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Lateral Thinking · 10 April 1989

History, psychology, biography etc

Norman Dixon, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence:

P18 Judging from the attitude of some historians, a putting together of psychology and history is, to say the least, bad form, while a putting together of psychology and military history is positively indecent.

Joachim Fest, Speer: The Final Verdict:

P2 Yet the tendency of professional historians to look down on biography as a genre continues, even though the lives of the protagonists would tie up many loose ends and provide a clearer picture of the process of progressive involvement and persuasion. This disregard for personal drama has robbed history of an entire dimension. This conflict cannot be resolved. Scholarship invariably tries to arrange a confusing flood of images into regular patterns. But the protagonists are made up of the very contradictions which the profession finds intolerable. For human beings are more inconsistent than scholars like to acknowledge.

Daniel Goleman, Working with Emotional Intelligence:

P222 Quoting a neurologist: I find myself fighting for the reviewers to understand that the collaboration is in itself a skill worth fighting for it’s essential to biomedical research. But academics from disciplines like math and history, where research is a solitary pursuit, don’t understand.

John Kay, Financial Times, 21 April 2009

“Max Planck, the physicist, said he had eschewed economics because it was too difficult. Planck, Keynes observed, could have mastered the corpus of mathematical economics in a few days it might now have taken him a few weeks. Keynes went on to explain that economic understanding required an amalgam of logic and intuition and a wide knowledge of facts, most of which are not precise: a requirement overwhelmingly difficult for those whose gift mainly consists in the power to imagine and pursue to their furthest points the implications and prior conditions of comparatively simple facts which are known with a high degree of precision. On this, as on much else, Keynes was right.”

Peter Loewenberg

“Too much history is still written as though men had no feelings, no childhood, and no bodily senses.”

James Packer a man or a God? · 22 October 2006

James Packer’s lieutenants, and other potential beneficiaries of his wealth and influence, paid public homage and reassured him of their loyalty in the Australian Financial Review on Saturday AND provided a reference for my forthcoming book with its theme of power and servility in the executive suite!

If John Alexander, Paul O’Sullivan, David Gyngell and Mark Bouris are to be believed, there are no limits to the talents of James Packer. Much the same was said about Josef Stalin, Benito Mussolini, Adolf Hitler, Kemal Ataturk, and Napoleon Bonaparte.

According to Alexander, James grasp of numbers is a sight to behold. He doesn’t forget them and has a capacity to crunch complicated figures instantaneously. And Bouris says that he has this quantitative ability second to none and can do complex calculations in his head quicker than most people can use a calculator. According to O’Sullivan, James has an inquiring mind represented by an amazing ability to grasp new technologies.

James is clearly wasted on the board of Qantas. We can only anticipate that he will soon be invited to join the board of NASA. With James as a director, NASA will presumably be able to engage in considerable cost-cutting; who needs expensive computers and analysts when you have the instant ability of James to handle the calculations for a flight to Mars.

But James contributions to science may not stop there. Give it a couple of years and we will almost certainly learn about James contributions in the field of genetics. Presumably evolution means that he is an improvement on his father, because Gyngell tells us that James is a bigger thinker than his father and history will show him to be an even better businessman than his father. Josef Stalin’s secretary, Alexander Poskrebyshev, wrote in an article in Pravda at the time Stalin’s seventieth birthday: Comrade Stalin, who has been involved for many years in the cultivation and study of citrus culture on the Black Sea coast, has shown himself to be a scientific innovator. No fruity genes for James he is himself genetic evolution and technology combined!

James will presumably help those who are less genetically super-charged and have to make do with what they have got, just like Mussolini. Dino Grandi, a lieutenant of Mussolini, wrote to him: To become ever more one of the new Italians whom you are hammering into shape; that is the aim of my life.

David Gyngell James best mate tells us that James is one of the most strategic, futuristic thinkers that I have ever come across. The highly qualified Gyngell is backed-up by Alexander, James has the best strategic brain I have ever seen in business. He has the capacity to see trends before they actually happen, whether it’s the arrival of the online revolution, the globalization of gambling or the long-term challenges to traditional media. Clearly Gyngell and Alexander feel the same as Giuseppe Bottai, who indicated to Mussolini his infinite faith in your thought and method.

In fact, James is clearly a genius, just as were Stalin and Ataturk. Lavrenti Beria wrote his own article for Pravda at the time of Stalin’s seventieth birthday, praising his utmost clarity of thought and his genius. Celal Bayer upon his appointment in 1932 as Minister of National Economy telegraphed Ataturk: I will work as your idealistic laborer on the radiant road opened by your great genius, which comprehends better than anyone the needs of the people and the country. Ataturk eventually appointed Celal Bayer his prime minister.

Come to think of it, James talents as a strategic futuristic thinker suggest that we should quickly get rid of Johnny (if James is not Jim, why should Johnny be John?) Howard and appoint James Prime Minister and for life! After all, Napoleon got appointed Consul for Life before progressing to Emperor.

Just imagine James in Canberra! Bouris says that he doesn’t mince his words, he goes straight to the issues. The Ministers the Costellos, the Turnbulls etc would be lining up to ape Lazar Kaganovich who himself admitted, that when I go to Stalin, I try not to forget a thing! I so worry every time. I prepare every document in my briefcase and I fill my pockets with cribs like a schoolboy because no one knows what Stalin’s going to ask. In turn, Stalin helped Kaganovich with his grammar, and in 1931 he expressed his gratitude: I’ve re-read your letter and realise that I haven’t carried out your directive to master punctuation marks. I’d started but haven’t quite managed it, but I can do it despite my burden of work. I’ll try to have full-stops and commas in future letters.

Of course, James may be very smart. But is he as smart as claimed? Consider the words of Albert Speer, Adolf Hitler’s friend (best mate), architect, and Armaments Minister, about power and presumably, money: There is a special trap for every holder of power, whether the director of a company, the head of a state, or the ruler of a dictatorship. His favor is so desirable to his subordinates that they will sue for it by every means possible. Servility becomes endemic among his entourage, who compete among themselves in their show of devotion. This in turn exercises a sway upon the ruler, who becomes corrupted in his turn. The key to the quality of the man in power is how he reacts to this situation.

Maybe James Packer will believe the words of Alexander, O’Sullivan, Gyngell and Bouris, but he would do well to and this will depend on his quality to remember a few simple quotes. According to Stalin’s daughter, Svetlana, Lavrenti Beria would say to Stalin: Oh yes, you are so right, absolutely true, how true. He was, she recalled, always emphasising that he was devoted to my father and it got through to Stalin that whatever he said, this man supported him. Lavrenti’s son, Sergo, wrote that he Lazar Kaganovich was a rather servile creature, not stupid, a good executive (Yes, a good executive!), always ready to anticipate Stalin’s wishes.

The results are not surprising. Referring to Mussolini, Italo Balbo, a long-time lieutenant said: If a man is told a hundred times a day that he is a genius, he will eventually believe in his own infallibility. The same might be said, if he reads too many AFR articles saying almost the same thing. The resulting cerebral congestion (in the words of Napoleon’s first secretary, Louis Bourreinne) can lead to fatal mistakes as an over-confident Napoleon (and later, Hitler) found out when they sought to take-over Russia.

Howard & Sinodinos: a mutual need for master and servant! · 7 May 2007

In two articles in the Weekend Sydney Morning Herald, journalist Peter Hartcher profiled Arthur Sinodinos who recently resigned as John Howard’s chief of staff —and related the Sinodinos view on why Howard has been able to remain Prime Minister of Australia for so long.

It seems clear that Howard and Sinodinos, who is described as Howard’s closest confidant and most important lieutenant, needed each other for their considerable success. Such relationships are very common. Milovan Djilas described how Josef Stalin and Vyacheslav Molotov ideally complemented one another with Molotov’s relativism offsetting Stalin’s dogmatism. Mao and Zhou Enlai is another example of such a relationship, as is that of Adolf Hitler and Hermann Goering until the invasion of Russia.

Howard himself said that Sinodinos suited my temperament and we had remarkably similar views about policy; with Tony Abbott adding the perspective that the Sinodinos was calm, articulate, measured, thoughtful, which suggests a Molotov-type relativism.

In the Howard-Sinodinos relationship, Howard felt no sense of threat from the highly competent Sinodinos who could make me laugh. Falih Rifki Atay described the relationship between Kemal Ataturk and Ismet Inonu (who actually succeeded Ataturk): Aside from not feeling any personal competition towards Ataturk he was a hard-working, serious administration man. He was an intellectual who believed in Ataturk. Ditto, it would appear, Sinodinos.

Sinodinos, despite his talents, appears to have needed Howard as master to achieve the success that he has. Falih Rifki Atay wrote that Inonu had a definite need for Ataturk’s authority (in spite of topping his class at the Ottomans elite military school), while Djilas wrote that Molotov was essentially impotent without Stalin’s leadership.

But what of the reasons for Howard’s success? As already noted, Sinodinos himself was important in this. One of Paul Keating’s advisers noted that Howard got a good team and he kept it. Like Napoleon Bonaparte, Howard seems to have chosen reasonably well and then had an aversion to new faces.

According to Hartcher, there are six core lessons of success distilled from extended conversations with Sinodinos but above all is the fundamental disposition of the Prime Minister. “People say that Howard moved Australia to the right,” Sinodinos said. “But that’s a misunderstanding. The Howard Government succeeded because he expressed the innate conservatism of the Australian people.”

In fact, all societies are essentially conservative and longing for stability. Despite the wars that they eventually brought, it was this conservatism that delivered Hitler, Benito Mussolini and Napoleon votes in elections.

The first core lesson, according to Hartcher, is that Sinodinos says that Howard approaches every day as if it could be his last. “We always took the view that you always act as if you’re in opposition and your back’s to the wall – and you fight accordingly. From day one he never took being in power for granted.”

Successful dictators operate in the same cautious way. Albert Speer wrote: To the imagination of the outsider Hitler was a keen, quick, brutally governing dictator. It is difficult to believe that in reality he edged along hesitantly, almost fearfully. But that was the case.

The second core lesson? According to Sinodinos, it had been central to Howard’s success to “put some skin in the game”. Rather than avoid difficult and unpopular reforms, Howard tackles them head-on, and is always at his best when he has a cause to fight for. It always brought out the best in him – in terms of his fighting skills, his advocacy skills, it really brought out the passion in him. And when he’s out there on the hustings fighting for what he believes in, the public responds very well.”

This word passion is so important, and along with such words as focus, self-belief and will-power explains the success of even dictators. Djilas wrote of Stalin’s passionate and convincing approach to an issue; General Caulaincourt wrote that Napoleon put passion into everything which gave him an enormous advantage over his adversaries. The loyal-to-the end Joachim von Ribbentrop recalled the effect: Hitler made a considerable impression on me. His statements always had something final and definite about them, and appeared to come from his innermost self.

The third core lesson, according to Hartcher, is the intensity of Howard’s day-to-day preoccupation with “filling the vacuum”, dominating the media and the political airspace. “Because if you leave a vacuum it will be filled by others – keep the initiative”, says Sinodinos.

The essential strategy here is simple: be seen to be The Man hard at work for the benefit of the each member of the electorate ie the source of power! No-one else must be seen as capable of doing this; and the best way of achieving this is to stop then being seen at all. As his brother, Joseph, wrote, Napoleon want the need for his existence to be so direly felt, and as such a great boon, that anybody would recoil at any other possibility. If anybody could say that all was well with the country if Bonaparte dies, that things would still be well, then my brother would no longer feel safe.

The fourth core lesson is an emphasis on unity and discipline. Although people like Howard and successful dictators adopt a divide and rule approach, division is their prerogative and no-ones else’s. What is presented to the world is unity. For dissenters who want out, or are wanted out, there are various options including diplomatic postings and illness.

In 1943 Count Ciano, Italy’s Foreign Minister who was also Mussolini’s son-in-law was sacked but got the convenient local job of ambassador to the Holy See. As Dino Grandi explained: In order to liquidate Ciano and Buffarini (Minister of the Interior) all the Ministers were dismissed as a wrapping round the removal of the two elements he wanted to get rid of. Hitler was a fan of the sick leave option. Just before the end in 1945, Hitler forced Goering to resign all his powers and stripped him of his rights of succession. Goering was out on the pretense of a severe heart attack, the intent of which was, according to Speer, to preserve the German people’s faith in the internal unity of the top leadership.

The fifth core lesson is Howard’s care never to appear arrogant or complacent – “not to be seen to cock a snook at the electorate. They want you to earn their vote.”

This is potentially tricky PR, even for dictators. On the one hand, people want A Man to take care of issues and relieve them of having to think. Speer described himself as like millions of others in this regard in the early 1930s. On the other hand, people do not want to feel that they are being dictated too. This is where pretense comes into play. According Sergo Beria, Stalin was a born actor, and Mao’s doctor wrote that he was a marvellous actor. So as to not appear arrogant, Hitler, according to Speer, always attempted to persuade and often gave his orders as an opinion only. Even the brutal Stalin did not want to be seen to cock the snoot at those he depended upon for power. He never gave direct orders, wrote one of his lieutenants, so you had to make your own conclusions. He would just say: Do as you wish.

And finally, according to Hartcher and Sinodinos, Howard had developed a “sophisticated radar system” for sensing looming political problems. It included conventional mechanisms such as polling, but also a priority on seeking out people with gripes. “He hates cheer squads.”

All people in power, including all successful dictators, benefit from the axiom, If only the Tsar knew! Yet, there are limits, and successful dictators are always on the look-out for a potential political problems they know the danger of cheer squads! As First Consul, Napoleon told Joseph Fouche, his Minister of Police: I wish to be informed about everything in the greatest detail and to work with you personally at least once, even twice a day when necessary. Baron Fain, Napoleon’s third secretary, gave an additional example of Napoleon’s polling he regularly looked over the lists kept at the palace gates. Each morning the Grand Marshal made up a bulletin indicating the names of people from the outside who had presented themselves the previous day, and the names of the people inside whom they had asked for. This provided (Napoleon with) an idea of the habits and relationships that the principle inhabitants of the palace had with the people of the city.

History of anti-terrorist laws in dictatorships · 10 November 2005

The term terrorism derives from the French Revolution’s reign of terror in 1793-4. While the term now has wider meaning, it remains the case that, given the opportunity, those in power will resort to oppression and even reigns of terror and do so with the excuse of cracking down on terrorism.

In February 1933, Hermann Goering, in charge of police and looking to consolidate the Nazi’s power, said: I know two sorts of men: those who are with us and those who are against us. Referring to Communist terrorism communists were against because they were hostile to the State—he indicated that police officers who fire their revolvers in the execution of their duty will be protected by me. Days later, after the burning of the Reichstag, President Hindenburg signed the decree, For the Protection of People and State: to guard against Communist acts of violence endangering the state. Seeing the measure as temporary, Hitler’s non-Nazi colleagues in the parliamentary coalition that had delivered him the position of Chancellor, raised no objections. When asked by a journalist from the London Daily Express, whether the suspension of personal freedom was to be permanent, Hitler replied: No! When the Communist danger is eliminated things will get back to normal. Of course, they didnt!

In 1925, the Turkish Maintenance of Order Law was passed and Independence Tribunals set up. Ataturk said that the Law had given to all government officials the task of preventing an incident before it happens and was necessary to repress those who create confusion in the innocent mind of the nation.

The Tribunals, which did not require proof, but passed sentences on the basis of considered opinion, executed people who opposed Ataturk’s dictatorship. Others executed had opposed the Hat Law which made it a criminal offence to wear the traditional Fez. Ataturk later commented that the existence of the Maintenance of Order Law prevented the large-scale poisoning of the nation by certain reactionaries opposed to the Hat Law.

One of Ataturk’s political critics, Cavit was executed, even though one of Ataturk’s admirers later admitted that Cavit was not a revolutionary terrorist. He was patriotic and honest. His only defect was arrogance.

Following the attempt on his life in 1800, Napoleon said that the actions of the terrorists gives us an opportunity for the action we propose to take. It is our duty to profit from the present feeling of indignation. The French Council of State then offered no objection to a decree deporting without trial over one hundred men accused of no specific crime, but condemned for their past behavior and future threats. The Senate also supported the decree because the presence of such men of blood in the Republic is a continual cause of alarm and of hidden terror for peaceful citizens.

Stalin consolidated his power in the 1930’s with many people being accused under article 58 of the criminal code concerning terrorist acts aimed at representatives of the Soviet regime and/or under the so-called Kirov law on terrorist organizations and terrorist acts. For example, former Politburo members Bukarin and Rykov were accused of being involved with criminal terrorist and right terrorist groups and eventually executed. Ordinary workers were executed, without any evidence, for intention to commit terrorist sabotage.

A feature of laws against terrorism is that they are often introduced in haste, and under the cover of an event which may be terrorist but which is then hyped-up and distorted to create popular fear of the terrorists. Thus, much of the German, Soviet, French and Turkish populations supported the laws against terrorists in the belief that only evil-doers would be affected and that those accused must be guilty.

As a famous Soviet miner (who was used as a propaganda tool) wrote: When the (terrorist) trials took place we immediately demanded that they be shot. Even the women in our settlement, who had never been interested in politics, clenched their fists when they heard what the papers said. The old folk and the young all demanded that the bandits be destroyed.

It is not only the general populations which supported extreme anti-terrorist laws. Carl Schmitt, Germany’s leading professor of public law was vocal in supporting the justice of the Fuhrer and, echoing Goering’s with us or against us, argued that the government should decide who was friend or foe—with the latter being excluded from society.

The lesson of history is that governments often use the excuse of fighting terrorism to accumulate more power, but that power is in turn often used to terrorise much of the population or, at least, parts of it. But, by then it’s too late for regrets.

Goering’s Wisdom · 20 August 2004

April 18, 1946, in Goering’s cell with Dr. G.M. Gilbert (prison psychologist at the Nuremberg Trials)

Why, of course the people don’t want war, Goering shrugged. Why would some poor slob on a farm want to risk his life in a war when the best he can get out of it is to come back to his farm in one piece? Naturally, the common people don’t want war; neither in Russia, nor in England, nor in America, nor for that matter in Germany. That is understood. But after all, it’s the leaders of the country who determine the policy, and it is always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether it is a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a parliament or a communist dictatorship. Voice or no voice, the people can always be brought to do the bidding of the leaders. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to danger. It works the same in any country.

Julia Gillard (Prime Minister of Australia): psychological profile · 3 April 2011

In an article in The Australian newspaper on 23 March, journalist Paul Kelly commented on the attitudes and values of Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard and on her apparent contradictions and back-flips on policy.

Kelly wrote: She warned Kevin Rudd (the former prime minister, whom she deposed) against pricing carbon and then seized this policy. She campaigned against a Big Australia (large population growth) and then dropped the rhetoric. She partly re-regulated the labor market and then paraded as a pro-market reformer.

Kelly concludes that: She appears too much as a work in progress. The reason is obvious – Gillard is a Prime Minister under construction. She is engaged in self-discovery, sorting out not just her policy framework but the convictions for which she will live or die. She is not fully formed as a political persona because she got the job too early.

Yet, there is possible a more basic and psychological explanation. On the face of it, Gillard seems to have many of the personal characteristics of someone who has a fear of failure rather than a need to achieve (in comparison, Tony Abbott, the Leader of the Opposition, has many of the characteristics of the latter category). The difference was extensively explored by Professor Norman Dixon in his book, On the Psychology of Military Incompetence.

Dixon, stressing that he was concerned with primary motivation, rather than secondary motivation, wrote:

The crucial difference between the two sorts of achievement the healthy and the pathological may be summarized by saying that whereas the first is buoyed by hopes of success, the second is driven by fear of failure. The former is associated with the possession of a strong ego and independent attitudes of mind, the latter with a weak ego and feelings of dependency. Whereas the former achieves out of a quest for excellence in his job, the latter achieves by any means available, not necessarily because of any devotion to the work, but because of the status, social approval and reduction of doubts about the self that such achievement brings. Although these two sorts of achievement motivation may bring about rapid, even spectacular, promotion, their nature and effects are very different. The first is healthy and mature, and brings to the fore those skills required by the job at hand; the second is pathological, immature, and developing of traits, such as dishonesty and expediency.

Dixon noted that a distinction that has been drawn between irrational authoritarianism (as dealt with in his book) and so-called rational authoritarianism. By the latter is meant the readiness to accept and obey the dictates of rational authority.” For so-called ‘rational authoritarianism’ Dixon prefered the phrase autocratic behaviour. “Whereas the autocrat exercises tight control when the situation demands it, the authoritarian is himself tightly controlled, no matter what the external situation.

As an example, Dixon wrote of Napoleon Bonaparte: The evidence suggests that though he was ambitious, ruthless, devious, unscrupulous, grandiose, despotic, Machiavellian, dictatorial and autocratic, he was not authoritarian. Napoleon’s peace of mind did not depend upon the authoritarian defence of structuring his social environment into in-groups and out-groups.

I have never met Gillard, and do not know a lot about her. But what I do know—from articles by Kelly and others suggests that Gillard has a lot in common with an irrational authoritarian, or simply (on Dixon’s preferred terminology) an authoritarian.

Let’s try to look at Gillard more closely.

PERSONALITY

One of Gillard’s cabinet ministers has been reported as saying: ‘’Gillard is at her best when she’s on the front foot. When she’s scared of making a mistake, she’s not good.’’

Dixon wrote that people vary in the degree to which they adjust the riskiness of their decisions to the realities of the external situation. Individuals who become anxious under conditions of stress, or are prone to be defensive and deny anything that threatens their self-esteem, tend to be bad at judging whether the risks they take, or the caution they display, are justified by the outcomes of their decisions. For example, they might well adopt the same degree of caution whether placing a small bet, getting married, or starting a nuclear war.

So, a question is: When is Gillard scared of making a mistake? Is it only on big issues, or also on small?

And Dixon continued: Nervousness, the need to respond because of the fear that one will lose either the desire or ability to respond, enhances the likelihood that a response will be triggered off by an insufficient stimulus, and thus make for instability. a proportion of people will make irrational decisions whose riskiness is unrelated to reality because, being neurotic, they will strive to maintain an image of themselves as either bold and daring or as careful and judicious decision-makers, and the urge to sustain their particular conceit will take precedence over the need to behave realistically.

Kelly wrote that after her elevation (to the position of prime minister) by the (Labor Party) caucus Gillard felt a legitimacy problem and dashed off to an election where, mid-campaign, she felt driven to reveal the real Julia.

Was the legitimacy problem a threat to Gillard’s self-esteem? Was the decision to dash off to an election unnecessary and triggered by an insufficient stimulus?

Gillard, contrary to her expectations, was able to remain prime minister only with the help of the Greens and independent members of parliament.

Was Gillard bad at judging whether the (election) risks she took were justified by the outcomes of her decision?

Kelly wrote that from this saga of near (election) disaster Gillard has taken a strategic decision – to operate as a strong policy leader. She has nothing to lose. Nothing to lose, perhaps, except the position of prime minister!

But, is there something of the real Julia in this strategic decision?

Dixon wrote that the authoritarian personality (tends) to be aggressive, superstitious, punitive, tough-minded. Gillard claims not to be religious, but we do not know if she is superstitious. However, Kelly wrote that she has tenacity and ambition.

Dixon wrote that the lifestyle of the authoritarian personality is one of finding and prosecution in others what he has come to fear in himself. attack, being the surest method of defence, would be incomplete, however, if the individual did not entertain a highly idealized view of himself. Because he has to deny his own shortcomings, he dare not look inwards. He is fearful of insight, and strenuously avoids questioning his own motives In the place of free-ranging, creative and inventive thought, an authoritarian’s thinking is confined to rigid formulae and inflexible attitudes. He is intolerant of unusual ideas and unable to cope with contradictions (with a) preference for order and simplicity. If he has a problem the best thing to do about it is not think about it and just keep busy. Similarly, the authoritarian personality is intolerant of ambivalence and ambiguity.

Gillard’s strong policy leader decision would fit nicely with someone who is intolerant of ambivalence and ambiguity. The real Julia?

And, as Kelly noted, Gillard has never written anything philosophical or, as far as I know free-ranging, creative and inventive.

Troy Bramston, a former speechwriter for Kevin Rudd, wrote that Gillard is at her best – developing personal relationships and communicating her warm personality, intelligence and integrity.

Dixon wrote of the the relationship between conformity, authoritarianism and the tendency to yield to group-pressures.

Is Gillard really preoccupied with being part of an in-group? Is this the reason she puts a lot of effort into developing personal relationships with members of such groups!

VALUES

Kelly wrote that in the past Gillard has denounced (former prime minister) Howard’s social views on many occasions (and) her origins on the political Left and her personal life choices led many to assume she was a dedicated social progressive. Yet Gillard backs welfare reform and personal responsibility.

Kelly wrote that as a childless atheist living in a de facto partnership Gillard is nevertheless a political conservative on many social issues. Her views, as she says, are tied to her past and identity. … her belief in personal responsibility, rejection of the option of state-sanctioned killing, support for biblical and cultural dimensions of the Western canon and the belief that social heritage should keep marriage to an institution between a man and a woman. She is an atheist who likes the Bible … happy to accept the brand of traditionalist. Explaining her family background in a pro-union, pro-Labor, conservative household, Ms Gillard said: We believed in politeness and thrift and fortitude and doing duty and discipline. These are things that were part of my upbringing. They’re part of who I am today.”

Dixon wrote that it seems that authoritarians are the product of parents with anxiety about their status in society. From earliest infancy the children of such people are pressed to seek the status after which their parents hanker. . the values inculcated by status-insecure parents are such that their children put personal success and the acquisition of power above all else. They are taught to judge people for their usefulness rather than their likeableness. They are taught to eschew weakness and passivity, to respect authority, and to despise those who have not made the socio-economic grade. Success is equated with social esteem and material advantage, rather than with more spiritual values. Then again, they are imbued by their parents with rigid view regarding sex and aggression.

So, is Gillard essentially a product of parents with anxiety? Are the apparent contradictions noted by Kelly really the result of Gillard’s attempts to position herself in whatever way will, at any given time, bring personal success and the acquisition of power?

AFGHANISTAN, the AUSTRALIAN / US alliance etc

Kelly wrote that despite her long and strong origins with the Victorian Left, Gillard has become a champion of Israel, the American alliance and the war in Afghanistan. Having declared no passion for foreign affairs she now works to leave her mark on foreign policy. Pledges to the US alliance, operates in lockstep with the Obama administration and speaks to the US congress with a more pro-US line than anything (former prime-minister) Howard said.

Dixon wrote that ignorance tends to evoke pontification in those who wish to conceal their lack of knowledge, or for whom ignorance of the facts means that they feel free to express strongly held beliefs of a contrary nature.

Are these the reasons that Gillard, despite her ignorance, is happy to voice such strong opinions?

Having found a new in-group, is Gillard displaying particularly aggressive, punitive and tough-minded attitudes to its out-groups?

ASYLUM SEEKERS

Gillard put forward an idea of a creating a processing center for asylum seekers (who are trying to get to Australia in small boats) in East Timor or some other place in the region only to have it very clearly rejected by East Timor and other countries. But, she continued to pursue the issue for an inordinate amount of time.

But why?

Dixon wrote about Rokeach’s The Open and Closed Mind which centered on an individual’s capacity to absorb fresh information. At one extreme are open minds, ready and willing to entertain new facts, even if these are incompatible with their previously held attitudes; at the other extreme are closed minds, which resolutely resist taking in anything that conflicts with their preconceptions and treasured beliefs. Not very surprisingly, the possession of a closed mind turned out to be yet another facet of the authoritarian personality.

Or, to look at it another way, Gillard seems to have cognitive dissonance on this issue. Dixon wrote: This uncomfortable mental state arises when a person possesses knowledge or beliefs which conflict with a decision he has made. Once the decision has been made and the person is committed to a given course of action, the psychological situation changes decisively. There is less emphasis on objectivity and there is more partiality and bias in the way in which a person views and evaluated the alternatives.

Dixon wrote that leaders with weak egos, with over-strong needs for approval and the closed minds will be the very ones least able to tolerate the nagging doubts of cognitive dissonance. In other words it will be the least rational who are the most likely to reduce dissonance by ignoring unpalatable intelligence. the less justified a decision, the greater will be the dissonance and therefore the more rigorous its resolution In short, an inability to admit one has been wrong will be the greater the more wrong one has been, and the more wrong has been the more bizarre will be subsequent attempts to justify the unjustifiable.

Are these the reasons that Gillard stuck with the regional processing center idea for so long?

CLIMATE CHANGE

Kelly wrote that after trying to dissuade her predecessor on the issue, Gillard now gives ringing speeches as a PM with a passion for carbon pricing and is hell-bent on it.

Dixon wrote about the relationship between pontification and cognitive dissonance. Pontification is one of the ways in which people try to resolve their dissonance. By loudly asserting what is consistent with some decision they have made and ignoring what is contrary they can reduce their dissonance.

They are, so to speak, driven from behind rather than pulled from the front. They have to achieve, not from the satisfaction which achievement brings but because only by doing so can they bolster up their constantly sagging self-regard. But herein lies their special dilemma. Though they need to achieve, it is the very act of trying which exposes them to what they fear most failure. Thus the person who fears failure prefers tasks which are very easy or very difficult. If they are easy, he is unlikely to fail; if very difficult then the disgrace attaching will be small, for no one really expected him to win.

Does carbon pricing fit-in here as a task that is very difficult for Gillard?

PERSONAL LIFE

After a series of relationships with influential people, Gillard has now settled on a hairdresser who has given no sign of any intellectual ability.

Dixon wrote that authoritarian personalities are taught (by their parents) to judge people for their usefulness rather than their likeableness. Their friends, and even their future marriage partners, are selected and used in the service of personal advancement; love and affection take second place to knowing the right people.

While this may play out in various ways, this sort of usefulness may conflict with another need noted by Dixon the tendency to be preoccupied with dominance-submission in their personal relationships.

Is his is where the hairdresser ultimately came to fit into the psychological picture after Gillard had a series of useful relationships?

OTHER ISSUES

Dixon wrote that authoritarians fear of failure predisposes toward secretiveness.

Kelly wrote that the electorate saw Gillard as loyal to Kevin Rudd until the evening she knifed him and that she ascended under the worst circumstances, as a willing recruit to a leadership assassination.

Gillard was inordinately angry about the public release of US diplomatic cables by Julian Assange and the Wikileaks organization. But was this because of her view of the US (and its alliance with Australia), or does Gillard have a predisposed toward secretiveness?

Having found a new in-group, is Gillard displaying particularly aggressive, punitive and tough-minded attitudes to one of its out-groups?

Dixon wrote that is a common observation that those over-concerned about their image devote considerable attention, energy and time to a continuous self-assessment against some external standard, usually another person. He continued: There are really two components to this process. The first concerns the way an individual sees himself in comparison with his competitors, the second the way in which he thinks others will see him in comparison with his contemporaries. In either case, he may try to elevate his own self-estimation by choosing a low standard with which to make comparison. Hence the phenomenon of people who tend to shun the company of individuals more gifted and even to choose workmates or select as subordinates people whom they consider inferior to themselves.

Does this account for the reportedly low-quality of the staff in the Prime Minister Gillard’s office?

CONCLUSION

Dixon was concerned with the competences of military leaders, but his observations have wider currency.

Dixon also made it clear that the apparent intellectual failings of some military commanders are due not to lack of intelligence but to their feelings. Cognitive dissonance, pontification, denial, risk-taking, and anti-intellectualism are all, in reality, more concerned with emotion than intelligence.

Bramston wrote that Gillard has a warm personality.

But it depends on whom it is aimed, and is not necessarily inconsistent with the authoritarian personality described by Dixon. He wrote: It has been suggested that those most susceptible to group think will tend to be people fearful of disapproval and rejection. Such people give priority to preserving friendly relationships at the expense of achieving success in the group’s work tasks.

Dixon added: Conversely, the sort of person who, as we have seen, makes the best military commander the outspoken individualist clearly cannot give his best in the group situation. If he fails to hold his tongue, he runs the risk of being ejected by his colleagues.

Thus, he concluded: Notwithstanding exceptions and at risk of over-simplifying what are really very complex issues, there are grounds for believing that high achievement-motivation characterizes highly successful (military) commanders.

And: �There are grounds for believing that incompetent military commanders tend to be those in whom the need to avoid failure exceeds the urge to succeed.

Dixon wrote that a number of consequences follow from these differences in achievement motivation. The first is that while both the drive towards self-betterment and the drive towards professional excellence may take a man to the top, only the latter guarantees that he is fitted for the job of high command, for only in the latter case can we be sure that he has the requisite expertise. (He must have it then, because this was his only qualification for promotion.) Conversely, the man who reaches a position of great power as outcome of his drive to achieve greater self-esteem may not necessarily have any outstanding military ability, for his ascent did not depend upon professional excellence. More serious is the fact that even if he has the requisite military skills these may be rendered quite nugatory by those other traits that are part and parcel of his underlying personality-structure: moral cowardice, indecisiveness, secretiveness and sensitivity to criticism.

Is this Julia Gillard?

Gillard’s personal decision UN vote! · 3 December 2012

Paul Kelly wrote (1 December, The Australian) that Julia Gillard’s insistence that Australia vote against UN recognition of Palestine’s non-member state observer status was a stark demonstration of her will to dominate and tenacious determination to impose her authority. He writes that we are now witnessing a psycho-political drama.

Kelly is right, but there may be more to it than he suggests!

Troy Bramston wrote (29 November, The Australian) that few can understand why she so trenchantly held the view that it must be a no vote. She was so fixated on no that she was all at sea in understanding the opposition to her own decision.

Dennis Shanahan and David Crowe reported (28 November, The Australian) a “very, very tense 12 hours is which Gillard came perilously close to losing the leadership” before she capitulated.

So, why was she so determined?

My view is that while Gillard wants to dominate those around her (as Kelly notes), she also desperately wants the approval of other authority figures. Who these other figures are, we can only guess. (Clearly, her late-father was one of these.)

I suspect that Gillard gave personal assurances to various figures (maybe Barrack Obama and/or senior members of the Australian Jewish community) about how Australia would vote. These assurances were essentially based on her psychological need for approval rather than on any serious consideration of what was good policy.

Contrary to what Peter Hartcher wrote (1 December, The Sydney Morning Herald), Gillard is not full of confidence and self-belief. Her displays are features of both conscious acting (with no children to distract her she has, over the years as a totally focused political performer, perfected the art) and unconscious cognitive dissonance and in the particular case of the UN vote, she was all at sea as she tried to avoid coming to grips with the disparity between party room facts and her notions and commitments about a “no” vote.

For more about Gillard’s basic psychology, read Julia Gillard: psychological profile shown in the left-side column on this page. (https://www.jeffschubert.com/index.php?id=100)

Gillard craves Obama · 26 June 2010

Soon after deposing Kevin Rudd as Prime Minister of Australia in a Labor Party coup, Julia Gillard rang Barak Obama and, among other things, assured him that she supports the present strategy in Afghanistan.

At a press conference she related that she also told him that “we are close as nations, we are in an enduring strategic alliance, we are close as peoples. We have fought together around the world, and we continue to fight together in Afghanistan”.

There was some politics in this as the majority of Australians particularly older people support the American alliance. However, a majority of Australians oppose the current deployment of about 1,500 soldiers in Afghanistan.

The present strategy in Afghanistan is also increasingly being questioned. This piece from the 24 June edition of The New York Times puts it in a nutshell:

If there continue to be problems (in Afghanistan), a senior official said, the debate will intensify between those who say we have to stick with it (the present strategy) and those who say we (have) lost momentum and we have to go to Plan B. Plan B would be some combination of Mr. Biden’s stripped-down counterterrorism strategy including a hard deadline for American withdrawal and an accelerated effort by Mr. Karzai’s government to reconcile with the leaders of the Taliban insurgency, said the official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity.

So why did Gillard support an Afghanistan strategy that is being increasingly questioned?

The answer has several layers.

In general, Australian prime ministers are particularly craven to US presidents. In part this is because it feels good to be on close terms with the most powerful man in the world, and it makes a good impression on others. But there is also an apparent belief among Australian policy makers that supporting the US—no matter what it does—is good for preserving the Australia-US relationship, and thus the security of Australia. Gillard’s background and government experience suggest that she knows very little about the world outside Australia and has little ability to rationally consider such issues as Afghanistan. So she said what she has been told to say—and possibly what her natural instincts suggest.

But, there is also a broader issue.

There is often a general tendency for leaders in many fields to try to gain the respect of other leaders by showing their strength with strong statements. Sometimes the relationship being sought is one of fear, but it is just as often one of approval. Nuance is sacrificed in this process.

When the relationship being sought is one of approval you may see television images of two leaders walking unaccompanied in a garden discussing issues such as war, world economic and financial conditions etc. Even though such walks are really undertaken for the media, they increase the likelihood that the nuances of complex issues are debased in the private conversation of very politically acute but not necessarily very intellectually insightful people aimed at reaching an accord.

One danger is that instincts for accord can mutually reinforce misguided policy thinking. Each political leader, uncertain that what they are doing is right, because of their limited knowledge of or an inability to handle complex issues, comes away from the discussion feeling that he/she must be right because the other leader—presumably acting, at least in part, on their own expert advice agrees with them. Neither recognizes the possibility that the words of the other are really soothing words of emotional support rather than well-thought out views.

The danger is especially acute when one of the leaders is craven to the other. Tony Blair and John Howard with George Bush on Iraq are in my view cases in point. Julia Gillard, lacking the relative international knowledge and sophistication of Kevin Rudd, may be in a similar relationship with Barack Obama.

Gillard, as a new leader and prime minister, had an opportunity to hold back on strong comments on the Afghanistan strategy. She, with the help of her advisers, would then have been in a better position to consider developments and to offer independent advice if it becomes brutally clear that a Plan B is needed.

Given the changing world she could have also been more sophisticated in her choice of words about the Australia-US alliance. But then, phrases such as we have fought together around the world imply an emotional commitment that Australia will keep doing it whatever the US strategy!

Gillard, it seems, will aim to please and her leader words to the other leader will remain craven and foolish.

Putin and Australia · 30 September 2011

Vladimir Putin wants Russia to get the benefits of a stronger and more modern economy, while Australia under Julia Gillard wants to get the benefits of economic growth in Asia.

But like Putin, Australia under Julia Gillard, is somewhat afraid of the uncertainty that comes with economic change and wants to maintain the political/security status quo. The fears of both are rooted in the past. The fear of Putin is rooted in the chaos of the 1990’s. The fear of Australia under Gillard is rooted in the Asia-Pacific area fighting of the Second World War.

Thus, Putin wants to maintain the United Russia political movement as the preeminent force in Russia with himself guiding the way. Australia under Gillard wants to maintain the US as the preeminent force in Asia with itself offering influential advice.

Both Putin and Gillard are pursuing aims that ultimately will fail because of their contradictory nature. This does not mean that these contradictory policies cannot co-exist for some time. It means only that in the current circumstances neither aim is likely to be more than moderately successful in the presence of the other.

The possible contradictions ultimately involved in the review of Australia’s relations in the Asia Century to be conducted by Ken Henry (a former Secretary of the Treasury), and the review being conducted by Allan Hawke and Ric Smith (two former secretaries of the Defence), have been highlighted by Graeme Dobell of the Lowy Institute.

The Henry review will be asked to assess:
The current and likely future course of economic, political and strategic change in Asia, encompassing China, India, the key ASEAN countries as well as Japan and the Republic of Korea;
The domestic economic and social opportunities and challenges of the Asian Century for Australia;
Opportunities for a significant deepening of our engagement with Asia across the board, including in the economy, science and technology collaboration, clean energy, education, business-to-business and people-to-people links and culture;
The political and strategic implications of the Asian Century for Australia;
The role of effective economic and political regional and global cooperation.

Note the emphasis on the word “economic”!

The Hawke and Smith report on the Asia Pacific has been asked to assess:
The rise of the Asia Pacific as a region of global strategic significance;
The rise of the Indian Ocean rim as a region of global strategic significance;
The growth of military power projection capabilities of countries in the Asia Pacific;
The growing need for the provision of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief following extreme events in the Asia Pacific region;
Energy security and security issues associated with expanding offshore resource exploitation in Australia’s North West and Northern approaches.

Note the absence of the word “economic”!

Dobell says that the agenda for the (Hawke and Smith) Review is all about moving more of Australia’s military to the north and west of the continent and aligning Australia with the US military Posture Review.

He further notes that not all parts of Canberra talk in exactly the same tongue. Treasury might be comfortable with the (term) Asian Century, but Defence wants the (term) Asia Pacific because it explicitly embraces the US.

Note the use of the word because!

So there is every chance, in my view, that Hawke and Smith may turn out to be somewhat like Putin — “because” their emotional fears will mostly negate analytical ability (and Putin has as much of this analytical capacity as Hawke and Smith).

Dobell says that Gillard put her own language, too, to the China-US conundrum when surveying what she called a vast landscape of change:

…much is written on the potential tensions inherent in our economic relationship with China and our Alliance ties. I’m a decision-maker, not a commentator, and I don’t by nature reach for the jawbone or the megaphone. But I do say this: The Government’s approach comprehends the challenges and risks. Certainly, these relationships will not manage themselves and we are far from complacent about them. But we are far from pessimistic too. Because there is nothing in our Alliance relationship with the United States which seeks to contain China, because a growing, successful China is in the interest of every country in the region, including our own and because our national strength, and that of our ally, is respected in the region and the world.

What!

..there is nothing in our Alliance relationship with the United States which seeks to contain China?

The Chinese will not be so stupid as to believe these words of Gillard. But large sections of the Australian population will be just as large sections of the Russian population will believe Putin when he uses his own fears to justify counterproductive policies.

And then the words because our national strength, and that of our ally, is respected in the region and the world!

My jaw dropped! Can Gillard possibly be so stupid? These are exactly the things that China wants to have for itself and China will think the US does not want China to have.

A smart Ken Henry will think beyond “economics” — but, in reality given his knowlege base as a numbers orientated economist, he may too easily be overwhelmed by the superficial arguments of the fearful conceptual minds who live in the past (quoting flawed historical examples) rather than the future.

For more on Russia see my writings at: www.russianeconomicreform.ru/

That both individuals and countries can ultimately be guided by the same fears and hopes that override rational analysis should not be a surprise, because the latter consists of the former. But this basic fact seems to be so often ignored in analysis of international relations.

As well intentioned as Putin and Gillard are, neither is psychologically well-equiped to lead a country living in the face of massive change. Because of their fears, neither has much vision beyond that of “control”— either of themselves or their surroundings.