Author: Admin

Morrison, Binskin and Napoleon · 30 August 2012

Lt. General David Morrison, Chief of the Australian Army, recently wrote that while he was a strong supporter of discussion and debate on a wide range of issues, including the future nature of warfare, it is important that the Department of Defence and Government knows what public comment is being expressed and that it is correct. We should be careful, however, not to base our debates on false premises.

This reminded me of Napoleon’s approach to his Council of State after he had been in power for about a decade. Napoleon would say: Read the draft proposal aloud. He would then give his view on the decision that should be made, before concluding: Does someone wish to speak about the wording?

I suspect that this is how Morrison sees things: he already knows what is correct and there is no need to debate any of his basic assumptions.

And then we have Air Marshal Mark Binskin in commenting on the recent deaths of 3 Australian soldiers in Afghanistan. He said: We remain committed to the mission.

After Napoleon had arrived in Paris while his army tried to struggle home from Russia by itself, he spoke, according to General Caulaincourt, of his disasters, of the mistake he had made by staying at Moscow, as a stranger might have done. The venture failed by a week’s time, he said. Everything in the whole depends on that. The right moment, timeliness, those are everything. In meeting with some senior officials, Napoleon’s first words were: Well, well, gentlemen, Fortune dazzled me. I let myself be carried away, instead of following the plan I had made and that I spoke of to you. I had thought to gain in a year what only two campaigns could achieve. I have made a great blunder; but I shall have the means to retrieve it.

In reality, Binskin has as much chance of completing his mission as Napoleon did. Perhaps he, along with Morrison, should reconsider some of his basic premises.

Medvedev & Putin: “power corrupts” · 16 November 2008

While Barak Obama traded in the psychology of hope to win the US presidency, Russia’s President Medvedev is trading in the psychology of fear including his own in moving to increase the Russian presidential term from four years to six years.

Psychologically, Medvedev may now be where George W Bush was after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Some of Bush’s fears about what might happen next were justified, but his responses included the major mistake of Iraq. Some of Medvedev’s fears may be similarly justified.

In particular, two recent events seem to have worked to boost such fears and possibly cut short Medvedev’s apprentice presidency.

The first was Georgia and the subsequent US response. Russia is rightly fearful of US (and NATO) military activities and ambitions so close to its borders. The US has shown that like an individual it is not unwilling to abuse its power.

The second is the world financial crisis. Some in the Russian power-elite seem to suspect that the crisis is some sort of conspiracy maybe one that is aimed against Russia with the intention of driving down high oil prices. This disconnect from the real world reminds me of the Gaidar-Chubais approach to economic reform in the early 1990s. Their understanding of how market economies worked was quite unsophisticated, and ultimately dangerous.

These events have occurred against a background of the deleterious effect of corruption, the unruly state of some of Russia’s regions, and the enormous economic power handed to a few Russians (who would quickly put concern for their money ahead of concern for their country) by the Western backed Boris Yeltsin.

However, like Bush with Iraq, Medvedev is looking at the wrong solution to his concerns about these issues. Making it possible for one man to remain at the peak of Russian power for 12 years will almost certainly have the reverse effect.

The thinking processes of the person in power become distorted over time, as do the thinking processes of those around him (or her). Albert Speer, Adolf Hitlers architect and Armaments Minister, summed it up nicely:

There is a special trap for every holder of power, whether the director of a company, the head of a state, or the ruler of a dictatorship. His favour is so desirable to his subordinates that they will sue for it by every means possible. Servility becomes endemic among his entourage, who compete among themselves in their show of devotion. This in turn exercises a sway upon the ruler, who becomes corrupted in his turn.

Louis de Bourreinne, who was Napoleon Bonaparte’s first secretary, called this corruption of the thinking processes a sort of cerebral congestion.

Even in the US, with its traditions and governmental structure, 12 years for a president would be a negative. Russia’s traditions, political structures such as the limits on political parties and appointed regional governors and the perverted distribution of wealth and corruption make 12 years potentially very dangerous.

Twelve years for a president would also mean 12 years for many other officials who themselves are less important holders of power. The holder of power pyramid would develop more of the characteristics of that of the USSR. This is even more so given that Medvedev has also moved to extend the terms of members of the lower house of parliament, the State Duma, from four years to five. These subordinates and the behavior of most of them merits this term—now have an additional incentive to be servile.

Speer also wrote that the key to the quality of the man in power is how he reacts to this situation.

And it is true not all people react exactly the same. Kemal Ataturk was much more restrained in his use of power than Josef Stalin. Even so, Ataturk’s regime had many psychological characteristics that were similar to that of Stalin. Ultimately there was only one source of power, and this was the man at the top.

This was the case, the law notwithstanding. In 1937 President Ataturk sacked Ismet Inonu as prime minister and replaced him with Celal Bayer. Legally, the Ataurk was entitled to appoint the prime minister, but as president he had few direct executive responsibilities. Nevertheless, when someone commended that Bayer has skillfully handled an issue, Ataturk retorted: The government is in my hands, my hands.

Medvedev likes to speak of the need to strengthen the rule of law, and he is no-doubt sincere. But like many enthusiasts for the law, he is putting too much faith in it at the expense of basic psychology.

Ataturk was in power for so long that his basically authoritarian psychology and the changing needs of the country began moving in opposite directions, and became a negative rather than positive factor in the country’s development. His pervasive influence meant that all depended on him, with little room for natural evolution. The legal system, that he played such a dominant role in forming, remained his—well intentioned—toy, to be pushed aside when he wished.

Medvedev seems to be relatively liberal in his outlook. But even his thinking would be corrupted by 10 years in power (assuming his present term of 4 years was to be followed by another of 6 years). The authoritarian streak in Vladimir Putin would become significantly less restrained if he were to return to the presidency. Eight years as president, 4 years as the major power behind his successor, plus a further 12 years as president would bring the total to 24 years. He could be president until 2024 when he would be 72 years of age.

Count Ciano, noted in his diary in 1941 (when Mussolini was 57) that the aging holder of power can be somewhat sensitive about age: The Duce (Mussolini) is exasperated by the publication in the magazine Minerva, published in Turin, of a motto by some Greek philosopher or other. The motto read:

No greater misfortune can befall a country than to be governed by an OLD tyrant.

The sensitivities of the tyrant as nothing compared to the damage generally done to a country. Old tyrant is not only about age. It is about a declining ability to match the desire to hold power with the desire to work, listen and to be engaged.

While Ataturk believed that government was in his hands, he was also quite disengaged from it. One of his admirers, Falih Rifki Atay said to him: Ataturk! Before you became President you were always in touch with the people. For years now, it is only us at your dinner table who listen to you. The people haven’t heard your voice. You only read the government’s report at the Assembly openings. This is your only communication.

Medvedev seems to be similar to Ismet Inonu in character. Falih Rifki Atay explained why Ataturk chose Inonu as Prime Minister in 1923:

Aside from not feeling any personal competition towards Ataturk he was a hard-working, serious administration man. He was an intellectual who believed in Ataturk.

Ataturk never made Inonu his legal superior in the way that Putin made Medvedev his. It was a bold move for someone who wanted to remain the real holder of power. It suggests to me that Putin’s intent was to fill the post of Prime Minister for a few years while Medvedev found his feet, and then find another quieter—but still very influential—life.

But Putin probably found that he missed being president more than he expected. Even if he intended to be the power behind the throne he would have gradually came to understand that over time Medvedev’s power would increase and his own would decline; and that his influence would be less than he had expected.

Then came Georgia and the financial crisis. As prime minister Putin has had a major role to play, but having tasted power at the top he will want to be in the supreme decision making seat again and doubly so, given the possibilities for a man of action in exciting and dangerous times. And, Putin will almost certainly feel that he is needed.

Ataturk had the same attitude. In 1938, with tensions rising in Europe, the dying Ataturk said:

If this second world war catches me when I’m still in bed, who knows what will become of the nation. It is I who must return to be in a position to take charge of government affairs.

So, will Medvedev resign early, as some suspect, to allow Putin to resume the presidency in 2009?

Medvedev knows that he owes his position to Putin. Moreover, he has been in power for only a short period of time, and will not yet have learnt to be comfortable with it. Indeed, he may be finding some of its aspects quite scary. According to Falih Rifki Atay, Inonu was appointed as prime minister in the first place because had a definite need for Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk’s) authority. Putin would not have chosen Medvedev to succeed him if he felt that Medvedev did not have a similar need—otherwise he could not expect continuing influence!

Yet, time and experience changes things! Medvedev may come away from the G20 Summit with a considerably enhanced sense of confidence. He will also recognize that if he were to step down now, he will irrevocably blacken his name in the eyes of many.

He will most likely have an agonising flight back from the USA. What to do?

What would happen if Putin returned to the presidency for 12 years?

A whole generation of educated and energetic Russians would have their cynicism confirmed and much of their enthusiasm for a better Russia—wasted. As it is now, they do not want Putin to return, and their dismay would only grow over time if he did. During the first six years a strong opposition could emerge, but Putin would probably retain the support of the majority of the population.

However, much also depends on events. These same educated Russians became emotionally charged over the events in Georgia, and are suspicious of US attempts to expend its power closer to Russia’s borders. Further events of this nature would boost Putin’s hold on power.

Traitor: Assange or Major-General John Cantwell? · 11 December 2010

Who scares me the most? Who is more likely to betray me and my northern suburbs of Sydney values?

Julian Assange or Major-General Cantwell of the Australian Army?

General Cantwell, commander of Australian troops in the Middle East, derided the northern suburbs of Sydney view of the world when defending the fact that six militiamen loyal to Matiullah Khan, a thuggishly dominant figure in the province of Oruzgan, had been brought to Australia for training by the Australian Defence Force.

Cantwell said: Matiullah Khan might not be the most angelic character, but I’ve got to know him pretty well. He’s effective, he does what he says he’ll do, he’s achieved things we’ve asked him to achieve, he’s our guy and we should work with him.

In January, 2010, a report entitled Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan lead-authored by Major General Michael T. Flynn, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence in Afghanistan, had this to say: In our experience civilians are on average better trained at analysis than military personnel, who are typically cultivated for leadership and management roles rather than analytical jobs.

And this lack of analytical ability shows in the case of Cantwell.

Take the words, I have got to know him pretty well! Even the most brutal people can often be very charming. For example, Sergo Beria (son of Lavrenti), who as a young man had direct official dealings with Stalin, wrote about an assignment Stalin gave him: When he thought it necessary he was able to seduce a Field Marshal just as well as a young man. It was not enough for me to be obedient, I had to be completely with him.

Take the words, not the most angelic character but he’s effective (and) he’s our guy! Adolf Hitler admired Martin Bormann’s efficiency, saying: I know that Bormann is brutal. But there is a sense in everything he does and I can absolutely rely on my orders being carried out by Bormann immediately and in spite of all obstacles. Hitler might have said, he’s my guy!

Cantwell is right in that it is sometimes necessary to work with the thuggish material that is already there as should, perhaps, have been done with elements Saddam Hussein’s regime after the invasion of Iraq in an attempt to maintain some order but it only makes sense to do so if a coincident effort is also being made to reduce their power and influence.

Cantwell, however, wants to boost the power a Stalin/Bormann type of person because he believes it brings some leadership and management changes which help him do his job.

The danger is that boosting the power of such Stalin/Bormann/Khan- types brings short-terms gains at the expense of the longer-term aims. Such people eventually come back to bite you!

Of course, Cantwell is not alone. I have noted in an earlier blog on this site that Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, Chief of the Australian Defence Force, defended the training of Matiullah Khan’s men, saying: I have read some stuff in recent times that indicates that Matiullah is very generous in circumstances. For example, a family lost a father and Matiullah provided support to that family in the absence of the father, and I’m familiar with other similar acts that he has been behind before.

As I then noted, even Stalin could show such generousity in circumstances. Stalin seems to have had a liking and respect for General Vasilevsky You command so many armies, yet you wouldn’t hurt a fly and during the war sent money orders, in his own name, to Vasilevsky’s father (a village priest) whom Vasilevsky had rejected when he joined the Red Army. Stalin also suggested to Vasilevsky that he visit his parents and ask for their forgiveness. However, even when he later showed the money orders to Vasilevsky, Stalin recognised all too clearly the utilitarian spin-off from his act, saying: It’ll be a long time before you pay off your debt to me.

Rather than threatening Julian Assange and suggesting that he is a traitor and clearly trying to help the US dump him in Guantanamo Bay Julia Gillard and her A-G Robert McClelland would be better-off taking a closer look at the activities of Cantwell and Houston (both of whom may be quite happy to see Assange in Guantanamo Bay).

However, it might be that Gillard and McClelland and much of the Australian population living outside the northern suburbs of Sydney are basically closet Stalin/Bormann types.

Residents of the northern suburbs of Sydney should at least know who their real enemies are and Assange is not among them!

Lawyer X, Huawei, National Security, Scott Morrison, Chinese in Australia! · 20 February 2020

The Victorian Lawyer X case tells us that we should be afraid of Scott Morrison and Australian national security officials, as they work to their intellectually poor but (in their view) morally superior drum-beat.

The law enforcement (police) people involved in Victoria’s Lawyer X tricks were so focused on protecting public security (reducing gang-land killings) that they lost sight about how public security is ultimately achieved ie an honest legal system! Instead, they used a criminal defense lawyer as an informant on her clients, and then spent years trying to cover this up. It has now been publicly exposed by Australia’s High Court.

Australia’s national security and defence officials will, like the Victorian police, tend to have a mindset that values order and certainty in their narrow area of interest. When this mindset is combined with excessive self-belief, it often leads to seeing people who disagree with them as morally problematic outsiders and an ends-justifies-the-means approach to issues. (See footnote regarding 1976 Church Committee report.)

In their attachment to the United States and the ANZUS alliance, Australian national security officials fail to see that they are often being led down a path that looks good from a narrow perspective, but is not in the broader national security interests of Australia.

Support for the invasion of Iraq is a powerful example. On the eve of the Iraq invasion I appeared on SBS television along with Dr Chris Caton (chief economist of BT) to discuss its economic consequences. On the topic of weapons of mass destruction, Caton said: Who knows what he (Saddam Hussein) has. In response I said that it was pretty clear by now that he has none. It was a strong statement by me, but one that was not hard to make because I had been reading a huge amount of generally available public information.

This is not meant to be a criticism of Chris Caton, but of the intelligence and mindset of those Australian officials who had even more time and opportunity than myself to objectively assess the evidence or who decided that lying to the Australian people was needed to preserve the ANZUS alliance! That is, in their narrow view of Australia’s security interests they missed the bigger picture of the broader consequences and believed that ends justified the means.

The arrest of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou undoubtedly smells very political, even if we accept that the Canadian courts are really only patsies in the game.

While there may be solid grounds for minimizing Huawei’s involvement in the development of domestic 5G networks (including that of Australia), many Chinese (including those living in Canada and Australia) are likely to see the arrest has part of the US effort to vilify Huawei.

More broadly, the arrest of Meng Wanzhou is clearly part of the US anti-Iran fixation which is based on US feelings of moral superiority. This has a religious aspect, and may well be the driving force behind some of Scott Morrison’s thinking.

Morrison, who is clearly intellectually shallow (and possibly a Christian religious extremist), may say that: Foreign policy must speak of our character and our values. What we stand for. What we believe in and, if need be, what we’ll defend. These are fine sentiments, but Morrison fails to see that people in other countries also have character and values and a willing to defend them.

It does not make much sense walking down the street abusing people and punching them just because you do not like their values! Or to starve children in Yemen, just because you feel morally superior to Iran’s leaders!

So, how should Australian Chinese feel about their future and that of their children given the values and mind-sets of Morrison and Australia’s national security and defence officials?

In December 2016, I conducted a survey of Australians asking, amongst other things: What should be done with Chinese students (and other Chinese) in Australia in the event of a US-China hot war?

The answer is here:

Half-brains and US-China war
https://www.jeffschubert.com/index.php?id=125

While a China-US hot war remains a possibility, the more immediate situation is probably a technology war, which ultimately could be just as dangerous for many Australian Chinese!

(Footnote: the 1976 Final Report of US Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities said: “Too often, constitutional principles were subordinated to a pragmatic course of permitting desired ends to dictate and justify improper means.”)

Lateral Thinking · 10 April 1989

History, psychology, biography etc

Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence:

P18 Judging from the attitude of some historians, a putting together of psychology and history is, to say the least, bad form, while a putting together of psychology and military history is positively indecent.

Joachim Fest, Speer: The Final Verdict:

P2 Yet the tendency of professional historians to look down on biography as a genre continues, even though the lives of the protagonists would tie up many loose ends and provide a clearer picture of the process of progressive involvement and persuasion. This disregard for personal drama has robbed history of an entire dimension. This conflict cannot be resolved. Scholarship invariably tries to arrange a confusing flood of images into regular patterns. But the protagonists are made up of the very contradictions which the profession finds intolerable. For human beings are more inconsistent than scholars like to acknowledge.

Daniel Goleman, Working with Emotional Intelligence:

P222 Quoting a neurologist: I find myself fighting for the reviewers to understand that the collaboration is in itself a skill worth fighting for it’s essential to biomedical research. But academics from disciplines like math and history, where research is a solitary pursuit, don’t understand.

John Kay, Financial Times, 21 April 2009

“Max Planck, the physicist, said he had eschewed economics because it was too difficult. Planck, Keynes observed, could have mastered the corpus of mathematical economics in a few days it might now have taken him a few weeks. Keynes went on to explain that economic understanding required an amalgam of logic and intuition and a wide knowledge of facts, most of which are not precise: a requirement overwhelmingly difficult for those whose gift mainly consists in the power to imagine and pursue to their furthest points the implications and prior conditions of comparatively simple facts which are known with a high degree of precision. On this, as on much else, Keynes was right.”

Peter Loewenberg

“Too much history is still written as though men had no feelings, no childhood, and no bodily senses.”

James Packer a man or a God? · 22 October 2006

James Packer’s lieutenants, and other potential beneficiaries of his wealth and influence, paid public homage and reassured him of their loyalty in the Australian Financial Review on Saturday AND provided a reference for my forthcoming book with its theme of power and servility in the executive suite!

If John Alexander, Paul O’Sullivan, David Gyngell and Mark Bouris are to be believed, there are no limits to the talents of James Packer. Much the same was said about Josef Stalin, Benito Mussolini, Adolf Hitler, Kemal Ataturk, and Napoleon Bonaparte.

According to Alexander, James grasp of numbers is a sight to behold. He doesn’t forget them and has a capacity to crunch complicated figures instantaneously. And Bouris says that he has this quantitative ability second to none and can do complex calculations in his head quicker than most people can use a calculator. According to O’Sullivan, James has an inquiring mind represented by an amazing ability to grasp new technologies.

James is clearly wasted on the board of Qantas. We can only anticipate that he will soon be invited to join the board of NASA. With James as a director, NASA will presumably be able to engage in considerable cost-cutting; who needs expensive computers and analysts when you have the instant ability of James to handle the calculations for a flight to Mars.

But James contributions to science may not stop there. Give it a couple of years and we will almost certainly learn about James contributions in the field of genetics. Presumably evolution means that he is an improvement on his father, because Gyngell tells us that James is a bigger thinker than his father and history will show him to be an even better businessman than his father. Josef Stalin’s secretary, Alexander Poskrebyshev, wrote in an article in Pravda at the time Stalin’s seventieth birthday: Comrade Stalin, who has been involved for many years in the cultivation and study of citrus culture on the Black Sea coast, has shown himself to be a scientific innovator. No fruity genes for James he is himself genetic evolution and technology combined!

James will presumably help those who are less genetically super-charged and have to make do with what they have got, just like Mussolini. Dino Grandi, a lieutenant of Mussolini, wrote to him: To become ever more one of the new Italians whom you are hammering into shape; that is the aim of my life.

David Gyngell James best mate tells us that James is one of the most strategic, futuristic thinkers that I have ever come across. The highly qualified Gyngell is backed-up by Alexander, James has the best strategic brain I have ever seen in business. He has the capacity to see trends before they actually happen, whether it’s the arrival of the online revolution, the globalization of gambling or the long-term challenges to traditional media. Clearly Gyngell and Alexander feel the same as Giuseppe Bottai, who indicated to Mussolini his infinite faith in your thought and method.

In fact, James is clearly a genius, just as were Stalin and Ataturk. Lavrenti Beria wrote his own article for Pravda at the time of Stalin’s seventieth birthday, praising his utmost clarity of thought and his genius. Celal Bayer upon his appointment in 1932 as Minister of National Economy telegraphed Ataturk: I will work as your idealistic laborer on the radiant road opened by your great genius, which comprehends better than anyone the needs of the people and the country. Ataturk eventually appointed Celal Bayer his prime minister.

Come to think of it, James talents as a strategic futuristic thinker suggest that we should quickly get rid of Johnny (if James is not Jim, why should Johnny be John?) Howard and appoint James Prime Minister and for life! After all, Napoleon got appointed Consul for Life before progressing to Emperor.

Just imagine James in Canberra! Bouris says that he doesn’t mince his words, he goes straight to the issues. The Ministers the Costellos, the Turnbulls etc would be lining up to ape Lazar Kaganovich who himself admitted, that when I go to Stalin, I try not to forget a thing! I so worry every time. I prepare every document in my briefcase and I fill my pockets with cribs like a schoolboy because no one knows what Stalin’s going to ask. In turn, Stalin helped Kaganovich with his grammar, and in 1931 he expressed his gratitude: I’ve re-read your letter and realise that I haven’t carried out your directive to master punctuation marks. I’d started but haven’t quite managed it, but I can do it despite my burden of work. I’ll try to have full-stops and commas in future letters.

Of course, James may be very smart. But is he as smart as claimed? Consider the words of Albert Speer, Adolf Hitler’s friend (best mate), architect, and Armaments Minister, about power and presumably, money: There is a special trap for every holder of power, whether the director of a company, the head of a state, or the ruler of a dictatorship. His favor is so desirable to his subordinates that they will sue for it by every means possible. Servility becomes endemic among his entourage, who compete among themselves in their show of devotion. This in turn exercises a sway upon the ruler, who becomes corrupted in his turn. The key to the quality of the man in power is how he reacts to this situation.

Maybe James Packer will believe the words of Alexander, O’Sullivan, Gyngell and Bouris, but he would do well to and this will depend on his quality to remember a few simple quotes. According to Stalin’s daughter, Svetlana, Lavrenti Beria would say to Stalin: Oh yes, you are so right, absolutely true, how true. He was, she recalled, always emphasising that he was devoted to my father and it got through to Stalin that whatever he said, this man supported him. Lavrenti’s son, Sergo, wrote that he Lazar Kaganovich was a rather servile creature, not stupid, a good executive (Yes, a good executive!), always ready to anticipate Stalin’s wishes.

The results are not surprising. Referring to Mussolini, Italo Balbo, a long-time lieutenant said: If a man is told a hundred times a day that he is a genius, he will eventually believe in his own infallibility. The same might be said, if he reads too many AFR articles saying almost the same thing. The resulting cerebral congestion (in the words of Napoleon’s first secretary, Louis Bourreinne) can lead to fatal mistakes as an over-confident Napoleon (and later, Hitler) found out when they sought to take-over Russia.

Howard & Sinodinos: a mutual need for master and servant! · 7 May 2007

In two articles in the Weekend Sydney Morning Herald, journalist Peter Hartcher profiled Arthur Sinodinos who recently resigned as John Howard’s chief of staff —and related the Sinodinos view on why Howard has been able to remain Prime Minister of Australia for so long.

It seems clear that Howard and Sinodinos, who is described as Howard’s closest confidant and most important lieutenant, needed each other for their considerable success. Such relationships are very common. Milovan Djilas described how Josef Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov ideally complemented one another with Molotov’s relativism offsetting Stalin’s dogmatism. Mao and Zhou Enlai is another example of such a relationship, as is that of Adolf Hitler and Hermann Goering until the invasion of Russia.

Howard himself said that Sinodinos suited my temperament and we had remarkably similar views about policy; with Tony Abbott adding the perspective that the Sinodinos was calm, articulate, measured, thoughtful, which suggests a Molotov-type relativism.

In the Howard-Sinodinos relationship, Howard felt no sense of threat from the highly competent Sinodinos who could make me laugh. Falih Rifki Atay described the relationship between Kemal Ataturk and Ismet Inonu (who actually succeeded Ataturk): Aside from not feeling any personal competition towards Ataturk he was a hard-working, serious administration man. He was an intellectual who believed in Ataturk. Ditto, it would appear, Sinodinos.

Sinodinos, despite his talents, appears to have needed Howard as master to achieve the success that he has. Falih Rifki Atay wrote that Inonu had a definite need for Ataturk’s authority (in spite of topping his class at the Ottomans elite military school), while Djilas wrote that Molotov was essentially impotent without Stalin’s leadership.

But what of the reasons for Howard’s success? As already noted, Sinodinos himself was important in this. One of Paul Keating’s advisers noted that Howard got a good team and he kept it. Like Napoleon Bonaparte, Howard seems to have chosen reasonably well and then had an aversion to new faces.

According to Hartcher, there are six core lessons of success distilled from extended conversations with Sinodinos but above all is the fundamental disposition of the Prime Minister. “People say that Howard moved Australia to the right,” Sinodinos said. “But that’s a misunderstanding. The Howard Government succeeded because he expressed the innate conservatism of the Australian people.”

In fact, all societies are essentially conservative and longing for stability. Despite the wars that they eventually brought, it was this conservatism that delivered Hitler, Benito Mussolini and Napoleon votes in elections.

The first core lesson, according to Hartcher, is that Sinodinos says that Howard approaches every day as if it could be his last. “We always took the view that you always act as if you’re in opposition and your back’s to the wall – and you fight accordingly. From day one he never took being in power for granted.”

Successful dictators operate in the same cautious way. Albert Speer wrote: To the imagination of the outsider Hitler was a keen, quick, brutally governing dictator. It is difficult to believe that in reality he edged along hesitantly, almost fearfully. But that was the case.

The second core lesson? According to Sinodinos, it had been central to Howard’s success to “put some skin in the game”. Rather than avoid difficult and unpopular reforms, Howard tackles them head-on, and is always at his best when he has a cause to fight for. It always brought out the best in him – in terms of his fighting skills, his advocacy skills, it really brought out the passion in him. And when he’s out there on the hustings fighting for what he believes in, the public responds very well.”

This word passion is so important, and along with such words as focus, self-belief and will-power explains the success of even dictators. Djilas wrote of Stalin’s passionate and convincing approach to an issue; General Caulaincourt wrote that Napoleon put passion into everything which gave him an enormous advantage over his adversaries. The loyal-to-the end Joachim von Ribbentrop recalled the effect: Hitler made a considerable impression on me. His statements always had something final and definite about them, and appeared to come from his innermost self.

The third core lesson, according to Hartcher, is the intensity of Howard’s day-to-day preoccupation with “filling the vacuum”, dominating the media and the political airspace. “Because if you leave a vacuum it will be filled by others – keep the initiative”, says Sinodinos.

The essential strategy here is simple: be seen to be The Man hard at work for the benefit of the each member of the electorate ie the source of power! No-one else must be seen as capable of doing this; and the best way of achieving this is to stop then being seen at all. As his brother, Joseph, wrote, Napoleon want the need for his existence to be so direly felt, and as such a great boon, that anybody would recoil at any other possibility. If anybody could say that all was well with the country if Bonaparte dies, that things would still be well, then my brother would no longer feel safe.

The fourth core lesson is an emphasis on unity and discipline. Although people like Howard and successful dictators adopt a divide and rule approach, division is their prerogative and no-ones else’s. What is presented to the world is unity. For dissenters who want out, or are wanted out, there are various options including diplomatic postings and illness.

In 1943 Count Ciano, Italy’s Foreign Minister who was also Mussolini’s son-in-law was sacked but got the convenient local job of ambassador to the Holy See. As Dino Grandi explained: In order to liquidate Ciano and Buffarini (Minister of the Interior) all the Ministers were dismissed as a wrapping round the removal of the two elements he wanted to get rid of. Hitler was a fan of the sick leave option. Just before the end in 1945, Hitler forced Goering to resign all his powers and stripped him of his rights of succession. Goering was out on the pretense of a severe heart attack, the intent of which was, according to Speer, to preserve the German people’s faith in the internal unity of the top leadership.

The fifth core lesson is Howard’s care never to appear arrogant or complacent – “not to be seen to cock a snook at the electorate. They want you to earn their vote.”

This is potentially tricky PR, even for dictators. On the one hand, people want A Man to take care of issues and relieve them of having to think. Speer described himself as like millions of others in this regard in the early 1930s. On the other hand, people do not want to feel that they are being dictated too. This is where pretense comes into play. According Sergo Beria, Stalin was a born actor, and Mao’s doctor wrote that he was a marvellous actor. So as to not appear arrogant, Hitler, according to Speer, always attempted to persuade and often gave his orders as an opinion only. Even the brutal Stalin did not want to be seen to cock the snoot at those he depended upon for power. He never gave direct orders, wrote one of his lieutenants, so you had to make your own conclusions. He would just say: Do as you wish.

And finally, according to Hartcher and Sinodinos, Howard had developed a “sophisticated radar system” for sensing looming political problems. It included conventional mechanisms such as polling, but also a priority on seeking out people with gripes. “He hates cheer squads.”

All people in power, including all successful dictators, benefit from the axiom, If only the Tsar knew! Yet, there are limits, and successful dictators are always on the look-out for a potential political problems they know the danger of cheer squads! As First Consul, Napoleon told Joseph Fouche, his Minister of Police: I wish to be informed about everything in the greatest detail and to work with you personally at least once, even twice a day when necessary. Baron Fain, Napoleon’s third secretary, gave an additional example of Napoleon’s polling he regularly looked over the lists kept at the palace gates. Each morning the Grand Marshal made up a bulletin indicating the names of people from the outside who had presented themselves the previous day, and the names of the people inside whom they had asked for. This provided (Napoleon with) an idea of the habits and relationships that the principle inhabitants of the palace had with the people of the city.

History of anti-terrorist laws in dictatorships · 10 November 2005

The term terrorism derives from the French Revolution’s reign of terror in 1793-4. While the term now has wider meaning, it remains the case that, given the opportunity, those in power will resort to oppression and even reigns of terror and do so with the excuse of cracking down on terrorism.

In February 1933, Hermann Goering, in charge of police and looking to consolidate the Nazi’s power, said: I know two sorts of men: those who are with us and those who are against us. Referring to Communist terrorism communists were against because they were hostile to the State—he indicated that police officers who fire their revolvers in the execution of their duty will be protected by me. Days later, after the burning of the Reichstag, President Hindenburg signed the decree, For the Protection of People and State: to guard against Communist acts of violence endangering the state. Seeing the measure as temporary, Hitler’s non-Nazi colleagues in the parliamentary coalition that had delivered him the position of Chancellor, raised no objections. When asked by a journalist from the London Daily Express, whether the suspension of personal freedom was to be permanent, Hitler replied: No! When the Communist danger is eliminated things will get back to normal. Of course, they didnt!

In 1925, the Turkish Maintenance of Order Law was passed and Independence Tribunals set up. Ataturk said that the Law had given to all government officials the task of preventing an incident before it happens and was necessary to repress those who create confusion in the innocent mind of the nation.

The Tribunals, which did not require proof, but passed sentences on the basis of considered opinion, executed people who opposed Ataturk’s dictatorship. Others executed had opposed the Hat Law which made it a criminal offence to wear the traditional Fez. Ataturk later commented that the existence of the Maintenance of Order Law prevented the large-scale poisoning of the nation by certain reactionaries opposed to the Hat Law.

One of Ataturk’s political critics, Cavit was executed, even though one of Ataturk’s admirers later admitted that Cavit was not a revolutionary terrorist. He was patriotic and honest. His only defect was arrogance.

Following the attempt on his life in 1800, Napoleon said that the actions of the terrorists gives us an opportunity for the action we propose to take. It is our duty to profit from the present feeling of indignation. The French Council of State then offered no objection to a decree deporting without trial over one hundred men accused of no specific crime, but condemned for their past behavior and future threats. The Senate also supported the decree because the presence of such men of blood in the Republic is a continual cause of alarm and of hidden terror for peaceful citizens.

Stalin consolidated his power in the 1930’s with many people being accused under article 58 of the criminal code concerning terrorist acts aimed at representatives of the Soviet regime and/or under the so-called Kirov law on terrorist organizations and terrorist acts. For example, former Politburo members Bukarin and Rykov were accused of being involved with criminal terrorist and right terrorist groups and eventually executed. Ordinary workers were executed, without any evidence, for intention to commit terrorist sabotage.

A feature of laws against terrorism is that they are often introduced in haste, and under the cover of an event which may be terrorist but which is then hyped-up and distorted to create popular fear of the terrorists. Thus, much of the German, Soviet, French and Turkish populations supported the laws against terrorists in the belief that only evil-doers would be affected and that those accused must be guilty.

As a famous Soviet miner (who was used as a propaganda tool) wrote: When the (terrorist) trials took place we immediately demanded that they be shot. Even the women in our settlement, who had never been interested in politics, clenched their fists when they heard what the papers said. The old folk and the young all demanded that the bandits be destroyed.

It is not only the general populations which supported extreme anti-terrorist laws. Carl Schmitt, Germany’s leading professor of public law was vocal in supporting the justice of the Fuhrer and, echoing Goering’s with us or against us, argued that the government should decide who was friend or foe—with the latter being excluded from society.

The lesson of history is that governments often use the excuse of fighting terrorism to accumulate more power, but that power is in turn often used to terrorise much of the population or, at least, parts of it. But, by then it’s too late for regrets.

Goering’s Wisdom · 20 August 2004

April 18, 1946, in Goering’s cell with Dr. G.M. Gilbert (prison psychologist at the Nuremberg Trials)

Why, of course the people don’t want war, Goering shrugged. Why would some poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war when the best he can get out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece? Naturally, the common people don’t want war; neither in Russia, nor in England, nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But after all, it’s the leaders of the country who determine the policy, and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a parliament or a communist dictatorship. Voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to do the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same in any country.

Julia Gillard (Prime Minister of Australia): psychological profile · 3 April 2011

In an article in The Australian newspaper on 23 March, journalist Paul Kelly commented on the attitudes and values of Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard and on her apparent contradictions and back-flips on policy.

Kelly wrote: She warned Kevin Rudd (the former prime minister, whom she deposed) against pricing carbon and then seized this policy. She campaigned against a Big Australia (large population growth) and then dropped the rhetoric. She partly re-regulated the labor market and then paraded as a pro-market reformer.

Kelly concludes that: She appears too much as a work in progress. The reason is obvious – Gillard is a Prime Minister under construction. She is engaged in self-discovery, sorting out not just her policy framework but the convictions for which she will live or die. She is not fully formed as a political persona because she got the job too early.

Yet, there is possible a more basic and psychological explanation. On the face of it, Gillard seems to have many of the personal characteristics of someone who has a fear of failure rather than a need to achieve (in comparison, Tony Abbott, the Leader of the Opposition, has many of the characteristics of the latter category). The difference was extensively explored by Professor Norman Dixon in his book, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence.

Dixon, stressing that he was concerned with primary motivation, rather than secondary motivation, wrote:

The crucial difference between the two sorts of achievement the healthy and the pathological may be summarized by saying that whereas the first is buoyed by hopes of success, the second is driven by fear of failure. The former is associated with the possession of a strong ego and independent attitudes of mind, the latter with a weak ego and feelings of dependency. Whereas the former achieves out of a quest for excellence in his job, the latter achieves by any means available, not necessarily because of any devotion to the work, but because of the status, social approval and reduction of doubts about the self that such achievement brings. Although these two sorts of achievement motivation may bring about rapid, even spectacular, promotion, their nature and effects are very different. The first is healthy and mature, and brings to the fore those skills required by the job at hand; the second is pathological, immature, and developing of traits, such as dishonesty and expediency.

Dixon noted that a distinction that has been drawn between irrational authoritarianism (as dealt with in his book) and so-called rational authoritarianism. By the latter is meant the readiness to accept and obey the dictates of rational authority.” For so-called ‘rational authoritarianism’ Dixon prefered the phrase autocratic behaviour. “Whereas the autocrat exercises tight control when the situation demands it, the authoritarian is himself tightly controlled, no matter what the external situation.

As an example, Dixon wrote of Napoleon Bonaparte: The evidence suggests that though he was ambitious, ruthless, devious, unscrupulous, grandiose, despotic, Machiavellian, dictatorial and autocratic, he was not authoritarian. Napoleon’s peace of mind did not depend upon the authoritarian defence of structuring his social environment into in-groups and out-groups.

I have never met Gillard, and do not know a lot about her. But what I do know—from articles by Kelly and others suggests that Gillard has a lot in common with an irrational authoritarian, or simply (on Dixon’s preferred terminology) an authoritarian.

Let’s try to look at Gillard more closely.

PERSONALITY

One of Gillard’s cabinet ministers has been reported as saying: ‘’Gillard is at her best when she’s on the front foot. When she’s scared of making a mistake, she’s not good.’’

Dixon wrote that people vary in the degree to which they adjust the riskiness of their decisions to the realities of the external situation. Individuals who become anxious under conditions of stress, or are prone to be defensive and deny anything that threatens their self-esteem, tend to be bad at judging whether the risks they take, or the caution they display, are justified by the outcomes of their decisions. For example, they might well adopt the same degree of caution whether placing a small bet, getting married, or starting a nuclear war.

So, a question is: When is Gillard scared of making a mistake? Is it only on big issues, or also on small?

And Dixon continued: Nervousness, the need to respond because of the fear that one will lose either the desire or ability to respond, enhances the likelihood that a response will be triggered off by an insufficient stimulus, and thus make for instability. a proportion of people will make irrational decisions whose riskiness is unrelated to reality because, being neurotic, they will strive to maintain an image of themselves as either bold and daring or as careful and judicious decision-makers, and the urge to sustain their particular conceit will take precedence over the need to behave realistically.

Kelly wrote that after her elevation (to the position of prime minister) by the (Labor Party) caucus Gillard felt a legitimacy problem and dashed off to an election where, mid-campaign, she felt driven to reveal the real Julia.

Was the legitimacy problem a threat to Gillard’s self-esteem? Was the decision to dash off to an election unnecessary and triggered by an insufficient stimulus?

Gillard, contrary to her expectations, was able to remain prime minister only with the help of the Greens and independent members of parliament.

Was Gillard bad at judging whether the (election) risks she took were justified by the outcomes of her decision?

Kelly wrote that from this saga of near (election) disaster Gillard has taken a strategic decision – to operate as a strong policy leader. She has nothing to lose. Nothing to lose, perhaps, except the position of prime minister!

But, is there something of the real Julia in this strategic decision?

Dixon wrote that the authoritarian personality (tends) to be aggressive, superstitious, punitive, tough-minded. Gillard claims not to be religious, but we do not know if she is superstitious. However, Kelly wrote that she has tenacity and ambition.

Dixon wrote that the lifestyle of the authoritarian personality is one of finding and prosecution in others what he has come to fear in himself. attack, being the surest method of defence, would be incomplete, however, if the individual did not entertain a highly idealized view of himself. Because he has to deny his own shortcomings, he dare not look inwards. He is fearful of insight, and strenuously avoids questioning his own motives In the place of free-ranging, creative and inventive thought, an authoritarian’s thinking is confined to rigid formulae and inflexible attitudes. He is intolerant of unusual ideas and unable to cope with contradictions (with a) preference for order and simplicity. If he has a problem the best thing to do about it is not think about it and just keep busy. Similarly, the authoritarian personality is intolerant of ambivalence and ambiguity.

Gillard’s strong policy leader decision would fit nicely with someone who is intolerant of ambivalence and ambiguity. The real Julia?

And, as Kelly noted, Gillard has never written anything philosophical or, as far as I know free-ranging, creative and inventive.

Troy Bramston, a former speechwriter for Kevin Rudd, wrote that Gillard is at her best – developing personal relationships and communicating her warm personality, intelligence and integrity.

Dixon wrote of the the relationship between conformity, authoritarianism and the tendency to yield to group-pressures.

Is Gillard really preoccupied with being part of an in-group? Is this the reason she puts a lot of effort into developing personal relationships with members of such groups!

VALUES

Kelly wrote that in the past Gillard has denounced (former prime minister) Howard’s social views on many occasions (and) her origins on the political Left and her personal life choices led many to assume she was a dedicated social progressive. Yet Gillard backs welfare reform and personal responsibility.

Kelly wrote that as a childless atheist living in a de facto partnership Gillard is nevertheless a political conservative on many social issues. Her views, as she says, are tied to her past and identity. … her belief in personal responsibility, rejection of the option of state-sanctioned killing, support for biblical and cultural dimensions of the Western canon and the belief that social heritage should keep marriage to an institution between a man and a woman. She is an atheist who likes the Bible … happy to accept the brand of traditionalist. Explaining her family background in a pro-union, pro-Labor, conservative household, Ms Gillard said: We believed in politeness and thrift and fortitude and doing duty and discipline. These are things that were part of my upbringing. They’re part of who I am today.”

Dixon wrote that it seems that authoritarians are the product of parents with anxiety about their status in society. From earliest infancy the children of such people are pressed to seek the status after which their parents hanker. . the values inculcated by status-insecure parents are such that their children put personal success and the acquisition of power above all else. They are taught to judge people for their usefulness rather than their likeableness. They are taught to eschew weakness and passivity, to respect authority, and to despise those who have not made the socio-economic grade. Success is equated with social esteem and material advantage, rather than with more spiritual values. Then again, they are imbued by their parents with rigid view regarding sex and aggression.

So, is Gillard essentially a product of parents with anxiety? Are the apparent contradictions noted by Kelly really the result of Gillard’s attempts to position herself in whatever way will, at any given time, bring personal success and the acquisition of power?

AFGHANISTAN, the AUSTRALIAN / US alliance etc

Kelly wrote that despite her long and strong origins with the Victorian Left, Gillard has become a champion of Israel, the American alliance and the war in Afghanistan. Having declared no passion for foreign affairs she now works to leave her mark on foreign policy. Pledges to the US alliance, operates in lockstep with the Obama administration and speaks to the US congress with a more pro-US line than anything (former prime-minister) Howard said.

Dixon wrote that ignorance tends to evoke pontification in those who wish to conceal their lack of knowledge, or for whom ignorance of the facts means that they feel free to express strongly held beliefs of a contrary nature.

Are these the reasons that Gillard, despite her ignorance, is happy to voice such strong opinions?

Having found a new in-group, is Gillard displaying particularly aggressive, punitive and tough-minded attitudes to its out-groups?

ASYLUM SEEKERS

Gillard put forward an idea of a creating a processing center for asylum seekers (who are trying to get to Australia in small boats) in East Timor or some other place in the region only to have it very clearly rejected by East Timor and other countries. But, she continued to pursue the issue for an inordinate amount of time.

But why?

Dixon wrote about Rokeach’s The Open and Closed Mind which centered on an individual’s capacity to absorb fresh information. At one extreme are open minds, ready and willing to entertain new facts, even if these are incompatible with their previously held attitudes; at the other extreme are closed minds, which resolutely resist taking in anything that conflicts with their preconceptions and treasured beliefs. Not very surprisingly, the possession of a closed mind turned out to be yet another facet of the authoritarian personality.

Or, to look at it another way, Gillard seems to have cognitive dissonance on this issue. Dixon wrote: This uncomfortable mental state arises when a person possesses knowledge or beliefs which conflict with a decision he has made. Once the decision has been made and the person is committed to a given course of action, the psychological situation changes decisively. There is less emphasis on objectivity and there is more partiality and bias in the way in which a person views and evaluated the alternatives.

Dixon wrote that leaders with weak egos, with over-strong needs for approval and the closed minds will be the very ones least able to tolerate the nagging doubts of cognitive dissonance. In other words it will be the least rational who are the most likely to reduce dissonance by ignoring unpalatable intelligence. the less justified a decision, the greater will be the dissonance and therefore the more rigorous its resolution In short, an inability to admit one has been wrong will be the greater the more wrong one has been, and the more wrong has been the more bizarre will be subsequent attempts to justify the unjustifiable.

Are these the reasons that Gillard stuck with the regional processing center idea for so long?

CLIMATE CHANGE

Kelly wrote that after trying to dissuade her predecessor on the issue, Gillard now gives ringing speeches as a PM with a passion for carbon pricing and is hell-bent on it.

Dixon wrote about the relationship between pontification and cognitive dissonance. Pontification is one of the ways in which people try to resolve their dissonance. By loudly asserting what is consistent with some decision they have made and ignoring what is contrary they can reduce their dissonance.

They are, so to speak, driven from behind rather than pulled from the front. They have to achieve, not from the satisfaction which achievement brings but because only by doing so can they bolster up their constantly sagging self-regard. But herein lies their special dilemma. Though they need to achieve, it is the very act of trying which exposes them to what they fear most failure. Thus the person who fears failure prefers tasks which are very easy or very difficult. If they are easy, he is unlikely to fail; if very difficult then the disgrace attaching will be small, for no one really expected him to win.

Does carbon pricing fit-in here as a task that is very difficult for Gillard?

PERSONAL LIFE

After a series of relationships with influential people, Gillard has now settled on a hairdresser who has given no sign of any intellectual ability.

Dixon wrote that authoritarian personalities are taught (by their parents) to judge people for their usefulness rather than their likeableness. Their friends, and even their future marriage partners, are selected and used in the service of personal advancement; love and affection take second place to knowing the right people.

While this may play out in various ways, this sort of usefulness may conflict with another need noted by Dixon the tendency to be preoccupied with dominance-submission in their personal relationships.

Is his is where the hairdresser ultimately came to fit into the psychological picture after Gillard had a series of useful relationships?

OTHER ISSUES

Dixon wrote that authoritarians fear of failure predisposes toward secretiveness.

Kelly wrote that the electorate saw Gillard as loyal to Kevin Rudd until the evening she knifed him and that she ascended under the worst circumstances, as a willing recruit to a leadership assassination.

Gillard was inordinately angry about the public release of US diplomatic cables by Julian Assange and the Wikileaks organization. But was this because of her view of the US (and its alliance with Australia), or does Gillard have a predisposed toward secretiveness?

Having found a new in-group, is Gillard displaying particularly aggressive, punitive and tough-minded attitudes to one of its out-groups?

Dixon wrote that is a common observation that those over-concerned about their image devote considerable attention, energy and time to a continuous self-assessment against some external standard, usually another person. He continued: There are really two components to this process. The first concerns the way an individual sees himself in comparison with his competitors, the second the way in which he thinks others will see him in comparison with his contemporaries. In either case, he may try to elevate his own self-estimation by choosing a low standard with which to make comparison. Hence the phenomenon of people who tend to shun the company of individuals more gifted and even to choose workmates or select as subordinates people whom they consider inferior to themselves.

Does this account for the reportedly low-quality of the staff in the Prime Minister Gillard’s office?

CONCLUSION

Dixon was concerned with the competences of military leaders, but his observations have wider currency.

Dixon also made it clear that the apparent intellectual failings of some military commanders are due not to lack of intelligence but to their feelings. Cognitive dissonance, pontification, denial, risk-taking, and anti-intellectualism are all, in reality, more concerned with emotion than intelligence.

Bramston wrote that Gillard has a warm personality.

But it depends on whom it is aimed, and is not necessarily inconsistent with the authoritarian personality described by Dixon. He wrote: It has been suggested that those most susceptible to group think will tend to be people fearful of disapproval and rejection. Such people give priority to preserving friendly relationships at the expense of achieving success in the group’s work tasks.

Dixon added: Conversely, the sort of person who, as we have seen, makes the best military commander the outspoken individualist clearly cannot give his best in the group situation. If he fails to hold his tongue, he runs the risk of being ejected by his colleagues.

Thus, he concluded: Notwithstanding exceptions and at risk of over-simplifying what are really very complex issues, there are grounds for believing that high achievement-motivation characterizes highly successful (military) commanders.

And: �There are grounds for believing that incompetent military commanders tend to be those in whom the need to avoid failure exceeds the urge to succeed.

Dixon wrote that a number of consequences follow from these differences in achievement motivation. The first is that while both the drive towards self-betterment and the drive towards professional excellence may take a man to the top, only the latter guarantees that he is fitted for the job of high command, for only in the latter case can we be sure that he has the requisite expertise. (He must have it then, because this was his only qualification for promotion.) Conversely, the man who reaches a position of great power as outcome of his drive to achieve greater self-esteem may not necessarily have any outstanding military ability, for his ascent did not depend upon professional excellence. More serious is the fact that even if he has the requisite military skills these may be rendered quite nugatory by those other traits that are part and parcel of his underlying personality-structure: moral cowardice, indecisiveness, secretiveness and sensitivity to criticism.

Is this Julia Gillard?