 1922 and explained why he appointed Mussolini Prime Minister: “He is really a man of purpose and I can tell you that he will last some time. There is in him, if I am not mistaken, the will to act and to act well.” Mussolini himself claimed that the “will to dominate” was the “fundamental law of the life of the universe”.

Boris Yeltsin later wrote of his decision to appoint Putin prime minister (and possible presidential successor): “Putin had the will and the resolve.”

When an American journalist asked Stalin about the role of good luck in his career, Stalin replied: “What do you think I am, an old Georgian granny to believe in gods and devils? I believe in one thing only, the power of the human will.”

Mao’s doctor, Li Zhisui, wrote that “Mao was the centre around which everyone else revolved. His will reigned supreme.” This “will would not be thwarted, and he was quick to lash out at anyone who tried”. By 1958 “Mao’s voice was so powerful, his point of view so strong, that it was becoming difficult for the cautious to disagree. The force of Mao’s will gradually silenced those who disagreed, and those who pandered to him began to lie.”

Napoleon’s friend and secretary wrote: “Without any shock, and in the space of four years, there arose above the ruins of the short-lived Republic a government more absolute than ever was Louis XIV’s. While this extraordinary change can be assigned to many causes, I had the opportunity of observing the influence which the determined will of one man exercised over his fellow men.”

The strength of will of the dictatorial CEO can become an excuse for the lieutenants’ willingness to be ‘servile’ and ‘obey’. Speer wrote about “how dependent we (he and other lieutenants) felt on Hitler’s will”. Nikita Krushchev made a similar point about being one of the “victim’s of Stalin’s will”.

As became clear, Putin’s first steps after becoming president in 2000 demonstrated will and resolve – and vitality – and were all about restoring order inside Russia and then restoring what he perceived as Russia’s historically important place in the world.

Dictators generally see themselves in a very positive light.

Milovan Djilas, the Yugoslav politician who spent time with Stalin and his lieutenants, noted that even in Stalin, “certain great and final ideals lay hidden – his ideals, which he could approach by molding and twisting the reality and the living men who comprised it”.

In a similar vein, Mao Zedong’s personal doctor for over twenty years, Li Zhisui, wrote that: “Mao insisted on policies that no one else had ever imagined, dangerous, risky policies like the Great Leap Forward (to promote rapid industrialization), the people’s communes, and the Cultural Revolution (attacking “those in authority pursuing the capitalist road”), all of which were designed to transform China”.

Putin has long been developing a fanatical side related to his reading of Russian history and, like Mussolini, is increasingly thinking of self and equating himself with an ideal of Russian greatness. There was probably accelerated reading during his COVID19 isolation periods. This has resulted in Putin’s ruthlessness becoming increasing cruel to achieve his aims. After the outbreak of war with Ukraine, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was asked whether Putin consulted with him.” Lavrov said:

“Putin has three advisers — Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great and Catherine the Great.”

Stalin also immersed himself in history. The cruelty of Ivan the Terrible was something that Stalin took particular notice of, writing in the margin of a biography: “teacher teacher” In 1946 he criticised a new movie, Ivan the Terrible, Part Two, telling the director that changes must be made: “Ivan the Terrible was very cruel. You can show he was cruel. But you must show why he needed to be cruel.”

Some close observers of Putin, such as Philip Short and Mark Galeotti have suggested that Putin “does not want to die in office”. Mussolini’s son-in-law and Italian Foreign Minister, Galeazzo Ciano, noted in his diary in 1941 that the aging dictator can be somewhat sensitive about this:

“The Duce (Mussolini) is exasperated by the publication in the magazine Minerva, published in Turin, of a motto by some Greek philosopher or other.” The motto read: “No greater misfortune can befall a country than to be governed by an old tyrant.”

History is likely to record that Putin initially did good things for Russia but by the end the situation had radically reversed. Chen Yuan, an early colleague of Mao, got the direction of change right when he said: “Had Mao died in 1956, his achievements would have been immortal. Had he died in 1966, he would still have been a great man. But he died in 1976. Alas, what can one say?”

While not wanting to be remembered like Mao, Philip Short (as well as Galeotti and others) has suggested that Putin saw the February 2022 “special military operation” as the “last opportunity to bring Ukraine to heal” and that “bringing Ukraine back into the fold would have been the crowning achievement of his career”. Putin also probably thought that he was the only person who could do this.

In August 1939, Hitler spoke to his generals to convince them it was time to take military action against Poland, saying: “Essentially all depends on me, on my existence, because of my political talents. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or a lunatic.” Therefore, according to Hitler, Poland had to be taken quickly! Several months later, with Poland under the belt and Germany consequently at war with Britain and its allies in the west, but still at peace with Russia in the east, Hitler told senior military officers that the time was propitious for a war on two fronts because of:

“Neither a military person nor a civil person could replace me. I am convinced of my powers of intellect and decision. Now there is a relationship of forces which can never be more propitious”.

Finally, a pithy description of what this text is about. Anatoly Sobchak, Putin’s mentor in St. Petersburg, before Putin moved to Moscow, said to journalist Andrei Kalitin in 1999: “I understand why Yeltsin chose Putin as his successor — he would never betray you. But I also understand that once he has power, Putin will never give it back to anyone.”