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Trump Psychology and Capability compared to Famous Dictators

Trump Psychology and Capability compared to Famous Dictators

A. Introduction
Timothy Snyder, the historian, and many others believe that Donald Trump is taking the USA to a dictatorship. This article aims to address this issue by comparing the psychology and capability of Trump and his “executive team” with Josef Stalin (from 1924 to 1953); Napoleon Bonaparte (1799 to 1814), Benito Mussolini (1922 to 1943), Adolf Hitler (1933 to 1945), Mao Zedong (1949 to 1976) and Kemal Ataturk (1923 to 1938) and their executive teams. The focus is not on policy or morality but on attitudes to, and ability, in the use of power.

B. Road to Power
C. Aims
D. PR / Communication / Actor
E. Personality
F. Intuition / Knowledge / Decision Making
G. Self-belief / Doubts
H. Influence and Manipulation
(1) Psychology of Influencing Trump
(2) Psychology of Trump Influencing Others
(3) The Special Role of Money
I. Admitting Mistake / Being Wrong
J. Grievances
K. Trump’s Executive Team

B.  Road to Power

In March 2023 Donald Trump addressed the Conservative Political Action Committee Conference, saying: “In 2016, I declared: I am your voice. Today (in 2023), I add: I am your warrior. I am your justice. And for those who have been wronged and betrayed: I am your retribution.”[1]

Similarly, Hans Frank, a Nazi lawyer and later Governor-General of Poland, described what he thought was “the secret of Adolf Hitler’s power”: “He stood up and pounded his fist, and shouted, ‘I am the Man!’ – and he shouted about his strength and determination – and so the public surrendered to him with hysterical enthusiasm.” Hitler was matching his talents with the times. A decade earlier the First World War had ended with Germany signing the punitive Treaty of Versailles. Not only was it financially harsh, but it excoriated national pride. After Rudolf Hess, Hitler’s secretary, first heard Hitler speak he was excited: “A man – I’ve heard a man, he’s unknown, I’ve forgotten his name. But if anyone can free us from Versailles, then it’s this man. This unknown man will restore our honour.”

Journalist David Brooks says that “all his life” Trump “has moved forward with new projects and attempted new conquests, despite repeated failures and bankruptcies that would have humbled a non-narcissist.”[2]

Emil Ludwig, the writer who met and interviewed Benito Mussolini, Josef Stalin and Kemal Ataturk, wrote about the role of determination in accumulating power: “It is undoubtedly true that the men Mussolini set out to overthrow were weaker than he. That is no proof of the rightness of his idea, but only the strength of his personality.” Ludwig went on to say that Mussolini’s “self-confidence” represents “half his success”. 

Journalist Mark Halperin and ex-politician Newt Gingrich have discussed how Trump’s “alpha male” energy helps him politically.[3] Journalist David Brooks has written about a “vitality gap” between Trump and his opponents.[4]

Turkish feminist and nationalist Edibe Halide wrote: “Of course, one knew all the time that there were men around him (Kemal Ataturk) who were greatly superior in intellect, and far above him in culture and education. But though he excelled them in neither refinement nor originality, not one of them could possibly cope with his vitality. Whatever their qualities, they were made on a more or less normal scale. In terms of vitality he wasn’t. And it was this alone that made him the dominant figure.”

Trump was widely admired for his defiant reaction when a potential assassin’s bullet missed his head by a fraction of an inch and clipped his ear. In 1926 an unbalanced foreigner took a shot at Benito Mussolini, but only nicked the bridge of his nose. In an example of indirectly providing inspiration to his lieutenants – as well as the general population as did Trump – Mussolini continued to work that day wearing a small plaster on his nose and gave several speeches. In one he said: “I am one of your generation. That means that I am the newest sort of Italian, one who is never thrown by events, but rather proceeds always straight down the road assigned by destiny.”

Trump’s has had a number of successes in 2025 – in foreign policy and domestically — which have boosted his power. Many Trump opponents have become afraid. The Financial Times has reported Lisa Murkowski, “the Republican senator least aligned with Trump”, as saying: “We’re all afraid. I’m often very anxious myself about using my voice because retaliation is real.” Her fear enabled Trump’s bill to pass by one vote.[5]

Louis Bourreinne, Napoleon Bonoparte’s first secretary and child-hood friend, later wrote about such accumulation of power: “Without any shock, and in the short space of four years, there arose above the ruins of the short-lived Republic a Government more absolute than ever was Louis XIV’s. (While) this extraordinary change is to be assigned to many causes. I had the opportunity of observing the influence which the determined will of one man exercised over his fellow men.”

Trump, in 2025, seems to have the same effect on much of the USA population as Napoleon’s Minister of Navy, Denis Decres, recalled: “Napoleon “enslaved us all” because “he held our imagination in his hand, sometimes a hand of steel, sometimes a hand of velvet; one never knew how it was going to be from day to day, so that there was no means of escaping.”

 

C.  Aims

General Armand de Caulaincourt, a close aide to Napoleon Bonaprte, later wrote that “France and Emperor (Napoleon) were blended in glory which had become common to both.” Similarly, Trump continually equates his own greatness with American greatness, but which is the primary goal? Trump greatness or American greatness?

Journalist and commentator Bill O’Reilly has known Trump for many years and often communicates with him. O’Reilly says that Trump “lives to win” and that “he is the most competitive person I have ever met.” “He separates winners from losers and he wants to associate with winners and he wants to be a winner.” “His whole life is about accomplishment.”[6]

Historian and commentator Nial Ferguson says that Trump’s “utility function is basically to lead the news every day and the fact that we’re talking about him now means he’s winning because that’s how really Trump defines success”[7] Mao Zedong’s long-time doctor, Li Zhisui, later wrote that Mao was similar and needed to be reassured: “His life depended on the admiration of others. He craved affection and acclaim.”

But Mao Zedong also had other goals to accomplish besides fame! Dr. Li also wrote that Mao insisted “on policies that no one else had ever imagined, dangerous, risky policies like the Great Leap Forward, the people’s communes, and the Cultural Revolution, all of which were designed to transform China”.

So, does Trump have any other aims other than to “lead the news every day”? Bill O’Reilly says that Trump is “he’s very interested in his legacy. He wants to be on Mount Rushmore (along with George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Theodore Roosevelt and Abraham Lincoln) and he’ll buy another Mountain to put himself on it if he has to”.[8]

Biographer Maggie Haberman interviewed Trump several times and on one occasion, after his first stint as president, he told her that “the question I get asked more than any other question: If you had it to do again, would you have done it?” Trump then answered the question himself: “The answer is, yeah, I think so. Because here’s the way I look at it. I have so many rich friends and nobody knows who they are.” Haberman wrote that Trump “went on to talk about how much easier life would have been had he not run. Yet there it was: reflecting on the meaning of having been president of the United States, his first impulse was not to mention public service, or what he felt he’d accomplished, only that it appeared to be a vehicle for fame, and that many experiences were only worth having if someone else envied them”.[9]

So, what strategy – apart from fame — does Trump have for getting on Rushmore? Trump has not said this, but he might instinctively imagine that his path to Mount Rushmore is similar to Mussolini’s view in 1917 when he was editor of the newspaper Popolo d’Italia. Mussolini wrote that Italy needed “a man who has when needed the delicate touch of an artist and the heavy hand of a warrior. A man who is sensitive and full of will-power. A man who knows and loves people, and who can direct and bend them with violence if required.”

But this still leaves the question of to what end such a “warrior” would use “violence”?

Trump would claim that he wants to “transform” the USA by bringing back manufacturing industries to America and stopping illegal immigration. But will this get him on Mount Rushmore? Bill O’Reilly has said that “uniting the country” is “not a main concern” of Trump because “he thinks that the people who hate him are not worth uniting”. He does not want to exclude anybody” but “wants to please his MAGA political base”. This sounds similar to what a British Ambassador said of Benito Mussolini: “His first consideration is Mussolini, his second is the fascist regime, his third Italy”.

Nial Ferguson says: “I remember Henry Kissinger saying to me once after he had met with Trump the president, that he has no strategic concept. Trump is a transactional individual with only a vague idea of any strategic concept”.[10]

Michael Wolff, who has written extensively about Trump says: “A longtime New York acquaintance, offered the observation that what excites Trump most is not the fire but the clanging fire engines and sirens rushing to the scene. The drama, the conflict, the sound and fury of it all.”[11] In other words, the desire to be continually part of the news of the day’s action without really knowing for what strategic purpose.

Trump’s White House Chief of Staff, Susie Wiles, says he is a “voracious reader” and lists the “New York Post cover”, Wall Street Journal, New York Times and “sometimes the Washington Post”, Financial Times and “all of the periodicals”. She then adds: “So you if you if you read the day’s newspaper, the day’s news, you can almost predict what the day is going to bring. And that is on top of whatever was supposed to be going on that day, too.”[12]

There obviously needs to be a balance but Wiles’ words are consistent with a Trump personality that is very focused on news events of the day and how he can become part of them in some way – with little idea of a “strategic concept” of why!

So, we seem to be left with the conclusion that Trump views fame and being in the news everyday as the main way of being viewed in the same way as Napoleon wanted the French to view him. According to his brother, Joseph, wrote, Napoleon “wants the need for his existence to be so direly felt, and as such a great boon, that anybody would recoil at any other possibility.” In Trump’s mind, this might eventually lead to Rushmore!

The next section covers Trump’s way of communicating with people – and particularly a larger audience. It may also contain a partial answer to the question posed in this section. Bill O’Reilly says that Trump got “well known” as a result of the 14 years reality television show The Apprentice.[13] “He was not a politician yet but after a while he got a little bored with it and so he decided to up the game again”[14] – to try to become the commander-in-chief president of the USA?

Mussolini’s Foreign Minister and son-in-law, Galeazzo Ciano, noted in his diary in 1939: “As usual with Mussolini, when he has obtained something, he always asks for more.” And, referring to Napoleon, Louis Bourreinne wrote: “His inordinate ambition goaded him on to the attainment of power; and power when possessed served only to augment his ambition.”

 

D.  PR / Communication / Actor

Journalist and commentator Mark Halperin says that Trump “understands the media as well as any politician I’ve ever covered”[15]— with ex-politician Newt Gingrich adding that Trump thinks “any media beats no media and bad media is better than no media.”[16]

Trump biographer Michael Wolff says: “Think of Trump as a showman, or even more to the point, an actor. Most actors have an instinct for the audience and that’s exactly what Trump plays to. It’s important to remember that Donald Trump was the star of a hit reality show – The Apprentice.’’[17] Biographer Maggie Haberman wrote: “Trump cast himself in The Apprentice as he preferred to be seen — a take-charge billionaire in a leather-backed seat.[18] Bill O’Reilly says that The Apprentice years were “perfect for Trump: Trump’s in charge; Trump’s making decisions; they’re all trying to please Trump. It could not have been better for him.”[19]

According to Michael Wolff: “Trump just goes for the conflict. He understands that it is a great television and then will give him the headlines and make him the center of attention.”[20] Wolf says “Trumpian politics is an act of cruelty — he’s a deranged comic with a rapt audience.”[21] Haberman wrote that a ”core tenet of the Trump political movement has been finding publicly acceptable targets to serve as receptacles for preexisting anger. That anger helped signal his supporters, who are bound to him more by common enemies — liberals, the media, tech companies, government regulators — than shared ideals.”[22]

Wolff says that Trump “has extraordinary, nuanced appreciation of how people are reacting to him like an actor — always scanning the crowd looking for that point of connection. When you go to Trump’s rallies, which if you read them seem incoherent, you see him throwing out things looking for the response and then when he gets the response he wants, he just keeps repeating that line and keeps getting that response – actually, it sort of grows! This is a level of Genius especially for somebody functioning in this media time of ours but it certainly doesn’t involve the more conventional craft of politics — policy legislative agenda! All that is really extraneous, if not irrelevant, to Trump.[23]

Trump’s talent is similar Italy’s Benito Mussolini who was a master communicator. A journalist wrote of a 1921 speech by Mussolini: “He is a most expert orator, master of himself, who before his public always assumes the mien which best suites his subject and the moment.” Over two decades later the very experienced Mussolini said “the extent of credulity which can be found in any man of whatever class or intelligence is quite extraordinary”; “lies always win against the truth”.

Albert Speer, Hitler’s architect and later Armaments Minister, was surprised at the appearance of Hitler when he saw him for the first time in January 1931 as he addressed students of Berlin University and the Institute of Technology: “On posters and in caricatures I had seen him in military tunic, with shoulder straps, swastika armband, and hair flapping. But here he was wearing a well-fitted blue suit and looking markedly respectable. Everything about him bore out the note of reasonable modesty.” But the next time that Speer saw him, the audience – and the clothes – were different. Now he presented the image of ‘a Man’ who would not be swayed from his purpose. “I saw Hitler reproving one of his companions because the cars had not yet arrived. He paced back and forth angrily, slashing at the tops of his high boots with a dog whip and giving the general impression of a cross, uncontrolled man who treats his associates contemptuously. This Hitler was very different from the man of calm and civilised manner who had so impressed me at the student meeting. I was seeing an example of Hitler’s remarkable duplicity – indeed, ‘multiplicity’ would be a better word. With enormous histrionic intuition he could shape his behaviour to changing situations in public.”

Even as he plays to the crowd Trump may sometimes actually believe – even if temporarily – some of the more outrageous things he says. Yugoslav politician Milovan Djilas, who closely observed Stalin at the dinner table after the end of the war, wrote that his “pretence was so spontaneous that it seemed he himself became convinced of the truth and sincerity of what he was saying. He very easily adapted himself to every turn in the discussion of any new topic, and even to every new personality.”

Trump biographer Maggie Haberman wrote that Trump is “the most disciplined undisciplined person I’d ever covered, using repetition to drive home a message as the throughline of his public commentary.”[24] Haberman says that Trump is “guided by a belief in repetition; over and over he would convey to employees and friends a version of the same idea: if you say something often enough, it becomes true.”[25]

Adolf Hitler claimed he had “the gift of reducing all problems to their simplest foundations”.

Trump is similar. Bill O’Reilly says Trump approach is “keep your message simple and entertaining, don’t be boring but don’t get too complex. He’s going to fix the border. He’s going to boost your wallet. He’s going to get China. He’s going to get the stuff that people can react to; always get a reaction!”. “He’s not in the same universe as 95% of American politicians because he doesn’t think if I say this that will happen. I’m going to say what I want and I don’t give a fig.”[26] Newt Gingrich adds that Trump is “clearly a vaudeville performer and part of that, I think, is a deliberate message — how can you really be afraid of me I’m just this funny guy!”[27]

O’Reilly says that Trump “certainly wants to rattle their cages – to use a cliché; he wants to shake them not just his political opponents but foreign leaders in the media. He likes to be a provocator because it’s not boring — it’s exciting!”[28] “Trump feels that he has to entertain his audience as well as put forth his point of view on various issues so that’s why he says all this wild stuff.”[29] In a sense, this is the “clanging fire engines and sirens” fixation described by Michael Wolff discussed earlier.

Maggie Haberman wrote that Trump “makes vague statements that allow people to project what they want onto his words, so two sides of the same issue could claim his support. More often than not, Trump is reacting to something instead of having an active plan, but because he so disorients people, they believe there must be a grander strategy or secret scheme at play. Whatever he’s up to is often part of what he sees as a game, whose rules and objectives make sense only to him.”[30]

When he wished, China’s Mao Zedong was also proficient at expressing views and ideas in ambiguous terms. This allowed him to simultaneously tell a number of people different things, while creating the pre-condition for ‘plausible deniability’ of anything. During the Cultural Revolution, the Red Guards students fell into feuding factions. When one group met with Mao in 1968, a student said to him: “Both sides (of feuding students) have been using the Chairman’s words to justify their actions. But the Chairman’s words can be subject to different, even conflicting, interpretations. While the Chairman is alive and can settle the disputes, such problems can be resolved. But when the Chairman is no longer with us, what shall we do?”

 

E.  Personality

On Tuesday 8 July 2025, Donald Trump made the following Truthsocial post: 

“It has been brought to my attention that the Great State of Florida, which I won BIG three times, and where I am a proud Resident, has renamed an important four-mile stretch of Southern Boulevard, in Palm Beach County, to “PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP BOULEVARD.” Thank you to Palm Beach County, Governor Ron DeSantis, and all of Florida’s great State Lawmakers, on granting me this wonderful honor! I LOVE FLORIDA!”

I could have put this post earlier in this text under the PR/Communication/Actor heading. But Trump, already by far the most important man in the world felt the need to tell it about the renaming of a road. It is possible that he was trying to offer indirect praise to Ron DeSantos but the post fits in with Trump’s continual need to be continually reassured about his worth by praising himself and repeating the praise of others.

Even if they existed in this modern media age, I doubt that Mao Zedong, Napoleon, Bonaparte, Adolf Hitler, Josef Stalin or Kemal Ataturk would have self-trumpeted such a trivial event – although Benito Mussolini may have! They would have been pleased with the renaming but would have below their dignity as an individual and leader of a country to make such an issue of it.

Bill O’Reilly says that Trump “gets bored easily. He wants action.” When O’Reilly was asked: “Is that where the mean tweets come from?” O’Reilly answered: “That’s where everything comes from. If Donald Trump is bored on a Saturday afternoon — its no good if it’s winter! He can’t play golf and he is at the White House!”[31] O’Reilly says that “the really entertaining thing about Trump is there’s no censor. He is just boom. Right out there.”[32]

O’Reilly says that Trump is “much more relaxed when the cameras are off”.[33] Maggie Haberman wrote:

“Over the years, those who got closest to him and chose to stay there often suggested they had been sucked in by a version best described as the “Good” Trump. The Good Trump was capable of generosity and kindness, throwing birthday parties for friends and checking on them repeatedly when they fell ill, calling the daughter of a political ally who was suffering from breast cancer for a surprise chat from the White House. The Good Trump could be funny and fun to be around, solicitous and engaged, able to at least appear interested in the people in his company. That version of Trump won the loyalty of many people over decades.[34] Haberman wrote that “in the White House, those who met Trump for the first time were often disarmed, seeing someone not at all like the angry voice of his Twitter feed or the fuming boss portrayed in innumerable news accounts. He is charismatic and can be charming, and in those initial encounters, he would ask people questions about themselves, zeroing in on them, giving them the sense that they were the only person in the room.”[35]

Sergo Beria, son of police chief Lavrenti, wrote: “Josef Stalin was able to charm people, as I can testify from experience. He managed to give the people he was with the impression that Jupiter had come down from his Olympus for them, deigned to speak with them in a familiar tongue, and was taking an interest in their problems.” Stalin, he wrote, “left each person he spoke to anxious to see him again, with a sense that there was now a bond that linked them forever”; “that was his strength”.

Adolf Hitler could also be masterful at making people feel special and needed. In mid-1940, Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano described Hitler kissing arse with “a thousand little courtesies: to this one, according to his custom, a glass of mineral water, to that one cigarettes. Always equal, calm.”

Haberman wrote that Trump was not always the “Good” version: “Even those who rationalized staying close to him acknowledged that a “Bad” Trump always revealed himself. He was interested primarily in money, dominance, power, bullying, and himself. He treated rules and regulations as unnecessary obstacles rather than constraints on his behavior. He lost his temper suddenly, and abusively, directing his ire at one aide in a roomful of others, before moving on from a burst of anger that instilled fear in everyone that they could be its next target.[36]

Toward the end of the war with Germany’s military in retreat, Adolf Hitler’s temper became increasingly unpredictable. But generally long-lived holders of power like Napoleon, Mao, Mussolini, Stalin and Ataturk have good control over their emotions – and use “fear” in a managed way. One of Napoleon’s secretaries, Fain, wrote that “Napoleon was not angry that people feared him a bit. What he dreaded most was appearing too easy.”

Josef Stalin knew how to use fear as a tool of control and had no qualms about using access of his target’s family members to education – which would not be past Trump!

Anastas Mikoyan was one of Stalin’s most independent minded lieutenants. In 1943, two of Mikoyan’s teenage sons found themselves associated with a teenage friend’s love induced murder-suicide. This boy had also written down some thoughts on a mock government with Mikoyan’s sons as “ministers”. They were arrested and after 6 months in prison signed confessions and were released. Six years later, in 1949, Stalin raised the issue again, giving a clear warning to Mikoyan to toe the line: “What happened to your children who were arrested? Do you think they deserve the right to study at Soviet institutions?”

And then there is Trump’s real attitude to the US Congress which he would like to be no more than a rubber stamp to his executive decisions1

In 1922 Mustapha Kemal (later to adopt the name Kemal Ataturk) wanted the Turkish Grand National Assembly to draft legislation stripping religious Islam, specifically the Caliphate, of its powers of government. He made his desires clear: “The question is merely how to give expression to it. If those gathered here, the Assembly and everyone else could look at this question in a natural way, I think they would agree. Even if they do not, the truth will soon find expression, but some heads may roll in the process.” When legislation to Ataturk’s liking had been prepared, and a vote proposed, Ataturk said: “There is no need for this. I believe that the Assembly will unanimously adopt the principles which will forever preserve the independence of the country and the nation.” With the ‘heads may roll’ threat still in the air, the chairman of the Assembly thus announced its acceptance by acclamation.

In 1939, Stalin contemptuously reminded his lieutenants where they stood when they approved an intended speech: “Ha, I gave you a variant that I’d thrown out and you all chant your hallelujahs. The speech I’m actually going to give is completely different!”

Maggie Haberman wrote that “among Trump’s most consistent attributes are a desire to grind down his opponents; his refusal to be shamed, or to voluntarily step away from the fight; his projection that things will somehow always work out in his favor; and his refusal to accept the way life in business or politics has traditionally been conducted.”[37]

Sergo Beria wrote that Stalin “took a wicked pleasure in striking blows, in trampling on people, in destroying whatever resisted him.” “Stalin did not miss a chance to criticise the appearance of the men around him” and “did not hesitate to humiliate” them. “He wanted his victim to feel cut down to nothing. If one of those near him allowed weakness or a tender spot to appear, Stalin never forgot it, nor missed an opportunity to remind him of it.”

In 1937 Kemal Ataturk criticised Prime Minister Ismet Inonu at a Cabinet meeting during the latter’s absence and directly reminded everyone who he was: “I can take a man and raise him up. But if he can’t understand this and thinks he has risen by his own worth, I can fling him away, like a rag.”

 

F.  Intuition / Knowledge / Decision making

Journalist and Commentator Mark Halperin says that “in the end, Trump believes following your instincts is key”[38] when making decisions. Former politician Newt Gingrich, who has known Trump for many years, told Halperin that Trump is essentially intuitive.[39] Michael Wolff says that Trump is “a genius” as an intuitive actor, but a “moron” in that he “doesn’t know very much” and “he prevents information from getting in”. His “whole life is a resistance to information, to anyone telling him anything”. “He just doesn’t listen. He’s just it’s a verbal barrage of broadcast.”[40]

These contradictory elements could also be a description of Adolf Hitler who was both very intuitive and knowledgeable in a few areas but very ignorant in many – and liked to talk! Erich Manstein – who later became a Field Marshal and is now considered one of the most brilliant generals of the Second World War – initially described Hitler in his diary as a “genius” with “staggering knowledge about military and technological innovations in every country” but was so frustrated by one of Hitler’s decisions in 1943 that he exclaimed: “My God, the man’s a moron”. Nevertheless, after the war had ended, Manstein spoke of Hitler’s “tremendously high intelligence” but noted the effect of his lack of “operational training’.

In August 1940 Erwin Rommel (who later became a Field Marshal) wrote in his diary: “Where on earth would we be without Hitler? I don’t know if there could ever be a German who has such a brilliant mastery of military and political leadership.” He later wrote to his wife: “The Fuhrer will make the right decision (as he) knows exactly what is right for us” and that he was “spending a lot of time” with Hitler. “The trust he has in me gives me the greatest delight. Yesterday, I was allowed to sit next to him.”

Rommel’s hero worship thereafter waxed and waned around a steady descent to reality; while the other generals also become increasingly critical and disenchanted. Implicated in the 20 July 1944 plot to assassinate Hitler, Rommel was given a choice between suicide, in return for assurances that his reputation would remain intact and that his family would not be persecuted following his death, or facing a trial that would result in his disgrace and execution. He chose the former and took a cyanide pill.

Journalist Mark Halperin says that Trump has “extraordinary instincts about human beings”[41] – even though he clearly has not understood Vladimir Putin!

Hitler’s war diarist Major Schramm thought Hitler was exceptionally skilful, with an “amazing ability to judge people to the extent that he was able to sense immediately whether the person standing in front of him was for him, could be won over, or would be immune to his personal dynamism. In this respect he had a sort of ‘sixth sense’.” Albert Speer wrote that Hitler “knew men’s secret vices and desires, he knew what they thought to be their virtues, he knew the hidden ambitions and motives which lay behind their loves and hates, he knew where they could be flattered, where they were gullible, where they were strong and where they were weak; he knew all this by instinct and feeling, an intuition which in such matters never led him astray.

Newt Gingrich told journalist Mark Halperin that Trump “is the most existential politician I’ve ever seen. Everything Trump does is in the moment. He is totally engaged, totally involved.” “He is at the same time sort of schizophrenic with part of him is thinking strategically while the other part is totally engaged with you.” “He is absorbing stuff all the time. I mean when we occasionally have a conversation I realize that there’s three or four conversations going on simultaneously in one conversation. He’s thinking about this, and then he’s over thinking about that and things just flow.”[42] Following Gingrich’s comments, journalist Mark Halperin said: “One way he’s intelligent, you’re saying, is he has the capacity to think in the moment, talk in the moment, but be thinking about other things and kind of connecting them all up and processing them.”

Maggie Haberman had a somewhat different take when she wrote: “The reality is Trump treats everyone like they are his psychiatrists — reporters, government aides, and members of Congress, friends and pseudo-friends and rally attendees and White House staff and customers. All present a chance for him to vent or test reactions or gauge how his statements are playing or discover how he is feeling. He works things out in real time in front of all of us. I spent the four years of his (first0 presidency getting asked by people to decipher why he was doing what he was doing, but the truth is, ultimately, almost no one really knows him. Some know him better than others, but he is often simply, purely opaque, permitting people to read meaning and depth into every action, no matter how empty they may be.”[43]

In another podcast Mark Halperin said: “Trump likes to talk about how he’s a great speaker. He’ll go point A and then point R and then back to point F. It doesn’t seem to make any sense, but in his view he weaves it all together. Lobbyists tell me if your client goes in the Oval Office, he or she is going to be subjected to the weave almost invariably. Sometimes one-on-one with Trump and the CEO, sometimes other people in the room, but invariably the weave will occur and if you’re a normal person who’s not used to the weave it’s a little disconcerting to be sitting with the president of the United States while he’s talking about golf and then (French President) Macron, then the prices at Mar-a-Lago and then gossip about some member of Congress. You got to get in the spirit of the weave because if you’re in there and you get confused or act confused or ask a question and interrupt the weave because you want to show you’re interested – its bad! You got to be in the rhythm of the weave and you have to follow it as best you can and you got to look like you’re following it. That’s good advice.”[44]

Trump may be similar to Italy’s Benito Mussolini. One loyal minister, Alfredo Rocco, claimed that Mussolini’s mind habitually moved “not in a straight line, but zig-zag, giving different people holding different opinions the idea that he agreed with them, when really he was merely trying to make up his own mind for himself”. According to Cesare Rossi, a one-time close collaborator, Mussolini possessed “a marvellous facility for playing the most diverse and contradictory parts one after the other. One day he says a certain thing is white, the next day he says it is black.”

Mark Halperin says that Trump does not believe in making a decision “before it’s time. When he’s got a choice, he feels absolute freedom to reach whatever conclusion he wants to long after the conventional timekeeping would suggest he has to decide.” Trump is extremely aware from his time as a business-person the importance of making decisions when they’re ripe, making them well, and following through.”[45]

One of the secrets of people who hold great power for prolonged periods is a good sense of timing.

Louis Bourrienne, Napoleon’s first secretary, later wrote: “Impatience, when he was under its influence, got the better of him; it was then impossible for him to control himself. He was indeed so precipitate that one might say, had he been a gardener, he would have wished to see the fruits ripen before the blossoms fell off.”

After a successful step in his early power struggles Mao Zedong said: “Melons ripen. Don’t pick them off when they are not yet ripe. When they are ready, they will drop. In struggle, one mustn’t be too rigid.”

Mussolini also had the ability to be patient. In late 1940, Galeazzo Ciano wrote in his diary about Marshal Badoglio: “Mussolini wants to sack him. He is moving slowly, because this is his nature in such matters, and because he wants to let time take its course.”

Mark Halperin says that before making an important decision Trump “will talk to the usual people. He’ll talk to someone in his office, a business leader who’s in his office for a meeting on a totally unrelated topic. Trump’s views is that “this business leader knows how to make decisions about business, so I’m going to ask them what they think about this unrelated decision.” “He’s famous for asking people at his two clubs in New Jersey and Florida.”[46]

This Trump characteristic is very unlike Napoleon, Mao, Hitler, Stalin, Ataturk or even Mussolini. All generally played their cards close to the chest. Halperin’s next comment may help us understand Trump’s behavior.

Halperin says that “Trump matches the decision to the specific problem. He sometimes will be guided by very simple, simplistic, good versus bad, right versus wrong principles to make a choice. But sometimes he’ll say, ‘Well, no, on this choice, it’s really got to be kind of bloodless. I need data. I need to make a very strategic decision’. It all depends on the nature of the facts on the ground for whatever the choice is, whatever decision he has to make. Some leaders will say, I’m just always going to say what’s right, what’s wrong. Some leaders are going to say, well, I’m just going to go on the data. In studying Trump, what I see is a guy who again matches each decision to whatever the specific is. He doesn’t feel hemmed in by either the simple a good versus bad, moral, amoral, or I got to decide based on data. It’s all situational.”[47]

This lines up with the earlier mentioned Henry Kissinger view that Trump is transactional with “no strategic concept”. This is the basic reason Trump can canvass views at his “two clubs” and from business leaders in an ad hoc way. This is totally different from Mao Zedong, Napoleon Bonaparte, Adolf Hitler, Josef Stalin and Kemal Ataturk. Even Mussolini had a “strategy” of expanding Italian regional power, but it was implemented in an erratic way – depending on the situation!

Halperin claims that Trump is “a massive student of history. Since he became president, he’s become even more invested in studying past presidents and how they’ve dealt with the job, including this issue of decision-making.”[48] In his podcast, Halperin then played a video clip of Trump pointing to pictures of past presidents and briefly commenting on them.

This is not a surprise, but it is also potentially a very narrow view of history!

Dr Li wrote that Mao “identified with China’s emperors” and he “turned to the past for instruction on how to rule.

The son of one of Stalin’s lieutenants remembers Stalin asking him a question, and then answering it himself: “What was the genius of Catherine the Great? Her greatness lay in her choice of Prince Potemkin and other such talented lovers and officials to govern the State.” Stalin was trying to be objective and to allude to his own choice of lieutenants, but suspicion was depriving him of that capacity to make such balanced assessments. The cruelty of Ivan the Terrible was something that Stalin took particular notice of, writing in the margin of a biography: “teacher teacher”. Stalin knew that he was a very tough ruler, but thought it necessary for his own survival and that of the organisation – in this case, both the communist party and the country. In 1946 he criticised a new movie, Ivan the Terrible, Part Two, telling the director that changes must be made: “Ivan the Terrible was very cruel. You can show he was cruel. But you must show why he needed to be cruel.” (After the outbreak of war with Ukraine, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was asked whether Putin consulted with him.” Lavrov said: “Putin has three advisers — Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great and Catherine the Great.”)

 

G.  Self-belief / Doubts

Bill O’Reilly, speaking with NewsNation’s Leland Vittert, said that “one of the most important points I want to make” is that Trump is “not an introspective man”. “He doesn’t regret. He lives in the moment. So the moment is bad, but the next moment he’s going to make it good. He thinks about a mistake but he doesn’t carry it around as a burden.” He “puts it aside and he just keeps going” and is “able to get by disasters that would sink other people by being resilient”.[49]

Mark Halperin says “Trump has doubt”. “When you talk to people who are around him as he’s making big decisions — he’s got doubt. He’s quite concerned about making a fateful decision like the Iran bombing. Trump doesn’t like risk, doesn’t like errors. He does certainly doesn’t want to make a bad decision as president.”[50]

All successful long-term holders of power have doubt, but — to a greater or lesser degree — have pushed themselves believe in themselves and to not be introspective.

Josef Stalin revealed that self-belief is not entirely innate when he felt the need to underline the following phrase in a book: “Don’t waste time on doubting yourself, because it is the biggest waste of time ever invented by man.”

After a decade in power since 1922, Benito Mussolini made it clear to his lieutenants that he wanted only obedience “because contradiction only raises doubts in my mind and diverts me from what I know to be the right path, whereas my animal instincts are always right.”

Dr Li Zhisui wrote that: “Mao continued to talk excitedly about the latest production statistics” of the Great Leap Forward. However, “in my night-time meetings with the Chairman, I noted a new measure of concern. ‘Is that steel (being produced in the small backyard furnaces) really useful?’, he would wonder out loud.” But Dr Li noted: “Whatever Mao’s doubts, they were overridden by rationale of his Great Leap Forward, which had stirred the creative enthusiasm of the Chinese masses. He did not want to throw cold water on it. His leadership lay in his capacity to motivate people to action, to unleash their creative force, and his policy of the Great Leap Forward, he believed, did precisely that. His faith in his own leadership continued undiminished.”

Maggie Haberman wrote that “Trump had spent decades surviving one professional near-death experience after another, and after a lifetime of bluffing and charming and cajoling and strong-arming his way through challenging situations, he saw no need to change after winning the White House in 2016.”[51] And the same can now be said after his election victory in November 2024.

There is also the issue of some divine entity or purpose. Surviving an assassination attempt, as did Trump in July 2024, can act to greatly bolster belief in metaphysical issue. Susie Wiles, his Chief of Staff, told Miranda Devine in July 2025: “I believe God wanted him saved.” “I would say I think he believes that he was saved. And he would never — even if he thought it before I don’t think he would have admitted it — and he will now.”[52]

On 13 July 2025 the White House released a Presidential Message saying: “It remains my firm conviction that God alone saved me that day for a righteous purpose: to restore our beloved Republic to greatness and to rescue our Nation from those who seek its ruin. One year after the attempt on my life in Butler, our country is in the midst of a new Golden Age.”

The failure of the July 1944 assassination attempt only reinforced Adolf Hitler’s self-belief with him subsequently saying: “I go with the certainty of a sleepwalker along the path laid out for me by Providence” which had again shown him that he had “been chosen to make world history”. 

Mark Halperin says Trump is he’s “very at peace when he makes a decision. Other presidents I’ve covered sometimes will agonize a little bit more.”[53]

First up, it is worth noting that, like all human beings, strong leaders dislike uncertainty, and feel – and display – a sense of relief after having made a difficult decision.

Louis Bourreinne wrote that he had “often observed” that Napoleon “appeared much less moved when on the point of executing any great design than during the time of projecting it, so accustomed was he to think that what he had resolved in his mind, was already done”.

Galeazzo Ciano, Mussolini’s Foreign Minister, noted in his diary in August 1939: “The Duce is now quite calm, as he always is after he has made a decision.”

Nicolaus Below, Hitler’s Luftwaffe adjutant, recalled the run-up to the invasion of France in May 1940: “The nearer the fatal hour approached the calmer and more optimistic Hitler became. It seemed to me that he had shed the doubts which had assailed him during the previous six months and was content to allow events to take their course.” A year later, Joseph Goebbels noted a similar change on the evening of the German invasion of Russia: “The Fuhrer seems to lose his fear as the decisive moment approaches. It is always the same with him. He relaxes visibly. All the exhaustion seems to fade away.”

But , at least according to Michael Wolff, “the secret of being Donald Trump is to have no self-awareness, and always to assume it is someone else’s fault, always 100% of the time. He will always blame somebody else. He will never accept blame, never accept failure.”[54]

Dr. Li Zhisui wrote that Mao Zedong believed that “if wrong decisions were made, wrong policies introduced , the fault lay not with him but with the information provided to him”. As early as 1958, Lin Biao, who later became Defence Minister, said that Mao “worships himself to such an extent that all accomplishments are attributed to him, but all mistakes are made by others”.

 

H.  Influence and Manipulation

Biographer Maggie Haberman wrote that Trump “has shown a willingness both to believe anything is true, and to say anything is true. He has a few core ideological impulses but is often willing to suppress them when it’s useful for another purpose.”[55]

Individual aspects of this Haberman comment could have been included earlier in this text – for example, emphasizing “say anything” under the PR/Communication heading; or emphasizing “believe anything” under the Personality heading; or “few core ideological impulses” under the Aims heading. However, I have chosen to interpret the comment as a whole about Trump’s efforts to influence and manipulate other people and how other people seek to influence and manipulate Trump.

 

  • Psychology of Influencing Trump

Maggie Haberman wrote that Trump “is incredibly suggestable, skimming ideas and thoughts and statements from other people and repackaging them as his own; campaign aides once called him a “sophisticated parrot.”[56]

Haberman wrote that “when assessing others, Trump is usually focused above all else on whether something or someone has “the look,” reflecting his view of life as a show he was casting.”[57] Journalist and commentator Mark Halperin says that “if you go on Fox television, which the president watches regularly or any other cable channel that Trump’s watching, you got to say the right things — but you also have to look great! If you don’t look great that’s all he’ll focus on. If you go to meet with the president; same thing — you got to dress the part and if you’re a man you have to wear the nicest possible shoes.[58]

Mark Halperin says that in addition to television a “good buzz around you is extremely important.” That is, Trump is “hearing from folks that X person is doing a great job”. Trump “also wants you to have the support of the MAGA movement. If there’s someone who wants influence with Trump who MAGA doesn’t like on social media or podcasts it makes it hard for Trump to continue to listen to them.”[59]

Halperin’s advice is: “You can always get back in Trump’s good graces if you do the right thing just as you can get on his bad side if you do the wrong thing. The right thing for Trump going on television and saying nice things about him. That’s the basic route to get on his good side. But you can do that one day and then the next day do something he doesn’t like. I think most of the time it’s genuine but at least a piece of it appears to me to be a little bit performative a little bit attempt to intimidate.” “With Trump no relationship is static, nothing is final and everything is transactional and he always is thinking what’s going to happen next. How’s this person potentially going to come back into my life? He’s not caught up in the past if the future and an alliance in the future is to his benefit or will help him.”[60]

According to Bill O’Reilly, “as long as Trump wins, as long as he gets what he wants, he’ll then say nice things about who’s ever giving him what he wants”[61]

The world that Trump inhabits is much more media orientated than anything that Napoleon, Mao, Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin or Ataturk operated in.  It is difficult to know how they would have operated in the modern media scene. However, there can be no doubt that these dictators – and maybe even Mussolini — had more “core ideological impulses” than Trump. Nevertheless, stroking the leader’s ego – in whatever situation – is always a way to gain influence.

But what about influence outside of media channels?

Maggie Haberman says that in Trump’s first term as president, “those who wanted to manipulate Trump learned to exploit his frequent uninterest in assessing the motives of whoever was providing him information.” Trump sometimes made clear to aides he knew when people were trying to manipulate him, but if their ends matched his own, or if he worried about them turning against him, he did not object. Other times, what mattered was less the credibility of the person trying to persuade him than simply who got to him last. But he enjoyed moments when he carried out his impulses over the objections of experts in his cabinet and White House staff.[62]

There are two issues here. Haberman is not the only person to emphasis the importance of being the “last” person to try to persuade Trump. For the other leaders covered in this text “first” was more important.

Albert Speer wrote that “experience had shown that the person who first managed to suggest a particular version of an affair to Hitler had virtually won his point, for Hitler never liked to alter a view he had once expressed.”

Dr Li Zhisui wrote that “Mao was easily persuaded of others’ ill intent. That is why it was so important in any dispute to get to see him first”.

And Sergo Beria wrote that with Stalin, “the first one to strike a blow was the winner”.

It is not clear why Trump is so susceptible to the “last” voice, although it may have something to do with the modern media scene in which Trump operates. There is always highly visible emerging news that his Chief of Staff, Susie Wiles noted, and Trump may be basically trying to ride the latest “situational” wave for boosting his fame!

What may be the other ways to influence Trump –particularly when media issues are not involved!

In 1926 the Turkish Independence Tribunal, using powers given to it by the 1925 Law for the Maintenance of Public Order, arrested General Kazim Karabekir and other war of independence colleagues of Ataturk on trumped-up charges; and, being subservient to Ataturk, wanted to execute them. Ataturk’s highly intelligent prime minister Ismet Inonu successfully used a combination of logic and flattery when Ataturk was weighing up whether to show some mercy: “You can be sure that as long as you are alive, your government will always be strong. The whole nation worships you. Ingratitude is confined only to a few deviants. If punishment is limited to them (the deviants and not Karabekir etc), your justice will increase the nation’s loyalty to you.”

There is another issue which is related to Trump the “actor” and the image he wants to present. As noted earlier, Bill O’Reilly says that The Apprentice years were “perfect for Trump: Trump’s in charge”; Trump’s making decisions etc.”[63] Strong leaders do not want others to see them being bested in a disagreement!

Soviet Admiral Kuznetsov realised he had more chance of influencing Joseh Stalin in a one-on-one meeting: “I became firmly convinced that it was best to make decisions when Stalin was alone. He then listened calmly and drew objective conclusions.” A similar point was made by Nikita Khrushchev: “It was always easier to exchange opinions with him candidly if we were alone.”

One good way to handle a narcistic leader is to slowly find a way help him (or her) reflect a little and then speak-up!

Albert Speer wrote that General Jodl, Hitler’s top military adviser who was always at headquarters, “rarely contradicted Hitler openly. He proceeded diplomatically. Usually, he did not express his thoughts at once, thus skirting difficult situations. Later he would persuade Hitler to yield, or even to reverse decisions already taken.”

According to one of Napoleon’s ministers of the interior, Jean-Jacques Cambaceres — initially the Second Consul and then Napoleon’s Arch-Chancellor and chief non-military lieutenant — “never attempted to confront or contradict that imperious character directly. That would have only pushed him to greater violence. Rather, he gave his fury a chance to develop fully, he gave him time to dictate the most iniquitous decrees; he prudently waited for the moment when that temper had spent itself without constraint to then offer some reflections. And if he did not always succeed in getting the measure in question revoked, he frequently managed to soften it.”

Then there is the parrot strategy! As noted earlier, Maggie Haberman wrote that Trump is so good at  “skimming ideas and thoughts and statements from other people and repackaging them as his own” that “campaign aides once called him a “sophisticated parrot.”[64] Other people can adopt the same strategy to influence a leader!

French Ambassador Poncet described Foreign Minister Joachim Ribbentrop’s methodology: “It consisted in listening religiously to his master’s endless monologues and in committing to memory the ideas developed by Hitler. More important, Ribbentrop noted the intentions to be divined behind those ideas. Then, after Hitler had forgotten ever discussing them with Ribbentrop, the courtier passed them off as his own. Struck by this concordance, Hitler attributed to his collaborator a sureness of judgement and a trenchant foresight singularly in agreement with his own deepest thoughts.” A member of his staff later confirmed this approach and noted: “If Ribbentrop found that Hitler had taken a stand different from what he had expected, he would immediately change his attitude.”

Joseph Goebbels neatly summed up the genre when referring to Field Marshal Keitel: “One might describe him as a ‘sentence-finisher’. He simply watches the Fuhrer’s lips and as soon as he sees where a sentence is heading, he is keen to finish it for him.”

And then there is the ever-present water-drip strategy for exerting influence!

According to Speer, Hitler “could be swayed by those who knew how to manage him. Hitler was mistrustful, to be sure. But he was so in a cruder sense, it often seemed to me; for he did not see through clever chess moves or subtle manipulation of his opinions. Since those who spoke out in candid terms on the important questions usually could not make Hitler change his mind, the cunning men naturally gained more and more power.” Martin Bormann was, according to Albert Speer, ‘little more than Hitler’s shadow’ who “never dared go on any lengthy business trips, or even to allow himself a vacation, for fear that his influence might diminish.” Speer wrote: “I had learned, from watching Bormann’s tactics, that one had to plant suspicions very carefully and gradually for them to be effective with Hitler. Any direct attempt to influence him was hopeless, since he never accepted a decision which he thought had been imposed on him.”

 

  • Psychology of Trump Influencing Others

Newt Gingrich says that Trump’s “ability to size up people as good as anybody I’ve ever seen. He understands what motivates them. He understands what how he can get what he wants from them.[65]

Maggie Haberman wrote: “Obsessed with other people’s secrets, Trump is expert at finding their weaknesses and exerting pressure on those weak points, as well as encouraging people to try to please him by taking risks on his behalf so that he can claim to be at a remove from the fallout.”[66]

Both Josef Stalin and Adolf Hitler had similar abilities to Trump. The Yugoslavian politician, Milovan Djilas, who had close dealings with Stalin and his lieutenants from 1944, observed that Stalin “sized up people quickly and was always particularly skilful in exploiting people’s weaknesses”.

In the same vein, Hitler was also a man of superior ability. Albert Speer noted that he “knew men’s secret vices and desires, he knew what they thought to be their virtues, he knew the hidden ambitions and motives which lay behind their loves and hates, he knew where they could be flattered, where they were gullible, where they were strong and where they were weak; he knew all this by instinct and feeling, an intuition which in such matters never led him astray.”

Even seemingly unconscious reaction of a leader can be inspiration, influential and command respect.

Maggie Haberman wrote: “Employees and advisers who wrapped their identities in him felt more bonded to him when he was under attack. (In the White House, aides who had not known him previously were struck by the projection of confidence at all times, even when he seemed to be at low points.) His most ardent fans saw pieces of themselves in him, or something they wanted to be like.”[67] The most obvious example was Trump’s immediate reaction to the attempted assassination attempt in July 2024.

Albert Speer wrote of the admiration he felt for Hitler in June 1944, when the war was going badly, and just prior to the 20 July assassination attempt: “His will often seemed to me as heedless and crude as that of a six-year-old child whom nothing can discourage or tire. But although it was in some ways ridiculous, it also commanded respect.”

 

  • The Special Role of Money

Journalist and commentator Mark Halperin says that “money is also a very important way to influence Trump. “Trump keeps score with a lot of different variables but money is really important to him and so what you’re seeing now, again largely below the radar, he’s raising a ton of money for his different campaign accounts — but he’s also asking corporations to make commitments to build manufacturing facilities in the United States, and other pots of money for his presidential library.”

According to Halperin: “Lobbyists all tell their clients: ‘You want to play big in Trump world, you want to be influential, you want to be part of the influential crowd and get what you want from the president, then you have to spend money. You either have to give a lot of campaign contributions or you have to you have to announce you’re going to spend money to help the US economy and campaign contributions.” We’re talking millions, and investing in America often we’re talking billions. If you can raise that money then you’re at the table. This White House keeps careful track of everything everyone’s ever said negative about Trump. He doesn’t forget but he does forgive particularly for the right price so there are people who’ve gotten big jobs in this administration, ambassadorships and other things because they understood the checkbook is king here. Trump is very transactional. He will turn on a dime. He will say “I hate this company, this company’s not done anything for me.” And then he’ll decide well they’ve said some nice things, they’ve put out some public statements, they donated some money — and you can go from being on the outs to being on the ins pretty quickly in Trump’s second presidency.[68]

Personal access to large amounts of money was more important to Napoleon than to Mao, Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin or Ataturk because Napoleon wanted money as a blatant direct way of buying support from military and non-military lieutenants. Hitler used what might be called “state funds” to buy support, and all turned a blind-eye to corruption if it suited them.

Napoleon had his “extraordinary domain” which consisted of the “the total resources supplied by conquest”. Napoleon had sole power to use these assets and their revenues as he wished – on the army, or for the encouragement and reward of civil or military services; and, of course, ensuring loyalty to himself. Napoleon’s third secretary, Fain, later wrote about the ‘extraordinary domain’ which Napoleon tightly and personally controlled: “My work was divided between two large books he always kept on a corner of his table, the list of holdings and the list of individuals. The list of holdings contained the gross total worth, in land and revenues, attributed to the extraordinary domain of Pomerania, Poland, … Belgium, … the French canals, the tolls on the Rhine, … and the Great Book of France. Next to the gross worth, the concessions deducted off the top were noted exactly, and what was left in available net worth appeared. The list of individuals was a sort of dictionary of grants. An account had been opened for each recipient and indicated there was not only the income that had been granted to him, but also the holdings from which this income had been derived.

Sometimes Napoleon’s lieutenants just took what they wanted, and Napoleon turned a blind-eye. When Napoleon was told that one of his marshals had walked into an Italian pawnshop and stuffed his pockets with jewels, he retorted: “Don’t talk to me about generals who love money. It was only that which enabled me to win the battle of Eylau. Marshal Ney wanted to reach Elbing to procure more funds.”

Mao’s doctor, Li Zhisui wrote that “the honesty of his staff was not a major concern. If an underling was useful, no matter what his other failings, Mao would protect and keep him safe.”

In 1941, Galeazzo Ciano wrote of the dismissal of Achille Starace as head of the fascist black shirt militia. Mussolini had complained that “Starace sends a militiaman to walk his four dogs!” However, “the Duce’s most serious complaint is that Starace wears a distinguished service medal without authorization. The criticism regarding financial doings finds fewer echoes in Mussolini’s mind.”

According to Hans Lammers, Hitler’s Chancellery Chief-of-Staff, “bonuses were granted in land and property, chiefly however in cash to ‘deserving men’”; with recipients including Foreign Minister Joachim Ribbentrop, Field Marshal Keitel, General Guderian, and Lammers himself. He noted:

“Category of bonus eligibles whom the Fuhrer personally designated: Minister, State Secretaries, General of the Army, Generals, Reichleiters (regional representatives of the central government), Gauleiters (regional Nazi party leaders), etc. Usual amount of the bonus in these cases: between one hundred thousand Reichsmark and a million Reichsmark. Occasion for granting the bonus: birthdays (fiftieth, fifty-fifth and sixtieth), special anniversaries, retirement from work etc.”

In late 1942 Hermann Goering journeyed to Italy with Field-Marshal Rommel, ostensibly to help co-ordinate operations in North Africa where the German and Italian forces were under pressure. However, Goering showed little interest in the task at hand. Instead, he went shopping for art works, flaunted his diamond ring – “one of the most valuable stones in the world” – and bragged to Rommel: “They call me the Maecenas of the Third Reich.”

 

I.  Admitting Mistake / Being Wrong

Journalist Leland Vittert, in a conversation with Bill O’Reilly, said that “one thing has been a constant in Donald Trump’s world is that he never admits he’s wrong and he never says I’m sorry. Vittert quotes Don Trump Jnr as saying “never in my entire life have I heard my father admit to a mistake”.[69] Maggie Haberman wrote that the “Bad Trump” would “occasionally recognize that he had gone too far, but instead of apologizing, he would be effusive toward his target the next time they saw each other.”[70]

Louis Bourreinne wrote that Napoleon had a similar approach.  Napoleon “was never known to say, ‘I have done wrong’: his usual observation was, ‘I begin to think there is something wrong’.” Nikita Khrushchev recalled Stalin’s efforts at this: “More than once, after being rude or spiteful to me, he would express his goodwill. But God forbid that there should have been any kind of apology! No. Apologies were alien to his very nature.”

Maggie Haberman wrote that “people also describe Trump as lonely, and often a people pleaser as much as he is a fighter, frequently allergic to direct interpersonal conflict.”[71]Trump does not like “direct one-on-one confrontation”.[72] “Trump is generally uninterested in face-to-face, one-on-one confrontation without a crowd backing him up.”[73]

As discussed earlier in this text, Trump the “actor” needs to be seen as a strong leader – as in The Apprentice television reality series: “Trump’s in charge”; Trump’s making decisions etc.”[74] Trump fears some internal psychological weaknesses will emerge if he is not publicly proclaiming his strength.

Louis Bourreinne wrote of Napoleon’s similar lack of confidence without a crowd backing him up: “When he was going to reprimand anyone he liked to have a witness present. He would then say the harshest things, and level blows against which few could bear up. In scenes of this sort I have frequently observed that the presence of a third person seemed to give him confidence. Consequently, in a ‘tête-à-tête’ interview, anyone who knew his character, and who could maintain sufficient coolness and firmness, was sure to get the better of him.” General Caulaincourt gave an example of this when Napoleon dressed down his Ambassador to Warsaw in 1812 for not being able to provide Polish reinforcements for the retreating Grand Army: “The Emperor desired the presence of a third party to increase M. de Pradt discomfiture, and he bade me remain. When I explained, however, that certain orders had to be given for the continuation of our journey he let me go, bidding me send for (others to be present).”

 

J.  Grievances

In 2022 Trump biographer Maggie Haberman wrote that “Trump had spent his life “dragging a deep raft of old grievances into the present.”[75] Haberman wrote: “Trump’s need to live in the eternal now usually outweighs any ability to think of the long term. But Trump also lives in the eternal past, constantly dragging a deep raft of old grievances — or impressions of better days lost — into the present, where he tries to force others to relive them along with him. His willingness to take a course of action that he knows will inflame critics and lead to him being seen as tough has guided him for decades.”[76]

This trait has continued to manifest itself during the first part of Trump’s second presidency in 2025 as he continues to insist – as in a 13 July 2025 TruthSocial post — that “the 2020 Election was Rigged and Stolen, and they tried to do the same thing in 2024”.

Haberman wrote that Trump’s “thirst for fame seemed to grow each time he tasted more of it, and his anger at being wounded, which was often met only with an outsize reaction against the person he blamed for the injury, was always there. Trump almost always foreclosed few options until the last possible minute and modulated his behavior only when he had to; more often than not, he waited out people and institutions who posed resistance, ultimately bending them to his will through inertia. That version of Trump was the one who was most often seen in the eight weeks leading to the violent aftermath of his 2020 loss on 6 January 2021.”[77]

Mao Zedong, Napoleon Bonaparte, Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Josef Stalin and Kemal Ataturk all had grievances – both personal and political. Ultimately they had more power than Trump to do something about it. Here we will concentrate on the personal.

Louis Bourreinne, Napoleon’s first secretary who had known him since they were children, wrote that Napoleon was “not a man to sacrifice the interests of policy to personal resentment”.

Mao Zedong was probably at the other end of the scale with grievances against many of his revolutionary colleagues who refused to acknowledge his primacy after the Communist Party came to power in 1949. Mao seems to have particularly focused on Defence Minister Peng Dehuai who criticized Mao’s “cult of the personality” and the Great Leap Forward (the industrialization campaign which began in 1958). Mao wrote: “Where Peng Dehuai is concerned, I have always had a rule. If he attacks, I attack back. It is thirty percent cooperation, seventy percent conflict – it has been like that for thirty-one years.” Peng was sacked from his position in 1959 and thereafter lived a precarious life until his death in a prison hospital in 1974. Because of his grievances Mao often allowed old colleagues to be persecuted during the Cultural Revolution (which began in 1966) and ensured that they were denied medical treatment when seriously in need.

According to Maggie Haberman, “for all the talk of how Trump values loyalty, he has been most abusive to those who readily offer it, and he enjoys watching people who had previously criticized him grovel in search of his forgiveness or approval.[78]

The very capable Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was probably Mao Zedong’s most loyal lieutenant. According to Dr Li, Zhou was “Mao’s slave, absolutely, obsequiously obedient”. Despite this, Mao wanted Zhou to essentially grovel for medical treatment when he was diagnosed with cancer in 1972. Mao demanded that Zhou make a self-criticism in front of 300 top officials for his “past errors”. Zhou concluded saying: “I have always thought, and will think, that I cannot be at the helm, and can only be an assistant.” He later got his medical treatment!

Bill O’Reilly claims that Trump is “not malevolent. He’s transactional and he wants to win every transaction and when he feels that he’s won it’s over”.[79] This might seem to be an odd comment given that Trump is continually railing against people associated with the Biden era, but Trump seems to aim to “get even” rather than look for new chances to hurt people.

 As should be clear by now, the various examples in this text suggest that Mao Zedong and Joseph Stalin were certainly malevolent to individuals who were not accepting their supremacy. At the other extreme, Napoleon could be quite forgiving. A notable case being Charles-Maurice-Talleyrand — who initially was attracted to Napoleon because of the “irresistible aura that only a genius can admit” – but fell out with Napoleon over his war-like policies and resigned as Foreign Minister in 1807. He was was given a relatively powerless but well renumerated position. By 1809 Talleyrand was suspected of trying to go behind Napoleon’s back to organize peace with France’s enemies. Napoleon gave him a “violent” dressing down – calling him “just a common shit in silk stockings” – but let him off lightly. But Talleyrand was still around and free in 1812 when Napoleon told General Caulaincourt that he was “a born intriguer and quite immoral”. “He is very witty and certainly the most capable of all the ministers I have had. I am no longer angry with him. He would still be a minister if he had wished to be.” Eventually, in 1814, the French Senate was led by Talleyrand to officially vote to overthrow Napoleon.

 

K.  Trump’s Executive Team

 So far this text has strongly focused on Donald Trump with his “executive team” only individually mentioned if this contributed to an understanding of Trump.

This section aims to further out understanding of Trump by considering the lives of some of the people who work for him: why they want to be part of his executive team, and why he chose them. An attempt is made to match some prominent members of Trump’s team with people who worked with Napoleon Bonaparte, Adolf Hitler, Mao Zedong, Benito Mussolini, Josef Stalin and Kemal Ataturk.

Trump’s executive team does not include many talented people of the caliber of Albert Speer, Herman Goering, Joseph Fouche, Charles-Maurice Talleyrand, Ismet Inonu, Zhou Enlai, Liu Shaoqi, Vyacheslav Molotov or Lavrenti Beria. (Note that when talking about “caliber” I am not referring to their political beliefs or morality.)

There are two main reasons for this relative lack of talent in Trump’s executive team. One is that Trump is truly interested in few policy issues apart from tariffs and immigration and tends to choose people based on how they look in the electronic media and how obsequious they are to him. The other reason is that – unlike a Stalin, Mao or Ataturk – Trump truly achieved power without serious assistance because of his own actions and personality and is not forced to share that power. In this he is more like Napoleon, Hitler and Mussolini – he calls the shots!

Sergo Beria wrote that Stalin “had not raised many intelligent people to the rank of his closest associates because he feared that such would hinder his actions. But neither could he allow himself to choose only imbeciles if he wanted results.”

Mark Halperin has said that “everyone I talked to says in this administration there’s more of a psychic connection between the president and most of his cabinet members”.[80] This is undoubtedly because Trump leant from his presidential term that it is much easier to work with people who have the same goals and interests as you.

Albert Speer noted how, “over the years”, Hitler had “assembled around himself a group of associates who more and more surrendered to his arguments and translated them into action more and more unscrupulously”.

Soon after his 1954 appointment as Mao’s doctor, Li Zhisui noted “a strong correlation between the flattery Mao received and the speed with which the flatterers were promoted” and by 1961, Dr Li noticed “Mao’s growing willingness to promote his sycophantic followers regardless of their abilities or skills”. Mussolini summed it all up nicely when someone, queried the appointment of Achille Starace as General Secretary of the Italian Fascist Party in 1931: “But you realise that Starace is a cretino?” Mussolini replied: “I know. But he is an obedient cretino.”

In August 1941, General Heinz Guderian – who was not yet in the very top ranks of the generals – met with Hitler to discuss some details of the operations against the Russians with which he disagreed. Guderian later wrote: “I saw here for the first time a spectacle with which I was later to become very familiar: all those present – Field Marshal Keitel, General Jodl and others – nodded in agreement with every sentence that Hitler uttered, while I was left alone with my point of view.”

Halperin says that: “like any courters in the king’s court they’re also concerned: am I up, am I down, what are they saying about me? That’s another thing the lobbyists collect information about: what the president and others are saying about the cabinet”[81]

Speer wrote of 1943: “The world in which we lived forced upon us dissimulation and hypocrisy. Among rivals an honest word was rarely spoken, for fear it would be carried back to Hitler in a distorted version. Everyone conspired, took Hitler’s capriciousness into his reckonings, and won or lost in the course of this cryptic game.”

This courtiers concern about their position is not the result of intrinsic paranoia but, according to Maggie Haberman, was driven by Trump who “created an environment perpetually beset by rivalries, where those in his circle became fixated on tearing down whoever had begun to win his favor.” “He encouraged people to take risky actions in his name, and demanded they prove themselves to him over and over, and many were so eager for his approval that they obliged.”[82]Haberman wrote that one of Trump’s “tricks” “is the backbiting about one adviser with another adviser, creating a wedge between them.”[83]

Mao Zedong summed the attitude of the successful dictator nicely when he commented on his staff: “They are always competing with each other, courting my favour. I can make use of them.” Thus, according to Dr Li, Mao “was constantly gathering information to play us off against each other”.

Dr Li noted, “Mao cultivated the discord, and when the divisions threatened to go too far, he would step in to mediate the dispute, serving as peacemaker, bringing us back to what was always an unstable, short-lived equilibrium.”

The result was that, as Sergo Beria noted in the Soviet armaments sector, “informers’ tales and calumnies flourished”. Sergo Beria called this the “the art of harnessing together men who could not stand one another”, and said that Stalin “practised this at every level”.

Albert Speer wrote that “Hitler did not foster any social ties among the leaders” such as Hess, Himmler, Goebbels and Goring. “In fact, as his situation grew increasingly critical in later years, he watched any efforts at rapprochement with keen suspicion.” Speer recalled a 1943 lunch with Hitler and Goebbels at which Hitler sowed discord: “As usual he made disparaging remarks about almost all of his associates except those of us who were present.”

According to Michael Wolff: “Trump, who is lazy, lets other people be in charge until they are perceived as being in charge and then they are no longer in charge.”[84]

In his diary, Galeazzo Ciano recorded the 1941 sacking of Achille Starace, and the effect of this on Mussolini’s other lieutenants: “Unless there are reasons that have escaped me, Starace’s sacking and especially the manner in which it was done were unjust.” However, it “made a deep impression on older Fascists, including the enemies of Starace, because everyone sees in this arbitrary and unmotivated punishment a direct personal threat”. Mussolini may have simply been sending an ‘I am boss’ message, as several weeks later Ciano added that “it is my impression that the Duce’s anger doesn’t go very deep. If Starace accepts the Duce’s scolding without kicking, in a short time we shall see him rising up to power again.”

In early 1943, Mussolini sacked a number of lieutenants, including Ciano, who had disagreed with his decision to side with Hitler. Bottai, one of those sacked, noted in his diary: “What has Mussolini being trying to do? To distract people from the great interrogation marks of the hour. And then, to show his power over men.”

In regard to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio who Trump disparaged in the past, Bill O’Reilly says: “Little Marco is now Secretary of State. Little Marco went to Big Marco and Secretary of State because he did was what Senator Cruz did and what a whole bunch of other Republicans did. They surrendered”[85] David Rothkcopf, a former US official involved in foreign policy and now a commentator says: “I think Marco Rubio does what he thinks the Secretary of State is supposed to do and Trump does what he wants to do and I doesn’t really pay much attention to Rubio’s feelings.”[86]

Admiral Doenitz, Hitler’s naval chief, made a point about Joachim Ribbentrop that sometimes applies to Trump – when his over-powering ego shield was lowered: “I don’t think that Hitler was so dull as not to have seen through his stupidity, but I imagine he purposely kept such a man as his Foreign Minister, so he could run the show himself.”

Michael Wolff says “Pete Hegseth is a moron. I mean, I don’t think that’s a difficult leap for anyone.[87]

In 1938, Hitler reorganised the German armed forces leadership structure, appointing himself as Supreme Commander. However, he still needed a Chief-of-Staff and he asked Field Marshal Blomberg about the then General Wilhelm Keitel. Blomberg replied that Keitel was “nothing more than the man who runs my office”. This suited Hitler: “That’s exactly the man I am looking for.”

Blomberg later noted “the general opinion is that Hitler kept Keitel firmly at his side, because he was convinced of his unquestioning obedience as a soldier and unswerving loyalty.” Indeed, Hitler had chosen well and was soon to say that he could not do without Keitel because he was “loyal as a dog”.

According to Maggie Haberman, Trump sought an endless stream of praise, prompting a range of aides to offer it in his presence or on television.”[88] The “celebratory 100-day cabinet meeting” in 2025 was a case in point. Pam Bondi, attorney-general, gushed during the televised session: “Mr President, your first 100 days has far exceeded that of any other presidency in this country ever, ever. [I’ve] never seen anything like it, thank you.”[89]

Lin Biao, reflecting on the disastrous Great Leap Forward – the industrialization campaign from 1958 to  1962 — which he thought “pure idealism”, commented that “whoever did not speak falsely fell from power”. He was thus ever ready to flatter Mao, and in 1966 began a speech by saying “Chairman Mao is a genius. One single sentence surpasses ten thousand of ours”. A few years later he told the 1969 Ninth Party Congress that “at any given time, in all important questions, Chairman Mao always charts the course. In our work we do no more than follow in his wake.” Mao loved it. Some years before, after a similar speech, he had commented that “Lin Biao’s words are always so clear and direct. They are simply superb. Why can’t the other party leaders be so perceptive?”

“Mao basked in the flattery”, wrote Dr Li, “even when he suspected that it was not sincere, knowing that over time he would be able to distinguish the genuine political loyalists from the sycophants”.

Nikita Khrushchev wrote that Politburo member Lazar Kaganovich “was nothing but a lackey” to Stalin – and that Stalin pretended not to love it; although, he clearly did! “Kaganovich used to throw back his chair, bring himself to his full height, and bellow: ‘Comrades! It’s time for us to tell the people the truth. Everyone in the Party keeps talking about Lenin and Leninism. We’ve got to be honest with ourselves. What was accomplished under him? Compare it with what has been accomplished under Stalin! The time has come to replace the slogan “Long Live Leninism” with the slogan “Long Live Stalinism”.’ While he would rant on like this, we would all keep absolutely silent and lower our eyes. Stalin was always the first and only one to dispute Kaganovich. ‘What are you talking about?’ he would say, ‘How dare you say that?!’ But you could tell from the tone in Stalin’s voice that he was hoping someone would contradict him. This ‘dispute’ between Kaganovich and Stalin became more frequent, right up until Stalin’s death. No one ever interfered.”

In 1932, when Celal Bayer was appointed Minister of National Economy, he had signalled his ambition and his willingness to ‘obey’ by telegraphing Ataturk: “I will work as your idealistic labourer on the radiant road opened by your great genius, which comprehends better than anyone the needs of the people and the country.” In 1937, after Mustafa Kemal Ataturk had been dictator for over a decade, one of his loyal lieutenants spoke in the National Assembly about a contentious issue: “Words and anxieties like ‘That side, this side…’ should be refrained from. Our direction of worship is the same. And that is Ataturk.”

One of Mussolini’s lieutenants, Giuseppe Bottai, indicated to Mussolini his infinite “faith in your thought and method”, and that he and his friends knew they worked “in Fascism and for Fascism and, above all for You, whom we acknowledge as the spiritual chief of our generation”. And Dino Grandi (who was to play a prominent part in Mussolini’s July 1943 downfall) wrote to Mussolini in March 1940: “To become ever more one of the new Italians whom you are hammering into shape; that is the aim of my life, my faith and my soul, which have been yours for twenty-five years, my Duce.”

Wolff: If you flatter Trump he will flatter you back.[90]

Albert Speer wrote that one evening in 1943 Adolf Hitler and Josef Goebbels heaped praise on one another. Speer wrote that Goebbels used a “masterly brew” of “brilliantly polished phrases” to “strengthen Hitler’s self-assurance and to flatter his vanity”. In such circumstances, the leader’s belief in the primacy of ‘self’ can only be boosted. Speer wrote that Hitler “reciprocated by magnifying his Propaganda Minister’s achievements and thus giving him cause for pride”.

[1] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, 2022, Prologue

[2] Andrew Hill, “What management theory tells us about Trump’s ‘team of rivals’”, Financial Times, 17 May

[3] Trump’s Unique Intelligence, Underrated Intuitive Nature, and “Alpha Male” Energy, w/ Newt Gingrich

[4] Andrew Hill, “What management theory tells us about Trump’s ‘team of rivals’”, Financial Times, 17 May 2025

[5] Trump’s ominous ICE security state

[6] Bill O’Reilly reveals who Trump is when cameras are off | The United States of Trump

[7] Trump’s trade policy continues to create ‘confusion’ and ‘uncertainty’ Interview with Nial Ferguson

[8] Bill O’Reilly reveals who Trump is when cameras are off | The United States of Trump

[9] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Epilogue

[10] Trump’s trade policy continues to create ‘confusion’ and ‘uncertainty’ Interview with Nial Ferguson

[11] Michael Wolff, All or Nothing: How Trump Recaptured America, Epilogue

[12] Trump’s Right Hand: The Most Powerful Person Behind the Scenes

[13] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[14] Bill O’Reilly reveals who Trump is when cameras are off | The United States of Trump

[15] Trump’s Unique Intelligence, Underrated Intuitive Nature, and “Alpha Male” Energy, w/ Newt Gingrich

[16] Trump’s Unique Intelligence, Underrated Intuitive Nature, and “Alpha Male” Energy, w/ Newt Gingrich

[17] The US president “is a moron and a genius” Trump biographer Michael Wolff speaks to The Daily T

[18] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[19] Bill O’Reilly reveals who Trump is when cameras are off | The United States of Trump

[20] The US president “is a moron and a genius” Trump biographer Michael Wolff speaks to The Daily 

[21] Michael Wolff, All or Nothing: How Trump Recaptured America, Chapter 6

[22] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[23] The US president “is a moron and a genius” Trump biographer Michael Wolff speaks to The Daily T

[24] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[25] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[26] Bill O’Reilly reveals who Trump is when cameras are off | The United States of Trump

[27] Trump’s Unique Intelligence, Underrated Intuitive Nature, and “Alpha Male” Energy, w/ Newt Gingrich

[28] Bill O’Reilly reveals who Trump is when cameras are off | The United States of Trump

[29] Bill O’Reilly reveals who Trump is when cameras are off | The United States of Trump

[30] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[31] Bill O’Reilly reveals who Trump is when cameras are off | The United States of Trump

[32] Bill O’Reilly reveals who Trump is when cameras are off | The United States of Trump

[33] Bill O’Reilly reveals who Trump is when cameras are off | The United States of Trump

[34] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[35] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[36] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[37] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[38] Trump’s Seven Rules For Making Decisions, and Vance’s Transformation, with Batya, Bolling, Knowles (July 2025)

[39] Trump’s Unique Intelligence, Underrated Intuitive Nature, and “Alpha Male” Energy, w/ Newt Gingrich

[40] The US president “is a moron and a genius” Trump biographer Michael Wolff speaks to The Daily T

[41] Trump’s Seven Rules For Making Decisions, and Vance’s Transformation, with Batya, Bolling, Knowles (July 2025)

[42] Trump’s Unique Intelligence, Underrated Intuitive Nature, and “Alpha Male” Energy, w/ Newt Gingrich

[43] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Epilogue

[44] How to Navigate Trumpworld, Trump’s War on Harvard, and Why the Dems are Lost in the Wilderness

[45] Trump’s Seven Rules For Making Decisions, and Vance’s Transformation, with Batya, Bolling, Knowles (July 2025)

[46] Trump’s Seven Rules For Making Decisions, and Vance’s Transformation, with Batya, Bolling, Knowles (July 2025)

[47] Trump’s Seven Rules For Making Decisions, and Vance’s Transformation, with Batya, Bolling, Knowles (July 2025)

[48] Trump’s Seven Rules For Making Decisions, and Vance’s Transformation, with Batya, Bolling, Knowles (July 2025)

[49] Bill O’Reilly reveals who Trump is when cameras are off | The United States of Trump

[50] Trump’s Seven Rules For Making Decisions, and Vance’s Transformation, with Batya, Bolling, Knowles (July 2025)

[51] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[52] Trump’s Right Hand: The Most Powerful Person Behind the Scenes

[53] Trump’s Seven Rules For Making Decisions, and Vance’s Transformation, with Batya, Bolling, Knowles (July 2025)

[54] Why Trump ‘Reamed Out’ Hegseth For Parade Fiasco | The Daily Beast Podcast

[55] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[56] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[57] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[58] How to Navigate Trumpworld, Trump’s War on Harvard, and Why the Dems are Lost in the Wilderness

[59] Why Stephen Miller and JD Vance Have All the Power, Plus Rand Paul’s Favorite Trump Admin Disruptors, Mark Halprin

[60] Mark Halperin on Trump vs. Elon Musk, and What Trump is Like When He Loves You and When He Hates You

[61] Bill O’Reilly reveals who Trump is when cameras are off | The United States of Trump

[62] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Chapter 23

[63] Bill O’Reilly reveals who Trump is when cameras are off | The United States of Trump

[64] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[65] Trump’s Unique Intelligence, Underrated Intuitive Nature, and “Alpha Male” Energy, w/ Newt Gingrich

[66] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[67] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[68] How to Navigate Trumpworld, Trump’s War on Harvard, and Why the Dems are Lost in the Wilderness

[69] Bill O’Reilly reveals who Trump is when cameras are off | The United States of Trump

[70] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[71] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[72] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Chapter 20

[73] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Chapter 27

[74] Bill O’Reilly reveals who Trump is when cameras are off | The United States of Trump

[75] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[76] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[77] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[78] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[79] Bill O’Reilly reveals who Trump is when cameras are off | The United States of Trump

[80] How to Navigate Trumpworld, Trump’s War on Harvard, and Why the Dems are Lost in the Wilderness

[81] How to Navigate Trumpworld, Trump’s War on Harvard, and Why the Dems are Lost in the Wilderness

[82] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[83] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[84] Why Trump ‘Reamed Out’ Hegseth For Parade Fiasco | The Daily Beast Podcast

[85] Bill O’Reilly reveals who Trump is when cameras are off | The United States of Trump

[86] David Rothkopf, “Trump Is Most ‘Impotent’ President In A Lifetime”, The Daily Beast Podcast, June 2025

[87] What Trump Really Thinks About Tucker and Tulsi | The Daily Beast Podcast

[88] Maggie Haberman “Confidence Man: the Definitive Biography of Donald Trump”, Prologue

[89] Andrew Hill, “What management theory tells us about Trump’s ‘team of rivals’”, Financial Times, 17 May 2025

[90] The US president “is a moron and a genius” Trump biographer Michael Wolff speaks to The Daily 

Trump’s Security Adviser Stephen Miller & Himmler-Bormann

Trump’s Security Adviser Stephen Miller & Himmler-Bormann

Introduction 

Stephen Miller is Donald Trump’s homeland security adviser and may become the official National Security Adviser. Miller is a driven man whose psychology is a combination of those of Adolf Hitler lieutenants Martin Bormann and Heinrich Himmler. Miller’s Instagram posts suggest a potential Walter Mattner!

Trump biographer Michael Wolf says that the bond between Miller and Trump has grown to such an extent that Miller has been dubbed by some as “the president’s Id”. According to Sigmund Freud’s psychoanalytic theory, the “Id” is the instinct-driven, pleasure-seeking part of the mind, focused on immediate gratification. 

Freud also wrote about: “Superego” which is the “moral conscience”, representing societal and parental standards, striving for ideal behaviour; and “Ego” which is a rational mediator that balances the Id’s impulses with real-world constraints and the ideal standards of the “Superego”. (Freud’s original words in German referred to Id as “the it”, Ego as “I”, and Superego as “over-I”.)

If Heinrich Himmler was Adolf Hitler’s Id, then Martin Bormann was probably Hitler’s Ego. Stephen Miller has the extreme ideology bent of Himmler combined with the practical ambition for power and thuggish personality of Bormann. If he is Trump’s Id, he also has aspects of Trump’s Ego. Neither Himmler, Bormann, Miller or Trump have much use for Superego!

Miller-Himmler-Bormann: Id & Ego

In any personality there is a combination of Id, Ego and Superego that is not fixed at any time. Heinrich Himmler was, according to Albert Speer, not without “remarkable qualities: the quality of patience to listen; the quality of long reflection before coming to decisions; a talent for selecting his staff, who on the whole turned out to be highly effective people”. Despite having these Ego personality traits, they were ultimately subservient to Himmler’s racial cleansing Id ambitions – as may be the case with Stehen Miller who has a talent for “bureaucratic maneuvering”. Himmler was not an aggressive personality like Martin Bormann and Miller. Walter Schellenberg, an influential subordinate, described him as “a coward, not a brave man”; and General Heinz Guderian recalled Himmler’s “lack of self-assurance and courage in Hitler’s presence”; and Himmler was also clearly intimidated by Guderian’s powerful personality. Bormann was in many ways the opposite of Himmler because his Id was simply power itself and this fitted well with Ego personality traits.

An aide to Joseph Goebbels wrote in his diary that neither Himmler nor Borman trusted “the other out of his sight”. In Miller’s case the Id of Himmler and the Ego of Bormann are more concentrated in one person. 

Since he was a teenager Miller has publicly expressed extreme ideas – particularly suggesting a feeling of racial superiority. Miller often lets the Himmler Id part of his personality operate with little Bormann Ego constraint. According to a Wall Street Journal (WSJ) article, the teen-age Miller “was known for arguing with teachers, hijacking school events, and winning attention with his outrageous antics. In both high school and college, he would be repeatedly observed throwing trash on the floor and then insisting that the custodial staff pick it up. In a video from this period he is seen giving a speech with microphone in hand saying: “Am I the only one here who is sick and tired of being told to pick up my trash when we have plenty of janitors who are paid to do it for us?” 

In “Hatemonger: Stephen Miller, Donald Trump, and the White Nationalist Agenda”, author Jean Guerrero recounts one episode when he suddenly ditched a close friend, Jason Islas, on the grounds of his ethnicity. “The conversation was remarkably calm,” Islas, a Mexican American, is quoted saying. “He expressed hatred for me (his Id) in a calm, cool, matter-of-fact (Ego) way.”

After Trump launched his first presidential campaign in 2015, Miller was appointed a speech writer because of Trump’s focus on immigration. According to the WSJ, “the pair have been politically inseparable ever since. Miller wrote Trump’s dystopian ‘American carnage’ speech for his first inauguration in January 2017. As a senior policy adviser in the first Trump administration, it was Miller who was behind some of its most notorious policy initiatives. These included the so-called ‘Muslim ban’ on travellers from seven majority-Muslim countries and the practice of separating migrant children from their parents at the southern border.”

According to Trump biographer, Maggie Haberman, Miller continually urged Trump to call in the military to suppress The Black Lives Matter protests that followed the death of George Floyd in 2020.

When Biden later won that electoral-vote count to become president, Miller was at the forefront questioning its legitimacy. Miller stuck by Trump when many staffers quit their jobs after the Jan. 6, 2021, attack on the Capitol. He had helped draft Trump’s speech that morning and worked until 12 p.m. on Jan. 20 — the day Trump’s first term ended — telling the officer taking his badge he would be back in four years.” 

During the Biden presidency, according to the WSJ article, “Miller continued to play an active role across the Republican Party, even if his outreach wasn’t always welcome. Congressional aides fielded lengthy calls from Miller about illegal immigration, often without any specific requests. One likened him to a grandmother who wouldn’t stop talking and said his calls were akin to listening to a podcast. Others said he would call to scold aides about how they had framed a social-media post on a particular issue or criticizing the way they had worded a press release.”

Here we see evidence of the Ego part in Miller’s personality as he tries to operate in a similar way to Bormann who always aimed to appear to be practically constructive with Hitler.

But, according to the WSJ, Miller was later “a regular visitor to Mar-a-Lago during the 2024 campaign and always wanted to talk more about immigration – his Id! Trump’s top pollster, Tony Fabrizio, and his other aides wanted to keep the message on the economy – that is, on Ego. 

The WSJ says that Miller is now “wielding more power than almost any other White House staffer in recent memory”. “Miller, who isn’t a lawyer, first suggested using the wartime Alien Enemies Act to deport migrants, which the Justice Department pursued. He also privately, then publicly, floated suspending habeas corpus, or the right for prisoners to challenge their detention in court, which the administration hasn’t tried.” “Miller’s orders to increase arrests regardless of migrants’ criminal histories set off days of protests in Los Angeles. Miller coordinated the federal government’s response, giving orders to agencies including the Pentagon, when Trump sent in the Marines and the National Guard.”

Apart from these Himmler-type Id issues, Miller has become involved in many Bormann-type Ego issues where the focus is on real-world constraints. According to the WSJ, “Miller now tells other staffers how to behave around Trump and has upgraded his office from one on a different floor to one step from the Oval Office.” Miller tries to be involved in “almost every issue Trump is interested in. In recent months, he talked to CEOs about a coming tariff announcement; joined a meeting between Meta Chief Executive Mark Zuckerberg and Trump about the company’s antitrust case; and met with other tech companies on artificial intelligence.” “Even some posts at cabinet agencies have been described by administration officials as reporting directly to Miller, effectively bypassing cabinet secretaries.”

Martin Bormann, according to Albert Speer, was “little more than Hitler’s shadow” who “never dared go on any lengthy business trips, or even to allow himself a vacation, for fear that his influence might diminish”. Like Bormann with Hitler, Miller sticks close to Trump and, according to the WSJ he “has written or edited every executive order that Trump has signed”. “Miller keeps in Trump’s good graces by giving Trump ideas — but more importantly, helping the president carry his own out.”

The WSJ reported that “Administration officials noted how Miller shut down discussion about whether the U.S. should bomb Houthi targets in a Signal chat that was accidentally shared with The Atlantic’s editor in chief. As the vice president and top national security officials discussed options, Miller weighed in. ‘As I heard it, the president was clear’, Miller said. ‘Green light’, he added.”

Speer recalled that Bormann’s approach – ie mostly Ego centric – was admired by Hitler but also meant that Bormann had more power than Hitler would have actually intended: “In a few sentences he would report on the memoranda sent to him. He spoke monotonously and with seeming objectivity and would then advance his own solution. Hitler usually merely nodded and spoke his terse, ‘Agreed’. On the basis of this one word, or even a vague comment by Hitler, which was hardly meant as a directive, Bormann would often draft lengthy instructions. In this way ten or more important decisions were sometimes made within half an hour. De facto, Bormann was conducting the internal affairs of the Reich (ie Germany).” Walter Funk, the Minister of Economics, complained that it was “incredibly hard to have a reasonable conversation with the Fuhrer because Bormann butts in all the time. He cuts me short and constantly interrupts.”

Relationship with Leader

Trump – who is very Ego transactional most of the time when he manages to supress his Id – appears wary of some of Miller’s Id “masturbatory fantasies of immigration and deportation”. According to Trump biographer Michael Wolff, Trump has referred to Miller as Weird Stephen.” According to the New York Times, Trump told a campaign meeting in 2024 that if it was up to Miller there would only be 100 million people living in the US – and all of them would look like Miller.

Nevertheless, Trump values Miller for his combination of Himmler Id and Borman Ego personality.  Asked by Kristen Welker, the moderator of NBC’s Meet the Press, about speculation that Miller might become National Security Adviser, a White House post currently filled temporarily by Secretary of state, Marco Rubio, after the previous incumbent, Mike Waltz, was fired Trump replied: “Stephen is much higher on the totem pole than that.” 

Is there any sort of personal relationship between Miller and Trump? 

While Himmler spent a lot of time with Hitler, there is little evidence of a close personal relationship because Hitler regarded Himmler as “inartistic” – an almost career ending comment! Speer recalled that one day in March 1943, Hitler invited himself and Goebbels to lunch: “Oddly enough, on such occasions he refrained from asking Bormann – who was otherwise indispensable – to join him. In this respect, he treated Bormann entirely as a secretary.” Speer elaborated on this: “Bormann’s control – and power – only went as far as Hitler allowed it to go. Hitler trusted him implicitly but, although Bormann was always there, he had no personal relationship with him. He valued him immensely for his quite incredible diligence and as a totally loyal vassal, but always as a vassal. In all my years near Hitler I don’t think I ever heard Hitler make a private remark to him.” Speaking of Bormann, Speer opined that “a few critical words from Hitler and all his enemies would have been at his throat”.

Video (and Text) comparing Putin’s rise and consolidation of power to other historical dictators

Video (and Text) comparing Putin's rise and consolidation of power to other historical dictators

In this video presentation we consider how successful dictators, such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin, managed to obtain power and then keep that power for prolonged periods of time.

The essential ingredients, apart from some good luck being at the right place at the right time, are very good public relations or PR skills and being ruthless with your potential competitors for power.

But before considering the case of Vladimir Putin in more detail, we look at some other very successful dictators.

Napoleon Bonaparte, Mao Zedong, Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini and Kemal Ataturk came to power in very public ways with war, revolution or domestic turmoil providing the opportunity.

All held the beginnings of dictatorial power right from the start, but all then took steps to make sure that any possible  competitors were eliminated.

In contrast to these dictators,  Joseph Stalin,  like Vladimir Putin, came to power after being a very successful bureaucrat.

Mao Zedong came to power in 1949 with a proclamation of the People’s Republic of China after the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist Kuomintang  forces and their retreat to Taiwan. Mao held multiple official positions at the same time. He was Head of State or Chairman of the Chinese Republic, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (which was the main policymaking body) and Chairman of the Politburo (which was the main executive  body).

Despite all these titles, Mao was seen by many of his senior revolutionary comrades as only a “first among equals”. However, Mao saw himself and his will as supreme.

Criticism of some of his policies by several of these old comrades from the pre-1949 wars, concerned Mao enough that over time he removed them from their positions and  contributed to their deaths.

Mao was careful about how he went about removing such threats to his power. Defence Minister Peng Dehuai was sacked in 1959 when he made critical comments about the Great Leap Forward  and was later arrested and beaten during the Cultural Revolution which began in 1966, and he died in prison in1974.

Liu Shaoqi, another revolutionary colleague, was imprisoned in 1967 and also beaten by Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution and died in 1969 after being denied medical treatment at the direction of Mao.

Deng Xiaoping, who was later to become China’s supreme leader after the death of Mao in 1976, was also purged from his position during the Cultural Revolution. Liu and Deng were, like Peng, revolutionary colleagues of Mao who criticized Mao’s cult of the personality.

Mao’s doctor for two decades, Li Zhisui, wrote that Mao wanted a cult of personality so that he could stay at the top. However, he did not want to be accused of fostering his own cult, and so “needed the illusion that the demand for his leadership came spontaneously from the masses themselves”.

According to Dr. Li, Liu Shaoqi’s problems really started when Mao resigned as Chairman of the Republic in 1959 in order to reduce his administrative work-load, but kept the more powerful positions of Chairman of the Communist Party of China and of the Politburo. Liu became the new Chairman of the Republic and took his new title and responsibilities much too seriously for Mao’s liking.

Dr Li later wrote that when Liu contacted tuberculosis in 1964, “galvanised Mao into action”. Though he could not attack his rival directly, he could make Liu’s life miserable. Mao issued a series of instructions concerning the health care of the highest leadership. They would no longer have their personal physicians. He ordered me to not get involved in treating Liu.”

 Deng Xiaoping’s character could be prickly, but Mao seems to have had a soft spot for him and for his administrative talents and possible future usefulness, and he was brought back to the position of power eventually. On the other hand, the very talented and useful Zou Enlai proclaimed that he “did not have the talent to be number one”.

And because Mao did not thus see him as a threat, Zou Enlai survived as China’s Premier from 1954 until his death in 1976.

Building on his reputation as a very successful general in a number of battles in both Europe and in countries around the Mediterranean Sea, Napoleon Bonaparte claimed the position of First Consul in the three-man French Consulate, which replaced the Directory in 1799. Napoleon told the French people that the “revolution is finished”, which was welcomed by many after a decade of bloodshed which had begun in 1789, and then moved to consolidate his own power. In 1802 Napoleon became Consul for Life and in 1804 Emperor of France.

Like all the other dictators in this study, Napoleon worked to promote his image as necessary for the future of his country. Napoleon’s childhood friend and first secretary, Louis Bourrienne, noted that Napoleon worked hard too “depreciate the reputations of his military commanders, and to throw on their shoulders faults which he had committed himself. He wrote news bulletins from the battle fields and his campaigns to be published in the Moniteur newspaper. These bulletins always announced what Napoleon wished to be believed true. Normally, there was falsity in the exaggerated descriptions of his victories, and falsity again in the suppression or palliation of his reverses and losses.”

Theophile Berlier, later to be one of Napoleon’s lieutenants, and many other Frenchmen were tired after a decade of revolution and war and sought someone, a “man”, to bring stability.  Berlier later recalled that at the time he believed the undoubtedly strong Napoleon to be “the man sent by providence to consolidate our republican institutions and make them respected in all of Europe”. But as, Napoleon’s brother Joseph wrote, Napoleon was less interested in Republican institutions and had other ideas. “Napoleon wants the need for his existence to be so direly felt, and as such a great boon, that anybody would recoil at any other possibility.”

Napoleon experienced little opposition to his accumulation of power, except when he began thinking of becoming leader for life, and even then with an hereditary system. This was opposed by the ardent Republicans who had taken part in the French Revolution to remove hereditary monarchs and Napoleon regarded police chief Joseph Fouche as their complete personification, a center around which all the interests of the revolution concentrated themselves, and he was very wary of provoking them. Fouche knew this and worked to maintain his representation of the interest of the revolution in order to keep his job.

Louis Bourrienne wrote that “no doubt the circumstances of Fouche being in office conciliated those of the Revolutionary party who were his friends. But Fouche cherished an undue partiality for them, because he knew that it was through them that he held his place. Napoleon perfectly understood the situation. He kept Fouche as chief of police until he could find an opportunity of disbanding his undisciplined followers.”

 Bourrienne added that Napoleon “had the weakness at once to fear Fouche and to think him necessary”.

Napoleon did sack Fouche as Chief of Police in 1802, but made sure that he was financially well compensated and given a prestigious position in the French Senate.  He eventually hired Fouche again in 1804 before keeping him as Chief of Police until 1810.

Adolf Hitler was appointed Chancellor of Germany in January 1933 because the Nazi party could, with the help of other political parties, master a majority in the Reichstag parliament. Germany had been hard hit by the Great Depression with high unemployment and there was also resentment about the wording of the 1919 Treaty of Versailles and the associated economic penalties imposed on Germany after the First World War.

Hans Frank, a Nazi lawyer and later Governor General of Poland, described what he thought was the secret of Hitler’s power. “He stood up and pounded his fist, and shouted, I am the Man. And he shouted about his strength and determination. And, so the public surrendered to him with hysterical enthusiasm.”

Ernst Roehm was the most prominent party leader alongside Adolf Hitler at the 1933 Victory Rally, but his personal ambition and agenda was soon in conflict with those of Hitler. Roehm’s photo was appearing more than that of Hitler in the newspaper SA Man and many SA members took the word socialism in the party’s National Socialism title seriously and wanted to destroy capitalism in a second revolution.

But now that he was in power, Hitler, wanted none of this? And he warned the SA leadership: “I will suppress every attempt to disturb the existing order as ruthlessly as I will deal with the so-called second revolution, which would lead only to chaos.”

Roehm exacerbated his difficulties with Hitler by putting the Army generals offside. A reconciliation lunch was held and after Hitler and the generals had left, Roehm said of Hitler, who had been a corporal in the First World War: “What that idiot corporal says means nothing to us! I have not the slightest intention of keeping this agreement. Hitler is a traitor and needs a long vacation. If we can’t get there with him, we’ll get there without him.”

Hitler’s response when later told about this comment was to burst into Roehm’s hotel room and arrest him. When Roehm refused to commit suicide the next day he was shot. Hitler’s official announcement was short and to the point: “The former Chief of Staff Rohm was given the opportunity to draw the consequences of his treacherous behaviour. He did not do so and was thereupon shot.”

Hitler then faced no significant internal challenges until the failed 20 July 1944 assassination attempt by German military officers.

Benito Mussolini was appointed Prime Minister by the Italian King Victor Emmanuel III in 1922. There was much domestic economic and political turmoil after the First World War, and Mussolini was a gifted propagandist who played on fears of a so-called March on Rome by thousands of fascists to demand the resignation of then Prime Minister  Luigi Factor.

The King may have feared Civil War because Mussolini  had considerable support in the military and in various industrial and agrarian groups which were fearful of socialism.

As editor of a newspaper in 1917, Mussolini had written that Italy needed a man: “A man who has when needed the delicate touch of an artist and the heavy hand of a warrior. A man who is sensitive and full of will-power. A man who knows and loves people, and who can direct and bend them with violence if required.” 

Thereafter, Mussolini continually tried to live up to his self-image. Following several killings of members of Parliament in 1924, Mussolini announced to Parliament in early 1925 that the “only solution is force”.

And he meant his force! Enormously popular with the population, Mussolini was able to increasingly assume dictatorial powers.

Mussolini was even more audacious with his promotion of self than was Napoleon Bonaparte.  Several months after joining the war on the side of Germany, Italy invaded Greece via Albania, but it’s army was soon repelled. By March1941, Italy had strengthened it’s force  and Mussolini went there expecting to take charge of a victorious march into Greece.

But the Greeks held on. After three weeks of sitting around, Mussolini returned to Rome, putting out this startling story that he had been commanding the “greatest and most bloody battle in modern history”.

 Turkey’s Mustafa Kemal, who eventually took the surname of Ataturk in 1934, became a very successful general in the First World War, including beating back an attempt by the allies to capture the Gallipoli Peninsula and gain control of the Dardanelles Straits. He acquired effective dictatorial powers while leading nationalist military forces fighting for Turkish independence after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and was given the title of Gazi –meaning hero or warrior!

In 1923, the Turkish Republic was proclaimed with Mustafa Kemel as president.  Many other nationalist leaders were wary of his dictatorial ways right from the beginning.  One of his lieutenants later wrote of late 1922 to the 1923 period: “Had it not been for his influence in the army. Mustafa Kemal would not have been able to get his way in the National Assembly, or even in Ankara. The vigilant guard which surrounded him, as if he were in constant danger, was proof of this.” 

In 1925, using the excuse of a Kurdish revolt, Mustafa Kemal forced through the National Assembly the Law for Maintenance of Public Order, which allowed for the suppression of any signs or advocacy of reaction and rebellion.  Mustafa Kemal explained that the new law had “given all government officials the task of preventing an incident before it happens rather than repressing it after it had happened and is necessary to suppress those who create confusion in the innocent mind of the nation”.

The new law was to be enforced by Independent Tribunals, which had been set up despite their resistance of some members of Mustafa Kemal’s own Republican People’s Party. The Tribunals were then used to suppress other military leaders who have been prominent during the struggle for Turkish independence.

History, or at least how they see history, is important to long lived dictators. In October 1927, Mustafa Kemel spent six days giving a single speech to a Congress of his monopoly People’s Party, which gave his view of how he had founded the Turkish State. While he had indeed been the leader in his creation, he could not help but denigrate the role of others as he put it: “Writing history is just as important as making history. The reality is that humankind will be confused if he who writes does not remain loyal to he who makes history.”

A British diplomat recorded that the opening words of the president’s speech were characteristic of the tone of the whole: “On the nineteenth of May 1919, I landed at Samcoun. The great Turk in instructing his faithful disciples, who in turn are to go out to spread the good news of Turkey’s resurrection and thereby make the villager, shopkeeper and landowner appreciate the debt they owe to the Gazi and to his political party.”

By beginning with, “I landed”, Mustafa Kemal equated himself with Turkey. He eventually went further than this. Given the single name of Mustafa at birth,  with Kemal acquired along the way, Mustafa Kemal later decide that all Turks should have a surname. And in 1934 designated himself, father Turk — that is Ataturk!

When the news is bad, the successful dictator knows how to minimize his own responsibility. Nikita Khrushchev recalled the situation during the first part of the war when the Soviet armies were in retreat: “Stalin’s signature name never appeared on a single document or order. ‘High Command’, ‘General Staff’, or some other term was used, but never his name.”

Admiral Kuznetsov recalled that whilst Stalin had become Supreme Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces on eight August 1940 “not many people knew”. “It was only after victories at the front that Stalin began to be called Supreme Commander in Chief in the communiqués published in the press and naturally at the eventual victory parade in Red Square in Moscow in June 1945 “all successes and victories were attributed to him alone”. 

Stalin’s opportunity for supreme power arose with the death of Vladimir Lenin in 1924, and he eventually emerge victorious after an internal communist party power struggle that lasted several years.

American Admiral William H. Standley later reflected on his time in Moscow from October 1941 to October 1943, including a period of US Ambassador to the USSR:  

“We must also remember that Stalin was able to capitalize on his relationship with Vladimir Lenin. At every opportunity, he glorified the Great Lenin as the idol of the Russian people, the Communist deity of the Soviet Union. Life-sized pictures of the Great Lenin with his disciple Stalin on his left were displayed in the Red Square, in all schoolrooms, on public buildings, and in every public place. During the War, Stalin issued weekly bulletins in which he extolled the virtues of the Great Lenin and urged the people to hold sacred and to preserve the heritage handed down to them by the Great Lenin. It was as a devoted disciple of the Great Lenin that Stalin maintained his control of the Communist Party and his power over the Russian people.”

We now get to consider the case of Vladimir Putin who, like Josef Stalin, came to power in a way not directly associated with war, revolution or civil strife. Putin was handed power as Prime Minister in 1999 and then acting president with the resignation of Boris Yeltsin as president in December 1999. Putin’s presidency was then confirmed in an election several months later.

Exactly how Putin successfully emerged at the top in Moscow is subject to much dispute with many people claiming to be responsible for persuading Yeltsin to support him. Some have called him an accidental president, which may be true to the extent that he was in the right place at the right time, although this does not exclude ambition and manoeuvring to get there. And there was probably some surprise on Putin’s part when he actually did get there!

According to Gleb Pavlovsky, a Kremlin spin doctor who worked for both Yeltsin and Putin, Prime Minister Putin “was given the task of carrying out a purge of the Federal Security Service (FSB successor to the KGB) and he applied himself to that very actively. He fired a lot of people. That was something no one else had done before. People were afraid. And that pleased President Yeltsin”.

 Nevertheless, Vladimir Putin’s rise to power was somewhat different to that from Josef Stalin because according to Alexander Voloshin, the presidential chief of staff from 1999 to 2003, Putin “from the moment he became president, he held all power in his hands”.

There are probably four main reasons for Putin’s almost immediate grip on power. Firstly, was Yeltsin’s 1999 designation of Putin as his successor. Secondly, Putin’s early 2000 presidential election victory. The third reason contributed to the first two. Journalist Marcia Geesen wrote: “Everyone could invest this grey, ordinary man with what they wanted to see in him.”

This is often the case with people who later amassed dictatorial powers after a period of turmoil.  The case of Napoleon has already been referred to, and Putin came to power after a decade of economic chaos after the collapse of the USSR and the erratic leadership of Boris Yeltsin. Similarly historian, professor Tim Blanning has said that Napoleon Bonaparte was “able to secure his authority so easily from 1799 because he was not associated in people’s minds with any particular political grouping. He was only associated with military victory and so he could be all things to all people”.

The fourth reason for Putin’s quick consolidation of power once he became president was that prior to being  prime minister Yeltsin had, as already noted, appointed him head of the FSB, the Federal Security Service (former KGB). And he had carried out a purge firing lots of people. This would’ve enabled Putin to put his own long-term cronies or associates in important positions, and he even managed to usurp some of the prerogatives of Yeltsin as president.

For example, when Putin became head of the FSB, he appointed Nikolai Patrushev as Secretary of the Security Council and then when Putin became prime minister Patrushev became head of the FSB with both Patrushev and the chief of the general staff of the Russian military reporting directly to Putin as prime minister — rather than as traditionally reporting to Yeltsin as president!

Mikhail Kasyanov later related that when he was appointed prime minister in 2000, President Putin “told me not to step on his toes and not get involved with sovereign ministries such as military organizations, special services, the army and so on”.

Charles Maurice Talleyrand, the French Foreign Affairs minister, was well aware of Napoleon Bonaparte’s aims and ambitions when he suggested to the newly appointed First Consul in 1799  that Napoleon directly control the important ministries of interior, the police, foreign affairs and the armed forces leaving the Second and Third Consuls to handle the ministries of justice and finance.

Talleyrand told Napoleon that this would “occupy and amuse them, and you, General (Bonaparte), having at your disposal all the vital parts of the government, will be able to reach the end you aim at”. Napoleon later said to Bourrienne, his secretary: “What he Talleyrand advises, you know, I’m anxious to do. He is right. One gets on quicker by oneself.”

In 1926, Benito Mussolini was Prime Minister as well as minister for six of the 13 ministerial departments, and he later increased this. He also became chairman of the main committees of government, including those involving defence, statistics and serial production. When eventually asked if this was excessive, he replied that “it is really simpler to give orders myself instead of having to send for the minister concerned and convince him about what I want done”.

For all dictators, whether it’s Napoleon, Mussolini, Putin, or any of the others in this study, it’s much easier to get things done if you have all power or as much power as possible consolidated it in your own hands.

As well as control over government, Vladimir Putin also wanted power over society and soon after his election as president he took his first steps. After coming to power in 1799, Napoleon Bonaparte introduced fairly severe censorship, which saw the number of Parisian journals fall from about 70 to about three in a short space of time.

However, most Russians in the late 1990s and early two thousands when Putin came to power got their news from television with printed media having a relatively minor role. So Putin concentrated on television!

NTV was an independent television channel, which had been critical of both Yeltsin and Putin. Four days after Putin’s May 2000 presidential inauguration, NTV was raided by men from the Russian Interior Ministry. MTV’s owner was arrested. And forced to sell his shares to state owned Gazprom, and he eventually left Russia permanently.

Putin then moved against Boris Berezovsky, who controlled TV station ORT and imagined himself as some sort of intellectual power behind the Putin throne and had criticized some of Putin’s measures to exert control over Russia. Berezovsky was hit with fraud related criminal charges and had to sell his shares to Sibneft (controlled by Putin friendly Roman Abramovich). Television station TV6, also owned by Berezovsky, which increased its audience share as it moved from entertainment to opposition commentary was later taken off the air.

This left three television stations: RTR (renamed Rossiya), Channel One and NTV — all owned by the state!

But in between acting against television stations, Putin also moved quickly to assert his authority over business. In July 2000 Putin summed 21 leading business magnets, generally known as Oligarchs, to the Kremlin and told them that the “initial period of capital accumulation was over”.

There would be no attempt to reverse privatizations no matter how they had obtained these assets, but from now on the oligarchs were told that they should stay at arms-length  from the state, and not be involved in politics: “You yourselves have created this situation, to a large extent through political and quasi-political structures which you control.”

 Terrorist attacks – Dubrovka theatre in October 2002, and Beslan school in 2004 — were followed by further measures to tighten control over Russia, including the appointment rather than the election of regional governors and changes to the electoral system for the parliamentary Duma.

In October 2003 businessman Michail Khodorkovsky, who controlled oil conglomerate YUKOS, was arrested on fraud and tax related charges. Khodorkovsky had been one of the 21 businessmen at the July 2000 Oligarch meeting with Putin but had decided to remain active in public and private political discussion. He was eventually to lose YUKOS and be jailed.

Thereafter Putin, while he was both president and also prime minister during the four-year presidency of Dimitry Medvedev, took less high profile steps to strengthen his grip on power.

However, even as prime minister, Putin was not being shy about showing his power! In 2009, RUSAL, the big aluminium company headed by Oleg Deripaska, had closed a plant in region where it was the only large employer and there were unpaid wages. Hundreds of workers blocked the main highway to Moscow and threatened to block the railway.

Putin biographer Philip Short wrote about Putin’s reaction to this and his abilities in the PR department:  

“Two days later, Putin helicoptered in to confront Deripaska and two of his colleagues. ‘Why did you start running around like cockroaches the moment you heard I was coming’, he asked. ‘You have made thousands of people hostages to your ambition and incompetence and perhaps your greed.’ He ordered Deripaska to restart production immediately and pay workers what was owed. Then, pointing to a copy of an agreement they had drafted, he threw his pen across the table and told him to sign. As a further humiliation, once the magnate had complied, Putin snapped: ‘Now give me back my pen.’ Within hours the money had been transferred to workers accounts and Russian television showed them lined-up withdrawing money.”

 This demonstration of power by Putin as prime minister made it seem unlikely that Medvedev would actually be able to get the second presidential term that he so clearly desired. Ultimately, Medvedev did not have the psychological strength or courage to face down Putin and push himself forward for a second term.

We are now in 2025 and Putin has been in power for 25 years and, like all the other dictators already discussed, Putin wants to be seen as essential to the future of his country. It’s for this reason that the speaker of the Russian Duma coined a slogan to boost support for Putin: “No Putin. No Russia.” 

 

 

 

Video of Putin’s Psychology and Leadership Style

Video of Putin’s Psychology and Leadership Style

This video presentation, and written text below, compares Putin’s psychology and leadership style to that of Napoleon, Stalin, Mao, Hitler, Mussolini and Ataturk. 

This video presentation compares the psychology and leadership of Vladimir Putin to that of 6 other long-lived dictators: the Soviet Union’s Josef Stalin, who was in power from 1924 until his death in 1953; France’s Napoleon Bonaparte, in power from 1799 – except for a short period — until he was defeated at Waterloo in 1814; Germany’s Adolf Hitler, in power from 1933 until his suicide in 1945; Italy’s Benito Mussolini, in power from 1922 until he was overthrown in 1943 and eventually killed in 1945; China’s Mao Zedong, in power from 1949 until his death in 1976, and Turkey’s Kemal Ataturk, in power from 1923 until his death in 1938.   

We start with a quote by Albert Speer, who worked closely with Adolf Hitler, and later wrote about leadership and dictatorship: “There is a special trap for every holder of power, whether the director of a company, the head of a state, or the ruler of a dictatorship. His favour is so desirable to his subordinates that they will sue for it by every means possible. Servility becomes endemic among his entourage, who compete among themselves in their show of devotion. This in turn exercises a sway upon the ruler, who becomes corrupted in his turn. The key to the quality of the man in power is how he reacts to this situation.”

We now consider Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine in February 2022. I was living in Russia at the time and noticed almost immediate increase in fear amongst the population.

General Caulaincourt, a former French Ambassador to Russia, advised Napoleon Bonaparte not to invade Russia 1812, as did Hermann Goering advise Adolf Hitler in 1941 as they thought the risks were too great. Both Caulaincourt and Goering, a famous WW1 fighter pilot and head of the German airforce, had friendly relations with their leader and considerable knowledge of military affairs. But, both were ignored!

We do not know if anyone close to Vladimir Putin advised him not to invade Ukraine in February 2022, but the hesitancy shown by several members in the televised Russian Security Council meeting before the invasion suggests there was a lack of enthusiasm. The most equivalent person to Caulaincourt and Goering in Putin’s official working office circle, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, had good relations with Putin but no direct significant military experience.

Putin’s conduct at the Security Council suggests that Napoleon’s childhood friend and first secretary, Louis Bourrienne, was right when he wrote that “intoxication which is occasioned by success produces in the heads of the ambitious a sort of cerebral congestion”.  

The successful annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the total consolidation of his power inside Russia would have significantly influenced Putin’s thought processes.

The conduct of Putin’s minions at the Security Council meeting also suggests that Albert Speer was right about the “subordinates” and their “servility”. One liberal orientated Russian newspaper reported afterwards that during the Security Council meeting these subordinates sat “with gloomy, tense faces and afraid to look at each other, paralyzed with fear” as they all said what they knew Putin wanted them to say.

How did such a situation arise? When Putin first came to power, he was described by some commentators as little more than an ex-KGB operative of moderate success who got lucky and had the leadership baton passed to him from Boris Yeltsin and then benefited from a favorable international scene and rising oil prices before progressing to a dictatorship because of his historical grievances.

Putin first became president of Russia in 2000 — twenty five years ago! If Putin was there only by appointment and was without talent he would have been replaced in some way years ago.

Describing Josef Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev stressed his superior ability: “He didn’t simply come with a sword and conquer our minds and bodies. No, he demonstrated his superior skill in subordinating and manipulating people.”

The Yugoslavian politician, Milovan Djilas, who had close dealings with Stalin and his lieutenants from 1944, observed that Stalin “sized up people quickly and was always particularly skilful in exploiting people’s weaknesses”.

In the same vein, Adolf Hitler was also a man of superior ability. Albert Speer noted that Hitler “knew men’s secret vices and desires, he knew what they thought to be their virtues, he knew the hidden ambitions and motives which lay behind their loves and hates, he knew where they could be flattered, where they were gullible, where they were strong and where they were weak; he knew all this by instinct and feeling, an intuition which in such matters never led him astray.”

While a young officer in KGB, Putin underwent further training and told one of his friends that he was “now an expert in human relations”. Whether it be by training or instinct – or, most likely a combination of the two – Putin has talent in this area.

Ilya Ponomarev, who was a Member of the Russian Duma until 2015 – and is now a very strong Putin critic – has described Putin as a “brilliant psychologist”, the “best I know”, and “the best communicator”: “When you are talking to him like this (face to face) you feel like finally you have found somebody who truly understands you better than your wife”.

Sergo Beria (son of Soviet police chief Lavrenti Beria) wrote that:

“Stalin was able to charm people, as I can testify from experience. He managed to give the people he was with the impression that Jupiter had come down from his Olympus for them, deigned to speak with them in a familiar tongue, and was taking an interest in their problems.” Stalin, he wrote, “left each person he spoke to anxious to see him again, with a sense that there was now a bond that linked them forever”; “that was his strength”

Andrei Illarionov, chief economic policy adviser to Putin from 2000 to end 2005, has told the story of how he came to this position despite telling Putin that his military actions in Chechnya were “criminal”. “Because he is a good psychologist, not academically, but intuitively, he said: ‘Stop. In future we will not talk about Chechnya.’ For 30 or 40 seconds he remained silent, forcing himself to calm down. Maybe it lasted a minute. Then he said: ‘Let’s talk about the economy’.” Putin suggested another meeting next day, but Illarionov only agreed after several more meetings to be Putin’s “economic adviser”. Illarionov later said: “He had outsmarted me.”

But there may be another factor in Putin’s leadership. Halide Edibe, a female Turkish political activist who generally admired Kemal Ataturk who became Turkey’s first president in 1923 after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, wrote about Ataturk:

“Of course, one knew all the time that there were men around him who were greatly superior in intellect, and far above him in culture and education. But though he (Ataturk) excelled them in neither refinement nor originality, not one of them could possibly cope with his vitality. Whatever their qualities, they were made on a more or less normal scale. In terms of vitality he wasn’t. And it was this alone that made him the dominant figure.

“Vitality” may be defined as a highly developed combination of mental and physical vigor. Benito Mussolini successfully aimed to project such vitality in his Italian speeches and public appearances. Putin often aims to do the same in physical terms although he is much more restrained as a speaker.

Napoleon said that “there are two levers for moving men – interest and fear.” As far as “interest” is concerned, the main factor in Putin’s favour is that his Russia is – for the great majority of people – better than Yeltsin’s Russia in the 1990s; and this goes for both the general population and those with strong civic and nationalist feelings.

When the writer Emil Ludwig asked Stalin why “everybody” in his country feared him, Stalin responded:“Do you really believe a man could maintain his position of power for fourteen years merely by intimidation? Only by making people afraid?”

In 2020, journalist Masha Lipman said:

“The Putin of 2013 or Putin of 2012, when he started his third term after a four-year break, when Dmitry Medvedev had been President, was a different leader from the one that he was at the beginning of his Presidential career, in the two-thousands.” “Anybody who’s been in power for twenty years changes. So think of the experience that he has gained over time. During the twenty years that he has been in power, Russia went through terrorist attacks, the war in Chechnya, natural calamities, technological catastrophes, mass protests, and he coped with all those.” “I would say even somebody who does not approve of his policies cannot help marvelling at how he’s been in power for twenty years and enjoys an approval rating of about seventy per cent, and this without keeping his nation at large in fear.”

However, it is also the case that Putin displayed a ruthless and nasty side to his character right from the beginning of his time in power, and the promotion of fear has become a more important lever with time – and particularly after the February 2022 invasion of Ukraine!

Ironically, the long-lasting dictator is himself fearful. As Albert Speer put it: “To the imagination of the outsider Hitler was a keen, quick, brutally governing dictator. It is difficult to believe that in reality he edged along hesitantly, almost fearfully. But that was the case.”

Some analysts of Russian affairs such as Mark Galeotti have claimed that Putin is “not a risk taker” and can be slow to make decisions. He has also written that Putin can initially “panic” when faced with an unexpected and threatening situation.

Adolf Hitler on occasion acted the same during the early stages of the Second World War. When Allied landings in Norway in April 1940 led to some heavy losses for the German navy, General Jodl, who was Hitler’s main military adviser, wrote in his diary that “the hysteria is frightful”, and that “every unfavourable piece of news makes the Fuhrer fear the worst”. Eventually, Jodl tapped the table:

“Mein Fuhrer, in every war there are times when the Supreme Commander must keep his nerve!”

The next month, Germany’s tanks got so far ahead of the infantry during the successful German invasion of France that on 17 May, General Halder wrote in his diary: “A really unpleasant day. The Fuhrer is terribly nervous. He is frightened by his own success, does not want to risk anything, and therefore would rather stop us.” From this point, however, to the disastrous loss at Stalingrad in early 1943, Hitler was generally able to savour success rather than be frightened of it; and, his self-belief was so buttressed that even as late as mid-1944, Hitler was boasting of his ‘unprecedentedly strong nerves’.

Putin biographer Philip Short has pointed out that one of Putin’s KGB recruiters thought Putin had a “lowered sense of danger” and Short thinks that Putin “knows he is prone to taking risks” and has thus “become very cautious – almost to the point of indecision.”

So, what drives Putin? What does he really want? All successful – that is, long lived – dictators are very self-centred. A British Ambassador wrote about the Italian dictator: “His first consideration is Mussolini, his second is the fascist regime, his third Italy”.

Italian King Victor Emmanuel was concerned about the political turbulence in Italy in 1922 and explained why he appointed Mussolini Prime Minister: “He is really a man of purpose and I can tell you that he will last some time. There is in him, if I am not mistaken, the will to act and to act well.” Mussolini himself claimed that the “will to dominate” was the “fundamental law of the life of the universe”.

Boris Yeltsin later wrote of his decision to appoint Putin prime minister (and possible presidential successor): “Putin had the will and the resolve.”

When an American journalist asked Stalin about the role of good luck in his career, Stalin replied: “What do you think I am, an old Georgian granny to believe in gods and devils? I believe in one thing only, the power of the human will.”

Mao’s doctor, Li Zhisui, wrote that “Mao was the centre around which everyone else revolved. His will reigned supreme.” This “will would not be thwarted, and he was quick to lash out at anyone who tried”. By 1958 “Mao’s voice was so powerful, his point of view so strong, that it was becoming difficult for the cautious to disagree. The force of Mao’s will gradually silenced those who disagreed, and those who pandered to him began to lie.”

Napoleon’s friend and secretary wrote: “Without any shock, and in the space of four years, there arose above the ruins of the short-lived Republic a government more absolute than ever was Louis XIV’s. While this extraordinary change can be assigned to many causes, I had the opportunity of observing the influence which the determined will of one man exercised over his fellow men.”

The strength of will of the dictatorial CEO can become an excuse for the lieutenants’ willingness to be ‘servile’ and ‘obey’. Speer wrote about “how dependent we (he and other lieutenants) felt on Hitler’s will”. Nikita Krushchev made a similar point about being one of the “victim’s of Stalin’s will”.

As became clear, Putin’s first steps after becoming president in 2000 demonstrated will and resolve – and vitality – and were all about restoring order inside Russia and then restoring what he perceived as Russia’s historically important place in the world.

Dictators generally see themselves in a very positive light.

Milovan Djilas, the Yugoslav politician who spent time with Stalin and his lieutenants, noted that even in Stalin, “certain great and final ideals lay hidden – his ideals, which he could approach by molding and twisting the reality and the living men who comprised it”.

In a similar vein, Mao Zedong’s personal doctor for over twenty years, Li Zhisui, wrote that: “Mao insisted on policies that no one else had ever imagined, dangerous, risky policies like the Great Leap Forward (to promote rapid industrialization), the people’s communes, and the Cultural Revolution (attacking “those in authority pursuing the capitalist road”), all of which were designed to transform China”.

Putin has long been developing a fanatical side related to his reading of Russian history and, like Mussolini, is increasingly thinking of self and equating himself with an ideal of Russian greatness. There was probably accelerated reading during his COVID19 isolation periods. This has resulted in Putin’s ruthlessness becoming increasing cruel to achieve his aims. After the outbreak of war with Ukraine, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov was asked whether Putin consulted with him.” Lavrov said:

“Putin has three advisers — Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great and Catherine the Great.”

Stalin also immersed himself in history. The cruelty of Ivan the Terrible was something that Stalin took particular notice of, writing in the margin of a biography: “teacher teacher” In 1946 he criticised a new movie, Ivan the Terrible, Part Two, telling the director that changes must be made: “Ivan the Terrible was very cruel. You can show he was cruel. But you must show why he needed to be cruel.”

Some close observers of Putin, such as Philip Short and Mark Galeotti have suggested that Putin “does not want to die in office”. Mussolini’s son-in-law and Italian Foreign Minister, Galeazzo Ciano, noted in his diary in 1941 that the aging dictator can be somewhat sensitive about this:

“The Duce (Mussolini) is exasperated by the publication in the magazine Minerva, published in Turin, of a motto by some Greek philosopher or other.” The motto read: “No greater misfortune can befall a country than to be governed by an old tyrant.”

History is likely to record that Putin initially did good things for Russia but by the end the situation had radically reversed. Chen Yuan, an early colleague of Mao, got the direction of change right when he said: “Had Mao died in 1956, his achievements would have been immortal. Had he died in 1966, he would still have been a great man. But he died in 1976. Alas, what can one say?”

While not wanting to be remembered like Mao, Philip Short (as well as Galeotti and others) has suggested that Putin saw the February 2022 “special military operation” as the “last opportunity to bring Ukraine to heal” and that “bringing Ukraine back into the fold would have been the crowning achievement of his career”. Putin also probably thought that he was the only person who could do this.

In August 1939, Hitler spoke to his generals to convince them it was time to take military action against Poland, saying: “Essentially all depends on me, on my existence, because of my political talents. But I can be eliminated at any time by a criminal or a lunatic.” Therefore, according to Hitler, Poland had to be taken quickly! Several months later, with Poland under the belt and Germany consequently at war with Britain and its allies in the west, but still at peace with Russia in the east, Hitler told senior military officers that the time was propitious for a war on two fronts because of:

“Neither a military person nor a civil person could replace me. I am convinced of my powers of intellect and decision. Now there is a relationship of forces which can never be more propitious”.

Finally, a pithy description of what this text is about. Anatoly Sobchak, Putin’s mentor in St. Petersburg, before Putin moved to Moscow, said to journalist Andrei Kalitin in 1999: “I understand why Yeltsin chose Putin as his successor — he would never betray you. But I also understand that once he has power, Putin will never give it back to anyone.”

ASIO chief Mike Burgess would be happy working for Putin

ASIO chief Mike Burgess would be happy working for Putin

Cameron Stewart of “The Australian” newspaper (21 February) reports Burgess as saying:
“As the AUKUS project matures, (foreign adversaries) might go ‘the best way to stop Australia from having this is to turn the community against nuclear-propelled submarines’ … (they will) stir the pot, which will be detrimental to our national interests.”

So Burgess thinks that people like Malcolm Turnbull (and me) who speak out against the AUKUS project are acting against Australia’s “national interests”. In Russia, people who speak out against Russian military policies are often jailed as traitors. Burgess would appear to welcome something like this in Australia.

 

Australia’s Racist NSW Police

Australia’s Racist NSW Police

It appears that NSW police will try to have Bankstown hospital nurses Ahmad Rashad Nadi and Sarah Abu Lebdeh taken to court for some emotional comments about Israeli actions in Gaza in a private video conversation with Israeli online provocateur Max Veifer. At the same time they are giving Murdoch owned The Telegraph journalist Danielle Gusmaroli a free pass to try to create a physical confrontation involving a Jewish man at the Cairo Takeaway in Sydney’s Newtown.

Just imagine what would be the case if it were Jewish nurses and a Palestinian provocateur: NSW police would not be interested! And imagine a man with a Hamas scarf entering a shop known to be frequented by Jews. Egged on by Murdoch journalists, the police would be falling over themselves to arrest him on any charge they could think of.

NSW police are little more than racist pawns in the hands of lobby group leaders such as Alex Ryvchin of Executive Council of Australian Jewry. If JD Vance’s approach to security was to be applied to Australia, it would show that domestic players (NSW police, Murdoch journalists, and Jewish lobby groups) are a much bigger threat to Australian freedoms than China.

Trump’s Odessa for Greenland deal!

Trump’s Odessa for Greenland deal!

In late February 2022 I was walking on a street in Irkutsk (in the middle of Russian Siberia) when I met a former female student of mine who had just come from her work office. She was upset by the invasion of Ukraine but even more so by the attitude of some women in the office. The main topic of discussion was speculation on “how many new provinces we will get”. In my own discussions on the invasion I managed to condemn it and often – but not always – found that people agreed with me that one country should not simply try to take over another. So, there was an element of guilt amongst many Russians. But, following Donald Trump’s demands on Greenland I doubt my own conversations would again go the same way!

While there is significant censorship in Russia, many individual Russians will simply not understand why Russia is being condemned for its invasion and annexation of Ukrainian land when the United States is making similar demands on Greenland and Panama. While some Westerners might claim that this is typical Trump negotiating rhetorics, Vladimir Putin and those around him will be giving thanks to Trump for assisting their propaganda about taking over the territory of another country in order to bolster security.

Historians may see Trumps comments as the almost final nail in the coffin for Odessa, the last significant city on the Black Sea that Ukraine still controls, with real access to that sea and its trade routes. Russians forces in southern Ukraine are still several hundred kilometers from Transnistria, the Russian orientated breakaway province from Moldova, and Odessa stands between Russian forces in Kherson province and Transnistria. As things currently stand in the fighting, Russian forces would not have the power to take control of Odessa and then go onto Transnistria to completely cut off the remainder of Ukraine from the Black Sea.

However, whatever the shorter-term results of Trump’s efforts to “end the war”, Russian nationalists and the women in the office of my former student will feel that in the longer-term Odessa should be taken – additionally because it is something that the United States would do if given the chance!

Trump may feel that he can cut-a-deal with Vladimir Putin to stop the fighting and save Odessa, but there are limits to Putin’s power. Putin was able to push his Security Council into accepting the “special military operation” against Ukraine because they saw a certain sense to it. It would have been a completely different matter if Putin had suggested returning Crimea to Ukraine — his time in power would ha been very limited because it would have been seen as a betrayal of Russian national interests!

What Trump, and many of those around him, do not understand is that successful – and I mean, long time in power – dictators like Putin, Mao Zedong, Napoleon Bonaparte, Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Josef Stalin and Kemal Ataturk are actually long-serving because they do take notice of the views of the population — including the sort expressed in the office of my former student – and their advisors. The do not simply do deals with foreign leaders because they have some “personal connection”.

Confidential Letter to Trump on AUKUS

Confidential Letter to Trump on AUKUS

Dear Donald,

I know that you are a great deal-maker, but you will be seen as even greater if you do as I suggest.

Australia is already providing $4 billion to the United States under the AUKUS deal without any guarantee that Virginia class nuclear submarines will ever be provided to it.

I suggest that this amount be doubled or even tripled to even $12 billion.

It might surprise you how easy it would be to achieve this. You should understand that a the most significant Australian characteristic is “cowardness” – and, as an Australian it pains me to say this! Australia is afraid of the world and imagined fears – for example, the fear that after invading Taiwan, China will then invade Australia.

Another characteristic of Australian thinking that there is in a “cognitive dissonance” between these fears and the expenditure of money on “defence”. Some defence policy makers will claim that this means that Australians are not prepared to put up the money to match their fears. These people would readily give you $12 billion.

The is also a dirty secret amongst Australian – and United Kingdom – policy makers that the UK submarine industry is not capable of providing the technical submarine building capacity in Australia that is envisaged under the AUKUS deal. Nevertheless, Australia is also providing billions of dollars to the UK as an advance payment. So, as a point of leverage in your deal-making you should keep in mind that only the US can provide this expertise.

However, there is also another dissonance. The Australian mind is essentially not capable of distinguishing between $4 billion and, say, $12 billion. It is just seen as a number which does not directly affect them. Out of sight, out of mind! So, my advice is you should go for it! Of course with your deal-making skills you might even start with a higher number!

Finally, there are plenty of Australians who would back such a demand if you could find a way to channel some of the money back to them. The conga-line from Australia trying to get your attention will tell you who these people are.

Regards,

Jeff Schubert

Why Do People Serve a Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin?

Why Do People Serve a Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin?

“There is a special trap for every holder of power, whether the director of a company, the head of a state, or the ruler of a dictatorship. His favour is so desirable to his subordinates that they will sue for it by every means possible. Servility becomes endemic among his entourage, who compete among themselves in their show of devotion. This in turn exercises a sway upon the ruler, who becomes corrupted in his turn. The key to the quality of the man in power is how he reacts to this situation.”

So wrote Albert Speer, Adolf Hitler’s friend, architect, Armaments Minister, and for a while the second most powerful man in Nazi Germany.

We are now seeing the very public servility of potential subordinates and businesspeople to Donald Trump. This is very similar to the situation in Russia under Vladimir Putin. However, it is not always clear what motivates the servility of individual people to such holders of great power.

One way is to consider what motivated servility to such people as Josef Stalin, Napoleon Bonaparte, Adolf Hitler, Mao Zedong, Benito Mussolini and Kemal Ataturk. Like Putin, these men held great power for a prolonged period – and the return of Trump to the presidency had elicited a response that is similar.

There are four basic sets of factors that bind people to holders of power — like Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin — and the mix of these factors for a particular individual can change overtime!

The first set of factors involves loyalty to the country or some sort of philosophy or ideology. An individual may see little choice but to work for the holder of power, who may or may not be admired. There will be some people around Trump who believe that only he can “make America great again” even though they do not like many of his personal characteristics.

The second set of factors is essentially about a relationship. The holder of power is admired and respected. The subordinates and other people around the holder of power have a sense of being personally needed and important to them; or the holder of power has shown loyalty which must be reciprocated. There is also status — their status in the community depends on their relationship to the holder of great power. And, there are many people around Trump in this category!

The third set of factors is focussed on the inner personal life of the subordinate or hanger-on. This can be related to status, but is more related to opportunities for achievement and satisfying one’s personal ambitions such as work or professional satisfaction or simply money and the ability to have a certain quality of life!

The above three sets of factors are all related to the “interest” side of what Napoleon Bonaparte said were the “two levers for moving men” – that is “interest and fear”! While most people in Russia have good reason to fear Putin, there will be people in the United States who fear Trump and will try to work for or with him because of this.

While few people would want to initially want to serve somebody like Putin or Trump because they fear them; once in this position, fear may make it very difficult to leave. By entering into the orbit of the holder of power a previously unknown individual becomes part of the field of view of the holder of power. He or she now becomes one more person for the holder of power to watch, to control, and to potentially become suspicious of. If such an individual seems to have any sort of independent power base in the crowd around the holder of power, an attempt to resign may trigger a paranoid reaction by a Putin or Trump, putting that person in even more danger.

It is clear that crossing Putin in Russia can be extremely dangerous for people working in a government organization, businesspeople, and other individuals working in a profession — or even students who have expressed a view against the invasion of Ukraine. But, although it is unclear how seriously to take some of Trumps threats against people He likes to use fear as a method of getting his way.

There were suggestions that Josef Stalin feared Lavrenti Beria who was his secret police chief. While Stalin may not have known exactly how to get rid of Beria, he would have wanted to make sure that he – not Beria – was calling the shots in any such departure. Any move by Beria to resign would have seemed highly suspicious to Stalin, who would probably have had him arrested before he could carry out whatever plot that Stalin imagined he was up to. Beria probably felt safest staying where he was. Joseph Fouche would have been in less danger if he had resigned as French Minister of Police, but Napoleon Bonaparte would have been concerned that he was moving to put a priority on “the interests of the Revolution” rather than on Napoleon’s desire for life-long rule!

The remainder of this article gives example of less threatening reasons why people want to be in the inner circles of Putin and Trump and draws on some examples of the lives of Mao Zedong, Josef Stalin, Benito Mussolini, Adolf Hitler, Kemal Ataturk, and Napoleon Bonaparte. Each of the men attracted people to work for and with them by attributes not connected with fear – and these may be relevant to Donald Trump.

Love of the country or the organisation.

Loyalty to a country or any sort of organisation may result in considerable loyalty to an unpleasant holder of power, notwithstanding the others view of his (or her) personal qualities and abilities and the lack of any personal relationship.

At its simplest form, it is a matter of blind loyalty to whoever is in charge. When Adolf Hitler came to power in January 1933, Erich von Manstein was only a battalion commander and had no contact with him; but Manstein was with Hitler in spirit. He wanted Germany restored to “its former greatness” with an end to the Weimar Republic’s “external impotence and internal turmoil”. For Manstein, “the only way out was a temporary dictatorship by the leader of the strongest party.” And, it easy to suspect that some people feel this way about Trump.

Once in contact with Hitler as a general, Manstein initially regarded him as a “genius”; but by 1943 one of Hitler’s decisions moved him to exclaim in frustration: “My God, the man’s an idiot.” But then another aspect of Manstein’s loyalty to his country became evident. He was now a Field Marshal, and when approached to join a conspiracy to kill Hitler, it was – he claimed with some credibility – his loyalty to the Prussian heritage of the German army that kept him out of the plot. Manstein simply said: “Prussian Field Marshals do not mutiny.”

Like Field Marshal Manstein, Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano (who was married to Mussolini’s daughter) found himself saying – again with at least some credibility – he must stick with a dictator out of loyalty to his country. While Germany’s initial war successes were pushing the wavering Mussolini toward supporting Hitler, Ciano was becoming increasingly worried and antagonistic toward Germany. At this time Ciano was making little secret of his views, and in April 1940 – after a week in bed with bad flu – he noted: “My illness gave rise to much gossip. They talked about ‘diplomatic illness’ and Rome is filled with rumours about my resignation. Naturally, German successes have caused many desertions in the ranks of my so-called friends.”

A few days later, Mussolini insisted that Ciano read a French magazine article entitled, “Roehm, the man who aspired to the succession to Hitler”. Nazi S.A. Chief-of-Staff Ernst Roehm was shot on Hitler’s orders in 1934 for suggesting that he would be a better Nazi leader than Hitler. Ciano understood that he was being warned against becoming too ambitious in his opposition to Mussolini’s German policy, and soon commented: “Perhaps he intends to liquidate me. Should I go now? Risk opposition? Son-in-law against father-in-law? And what can I do the day I am no longer minister? Simply be the son-in-law? No. It’s necessary to try to remain in the government and continue to do as I am, as long as possible.”

In November 1942 Ciano was still Foreign Minister, and Germany’s Field Marshal Rommel was retreating in North Africa leaving many Italian soldiers prisoner of British Field-Marshal Montgomery’s forces. When a friend suggested that he resign, or even flee Italy, Ciano replied: “I should have done it (resign) on 10 June 1940 (when Italy entered the war by attacking France). When one is in my situation, one can only remain at one’s post until the moment that times are right for acting. I didn’t want the war, I didn’t accept it. I must risk something to bring it to an end.”

While Ciano was sticking with Mussolini in an attempt to prevent an eventual Italian defeat at the hands of the Allies, he would have most likely – indeed, for a while he did – have had a different view if he thought that Germany would eventually win. It is not only dictators who like glory!

Lazare Carnot, Napoleon’s first War Minister who later fell out with him, wrote to the restored Bourbon king in 1814: “What is it that made Napoleon’s tyranny bearable for so long? It is the fact that he excited national pride. With what devotion did even those who detested him the most serve him!”

Foreign Minister Talleyrand recalled that he “served Bonaparte as Emperor with devotion so long as I felt he himself was solely devoted to the interests of France”. In Berlin in 1806, Napoleon dictated very harsh peace terms to Prussia, declared trade and correspondence with Britain off limits, and told Talleyrand about his plans for war in Spain. Talleyrand did not believe all this was in the interests of his country: “I then swore to myself that I would cease to be his Minister as soon as we returned to France.” He eventually resigned in 1807.

Alexander Barmin, an early Josef Stalin colleague, later wrote that in the early 1930s “loyalty to Stalin was based principally on the conviction that there was no one to take his place, that any change of leadership would be extremely dangerous, and that the country must continue on its present course, since to stop now or attempt a retreat would mean the loss of everything.” And, even though Stalin later reacted to Hitler’s June 1941 invasion with shock and self-doubt, the other Soviet leaders did not move against him in large part because, as Politburo member Anastas Mikoyan said: “The very name of Stalin was a great force for rousing the morale of the people.”

Often, of course, the subordinate’s belief in the great leader needed by the country will coincide with a sense of a personal relationship. When the 1923 negotiations at Lausanne – which eventually to lead to an independent Turkey – were proving difficult, Kemal Ataturk responded positively to Ismet Inonu’s appeal for full authority to act on behalf of the Government. In response, Ismet wrote: “You always come to the rescue at these tumultuous times. You’re a man who has done great things and get great things done. My loyalty to you has increased twice-fold. I kiss your eyes my dearly beloved brother. My dear leader.” signed Ismet. Ismet at first opposed the introduction of the new Latin alphabet in Turkey but just before its introduction in 1928 he gave a speech saying that “the people are so attached to their customs and to have them part from it, needed a hard-working, determined and devoted leader like the Gazi (Ataturk) of the Turkish nation”. Ismet believed in Ataturk and, in spite of his frustrations with various issues, was ever the loyal lieutenant.

 The respect, admiration and attribution of subordinates and others

People who manage to grasp the mantle of the holder of great power are generally very talented people, and the others do have considerable reason to admire them. Even Trump has an uncanny ability to connect with many people fears and hopes via by what other see as wild language.

According to Hjalmar Schacht, Hitler’s Minister of Economics and President of the Reichsbank in the 1930’s: “Hitler often did find astonishingly simple solutions for problems which had seemed to others insoluble. His solutions were often brutal, but almost always effective”.

Hitler’s talents also impressed many of his generals. At the beginning of the war, General Manstein (who later became a Field Marshal) wrote in his diary that Hitler had a “staggering knowledge about military and technological innovations in every country”. General Jodl recalled his “astounding technical and tactical vision (which) led him also to become the creator of modern weaponry for the army”. In October 1941, just before the German invasion of Russia got bogged down, General Wagner noted that “the last great collapse stands immediately before us”, adding: “I am constantly astounded at the Fuhrer’s military judgement. He intervenes in the course of operations, one could say decisively, and up until now he has always acted correctly.”

No wonder, Hitler’s self-belief was bolstered and his earlier losses of nerve virtually forgotten!

In August 1940 General Rommel (who later became a Field Marshal) noted in his diary: “Where on earth would we be without Hitler? I don’t know if there could ever be a German who has such a brilliant mastery of military and political leadership.” He later wrote to his wife: “The Fuhrer will make the right decision (as he) knows exactly what is right for us.” Rommel’s hero worship thereafter waxed and waned around a steady descent to reality; while the other generals become increasingly critical and disenchanted.

Even after the war had ended, and Manstein was disillusioned with Hitler’s military leadership, he spoke of Hitler’s “tremendously high intelligence”. It should also be noted that Manstein was not oblivious to some of Hitler’s deficiencies, such as lack of “operational training”. The same can be said for many of the other generals; admiration and respect does not mean – except for the young novice lieutenant – total blindness to the dictator’s faults and weaknesses.

Later, when Nikita Khrushchev was no longer a novice subordinate to Stalin and almost totally disillusioned, he recalled his “absolute faith” in Stalin: “We blamed ourselves for being blind to the presence of enemies all around us. We thought we lacked Stalin’s deep understanding of the political struggle and were therefore unable to discern enemies in our midst the way Stalin could.” After the Soviet Ambassador to Berlin, Dekanozov, warned Stalin in May 1941 that Hitler was preparing to invade, Stalin said to him: “So, disinformation has now reached ambassador level.” Dekanozov disagreed, and was later reproached by Marshal Voroshilov, who had had a very long association with Stalin: “How can you allow yourself to argue with Comrade Stalin. He knows more and can see further than the rest of us.”

Stalin’s Transport Commissioner, Kovalev, later recalled that “one felt oppressed by Stalin’s power, but also by his phenomenal memory and the fact that he knew so much”. Marshal Zhukov noted Stalin’s “ability to formulate an idea concisely, a naturally analytical mind, great erudition and a rare memory”. Sergo Beria, Lavrenti Beria’s son, wrote that at the end of the war the Soviet military leaders “all had a high opinion of Stalin’s capacities, because he knew how to select and utilize men”. Khrushchev later wrote that Stalin “really was a man of outstanding skill and intelligence. He truly did tower over everyone around him.” His ability to “express himself clearly and concisely” was “admired” by “everyone”, and “because of it we were proud to work for him”. In the 1970’s an aged Vyacheslav Molotov still admired his former boss, saying: “Despite Stalin’s mistakes, I see in him a great, an indispensable man! In his time there was no equal!”

As with Hitler and Stalin, Napoleon’s ability was a major attraction for his subordinates and others. Baron Fain, Napoleon’s third secretary, recalled that in meetings of the Administrative Councils, “the Emperor, surrounded by skilful, superior men, seemed to me to exert an even greater intellectual superiority. In all discussions, he was eminently the man of good judgement; it seemed to me that he was always right. In addition, this same testimony was constantly given by the very men who had the honour of arguing against him: not perhaps regarding the point of view they had espoused, but for all others where they were disinterested observers.”

When General Caulaincourt tried to dissuade Napoleon from his plans to invade Russia in 1812, he told by General Duroc, who was Napoleon’s closest confidant and “friend” until killed by a cannonball: “He has his point of view; he is aiming at some objective of which we know nothing. You can be certain that his policy is more far-seeing than ours.”

Not too distant from the attitude of Duroc, was that of Germany’s General Jodl. In his diary in 1938, Jodl noted the “Fuhrer’s genius” and described him as “the greatest statesman since Bismarck”. But, while later awaiting trial at Nuremberg, Jodl wrote: “I ask myself: Do I then know this person at all, at whose side for so many years I led so thorny an existence? Even today I do not know what he thought, knew and wanted to do, but only what I thought and suspected about it.” Jodl was a highly competent military officer who had tapped the table during Allied landings in Norway and insisted that an anxious Hitler “keep his nerve”. Yet, Jodl had basically surrendered himself to Hitler because he “thought and suspected” – and hoped – that they were on the same wave-length!

What each individual lieutenant “thought and suspected” will differ.

One of the talents of many successful holders of great power is that they can simultaneously cater to each individual: he appears to each individual the way that individual wants. One of Mussolini’s predecessors as Prime Minister, Bonomi, wrote of that Mussolini had the conflicting forces almost naturally covered: “All these discordant elements he has himself … assimilated and melted in his personality, assuming almost the figure of a referee who, in the chaos of ideas and feelings, chooses the vital elements for his creature.”

But, to whatever degree it is evident in the personality of the individual holder of great power, the sheer fact of having authority creates further gullibility: wanting to believe that the person in power’ is working for them, the followers attribute to him a fact that he is working for them – even if, like General Jodl, they don’t quite understand how!

This may be a factor in Trumps popularity. Moreover, Trump would seem to “fascinate” many people.

The word “fascination” crops up in the cases of both Hitler and Napoleon. The ability to fascinate will often be one of the attributes that allow an individual to be identified as worthy of holding great power, as it greatly assists in product differentiation – more precisely, each of those being fascinated sees the product that he or she likes, and this increases gullibility.

The wife of Hitler’s Lufwaffe Adjutant, Nicolas Below, later said of Hitler: “He didn’t gain the loyalty of decent and intelligent men by telling them his plan was murder and allowing them to see that he was a moral monster. He persuaded them because he was fascinating.” Albert Speer recalled joining the Nazi Party in 1931: “His persuasiveness, the peculiar magic of his by no means pleasant voice, the oddity of his rather banal manner, the seductive simplicity with which he attacked the complexity of our problems – all that bewildered and fascinated me. I knew nothing about his program. He had taken hold of me before I grasped what was happening.”

General Caulaincourt wrote of Napoleon: “When he so wished, there could be a power of persuasion and fascination in his voice, his expression, his very manner, giving him an advantage over his interlocutor. Never was there a man more fascinating when he chose to be.” Even Charles-Maurice Talleyrand, the French Foreign Minister, with his cynicism and perception was initially taken in by Napoleon, recalling that “at the beginning I felt myself attracted to him by that irresistible aura that only a genius can admit”.

Both Speer and Caulaincourt mention “voice”, “manner”, and “persuasion” in trying to describe fascination. The ability to “fascinate” can attract highly capable supporters — as were Speer and Caulaincout — and can be quite enduring as it was with these two men. Speer later wrote that “face to face, his magnetic power over me” was “great up to the very last day”.

One of Hitler’s generals later recalled the effect Hitler had on very senior generals: “Hardly one of the great theatre commanders, when summoned to make a presentation or report at headquarters, was proof against the overpowering presence of Hitler.” Werner Best, one of the few officials who maintained any personal liking for Foreign Minister Joachim Ribbentrop, later wrote: “In Ribbentrop’s relationship with Hitler, his weaknesses and anxieties became more pronounced than ever. He was almost hypnotized by Hitler, like a rabbit by a snake. Of all the men who admired and feared Hitler and obeyed him unquestioningly, I would say from my own observation that Ribbentrop was the one most strongly under his hypnotic spell. His awe of Hitler was a peculiar phenomenon caused by the exercise of Hitler’s suggestive influence on Ribbentrop’s weak psychology.”

When motivated, Hermann Goering was a dynamic action man to whom Hitler owed much of his success; but Hitler had also brought Goering success by giving a sense of purpose and direction to this “brutal buccaneer”. The bonding experience of twenty years of common cause, failure and success could not be discarded. Only a few months before Germany’s defeat, Albert Speer went to see Goering seeking some indication of support for his own efforts to tear himself from Hitler and from Hitler’s plans for the destruction of German industry in the face of advancing Allied armies.

Despite having been made, in Speer’s words, “the scapegoat for all the failures of the Luftwaffe” (airforce) in fending off Allied bombing attacks, and the “most violent and insulting language” that Hitler used against him both at military situation conferences and behind closed doors, Goering could do no more that indicate a sense of disappointment with Hitler. Speer recalled Goering saying “it was easier for me, since I had joined Hitler a good deal later and could free myself from him all the sooner. He, Goering, had much closer ties with Hitler; many years of common experiences and struggles had bound them together – and he could no longer break loose.”

In 1937, Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu addressed the National Assembly in order to eliminate rumours regarding his dismissal by President Kemal Ataturk. As in the case of Goering, personal issues were important: “Friends, again he (Ataturk) said to me on leaving, ‘You are still my friend and brother as always.’ I have known him (Ataturk) to be a blessing to me, not just with his kind regards and addresses, but also in my official duties and my personal life.” Ismet was being sincere. His long association with Ataturk – which was about as long as that of Goering with Hitler – had created a similar tie to that felt by Goering; and his dismissal led to a similar sense of disappointment.

The holder of great power makes subordinates and others feel personally needed

The holder of power will often take advantage of the need of people to feel personally needed, and to want to think that they have been specifically chosen by him to be a lieutenant. This is distinct from general recognition and prestige flowing from the eyes and mouths of others. It is very personal and is about being special in the eyes of the person in power. Feeling needed is also very reassuring for the subordinate who never forgets that the holder of great power controls – in Napoleon’s words — the “levers for moving men”: the lieutenant hopes that he will be protected and favoured.

Napoleon succinctly described the way to make an actual or potential subordinate or supporter lieutenant feel needed and according to Caulaincourt, it “explains better than any other phrase could have done the price he was prepared to pay for success”. Napoleon said: “When I need anyone, I don’t make too fine a point about it; I would kiss his arse.”

Hitler was masterful at making people feel special and needed. In mid-1940, Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano described Hitler kissing arse at an informal gathering with “a thousand little courtesies: to this one, according to his custom, a glass of mineral water, to that one cigarettes. Always equal, calm.”

In 1936, on Josef Goebbel’s thirty ninth birthday, Hitler visited him at the Propaganda Ministry. Goebbels afterwards wrote: “We go into my room alone. And then he speaks to me very kindly and intimately. About old times, and how we belong together, how fond he is of me personally. He is so touching to me. Gives me his picture with a glorious dedication. And a painting of the Dutch school. That was a wonderful hour alone with him. He pours out his heart to me. The problems he has, how he trusts me, what great assignments he still has in store for me.” In early 1944, Hitler rejected a bid by Goebbels to broaden his powers to include that of managing the war economy, yet still managed to make him feel important and needed; indeed, possibly even more important than if Goebbels had got the job he wanted. Goebbels noted in his diary: “He would like me to take on the role of the moving force behind the whole thing.”

Hitler was also good at making his generals feel personally needed and valued. When Field Marshal Keitel took up his post as “Chief of the Wehrmacht Supreme Command” in 1938, Hitler continued his seduction, telling him: “You are my confidant and my sole adviser on Wehrmacht matters” – this, at the same time as he was telling close associates that Keitel had “the brain of a cinema doorman”.

At the beginning of the war Erwin Rommel – not yet a Field- Marshall – was commanding Hitler’s headquarters, and wrote to his wife that he was “spending a lot of time” with Hitler. “The trust he has in me gives me the greatest delight. Yesterday, I was allowed to sit next to him.” In early 1943 Hitler wanted the independent minded General Guderian – who had earlier been removed from his command on the Russian front for not strictly following orders – to return, and kissed arse: “Since 1941 our ways have parted: there were numerous misunderstandings at that time which I much regret. I need you.”

Albert Speer recalled Hitler telephoning him seeking the latest armaments production statistics. The conversation would end with Hitler saying something like: “My regards to your wife. Is she still at Obersalzberg? Well then, my regards again.” Speer wrote: “When I thanked him and added the salutation, ‘Heil mein Fuhrer!’ he sometimes replied, ‘Heil Speer’. This greeting was a sign of favour which he only rarely vouchsafed to Goering, Goebbels and a few other intimates; underlying it was a note of faint irony at the mandatory ‘Heil, mein Fuhrer’. At such moments I felt as if a medal had been conferred on me. To be precise, all the intrigues and struggles for power were directed toward eliciting such a word, or what it stood for. The position of each and every one of us was dependent on his attitude.”

Like Goebbels, Speer was more than once subjected to Hitler’s intimate conversation treatment. Speer knew that he had put the Gauleiters (regional Nazi party leaders) off-side by his efforts to mobilise all resources for the war economy and he had been told that Martin Bormann (Hitler’s secretary for the Nazi Party as well as his general gatekeeper) was encouraging this attitude. Speer mentioned this to Hitler, who knew how to reassure Speer: “He again conferred a distinction upon on me by a little gesture, inviting me for the first time up to his wood-panelled study on the second floor of the Berghof, where he generally only held extremely personal and intimate discussions. In his private tone, almost like an intimate friend, he advised me to avoid doing anything that would arouse the Gauleiters against me. I should never underestimate their power, he said, for that would complicate things for me in the future. He was well aware of their shortcomings, he said; many were simple-hearted swashbucklers, rather rough, but loyal. I had to take them as they were. Hitler’s whole tone suggested to me that he was not going to let Bormann influence his attitude toward me.”

Josef Stalin was no slouch either. Sergo Beria, son of Lavrenti, wrote: “Stalin was able to charm people, as I can testify from experience. He managed to give the people he was with the impression that Jupiter had come down from his Olympus for them, deigned to speak with them in a familiar tongue, and was taking an interest in their problems.” Stalin, he wrote, “left each person he spoke to anxious to see him again, with a sense that there was now a bond that linked them forever” — and “that was his strength”.

Working at his holiday house in Sochi under a big oak tree, Stalin said to a loyal lieutenant, Yury Zhdanov: “Look at you here with me. That’s the Mamre tree.” Zhdanov knew that the Mamre tree was where Jesus assembled his Apostles.

And, while Stalin used “the Motherland” rather than “I” – used by Hitler in his pitch to Guderian — in a pitch to Marshal Georgi Zhukov, the tone was still highly personal. Zhukov initially refused promotion to Deputy Supreme Commander of Soviet forces: “My character wouldn’t let us work together.” Stalin replied: “Disaster threatens the country. We must save the Motherland by every possible means, no matter the sacrifice. What of our characters? Let’s subordinate then to the interests of the Motherland.” After Zhukov agreed, and said that he had to get to work, Stalin continued the charm offensive: “Well that’s fine. But aren’t you hungry? It wouldn’t hurt to have a little refreshment (of tea and cakes).”

When Ismet Inonu resisted the job of Turkey’s chief delegate to the Lausanne peace conference in 1922, Ataturk appealed to Ismet’s vanity and patriotism by telling the Grand National Assembly that Ismet was “the best, the most perfect among us all – the surest counsellor, the most faithful supporter, the best of comrades, the most ardent of patriots, revered not only by all Turks but by all Muslim peoples, as the defender of their honour, virtue and probity.” Ataturk was not at all religious – indeed he did not want religion to be part of the Turkish state – but he knew that Ismet was. Like Zhukov and Guderian, Ismet took the bait and the job!

A decade later, when he was Prime Minister, Ismet had an argument with Ataturk and later sent a hand-written note expressing his devotion. Ataturk replied, also with a hand-written note (late at night, after the inevitable few drinks): “Ismet you are a great man; you feel and you inspire emotion. It seems you cry when you read my words. Would you believe it if I said that I sob when I read yours? I am expressing these feelings in writing, not in company at the dinner table, but after retiring to my bedroom with my intimate companion. I am certain that you love me very much. I love you too.”

Holder of power shows loyalty to others

 One of the most effective ways for the holder of great power to make subordinates and supporters feel needed and special is to show them loyalty, particularly when they are having difficulties with other subordinates or supporters. They will feel both need and desire to return that loyalty.

Nikita Khrushchev reminisced about how, on his appointment as Communist Party boss of Moscow in 1949, Stalin helped him in his disputes with Stalin’s other senior lieutenants: “I was constantly running up against Lavrenti Beria and Georgi Malenkov.” “Stalin certainly treated me well. He seemed to trust and value me. Even though he frequently criticised me, he gave me support when I needed it, and I appreciated that very much.”

Mao Zedong’s doctor, Li Zhisui, did not get on well with Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, and one day in 1961 he walked out on her, slamming the door, after an argument over her sleeping pills. From experience, Dr Li knew that Mao showed loyalty to those who clearly showed loyalty to him – and one way of showing loyalty to him was to tell him everything and be first to do it! Dr Li later wrote: “I realised that I must see Mao immediately. He would side with the first person who spoke to him.” After he was told what the argument was about, Mao said: “Jiang Qing is unreasonable. You have told me everything. It’s all right. I’ll talk to Jiang Qing. In the meantime, though, why don’t you stay away from here for a few days? We still have to do something to save her face.” Mao was not only returning Dr Li’s loyalty, but showing some to Jiang Qing – who was to become an important lieutenant.

The appointment of Albert Speer as Armaments Minister in early 1942 following the death of Dr Fritz Todt brought challenges for the 36 year-old architect with no military experience – not the least of which was establishing his authority. Hermann Goering, an authentic war hero, who was in charge of the Four-Year Plan to prepare the German economy for war (as well as the air-force), wanted Todt’s job as well. When Hitler appointed Speer, Goering tried to bully Speer into accepting an agreement – which he claimed to have had with Todt – that “in my procurement for the army I could not infringe on areas covered by the Four-Year Plan”. This was something Speer thought would have left “my hands completely tied”.

Overlapping and poorly delineated authorities were a feature of Hitler’s divide and rule approach, but he now decided to show loyalty and back Speer to the hilt if he had any problems at a pending armaments industry conference: “If any steps are taken against you, or if you have difficulties, interrupt the conference and invite the participants to the Cabinet Room. Then I’ll tell those gentlemen whatever is necessary.” The conference did not begin well for Speer, so he told them that Hitler wanted to speak to them in the Cabinet Room.

According to Speer, Hitler “was astonishingly candid on the subject of Goering: ‘This man cannot look after armaments within the framework of the Four-Year Plan.’ It was essential, Hitler continued, to separate this task from the Four-Year Plan and turn it over to me. He expected not only cooperation on their part but also fair treatment. ‘Behave toward him like gentlemen!’ he said, employing the English word, which he rarely used.” Speer wrote: “Heretofore Hitler had never introduced a minister in this way. Even in a less authoritarian system such a debut would have been of assistance. In our state the consequences were astonishing, even to me. For a considerable time I found myself moving in a kind of vacuum that offered no resistance whatever. Within the widest limits I could practically do as I pleased.”

By early 1943, however, things were different and Josef Goebbels (Minister of Propaganda) and Martin Bormann (Hitler’s executive secretary and gate-keeper) had joined forces in an attempt to rein in Speer’s power. Again, Hitler showed loyalty. Speer wrote that both he and Goebbels were to make speeches at the Sportpalast on armaments: “When we coordinated out texts, the Propaganda Minister advised me to shorten my speech, since his would take an hour. ‘If you don’t stay considerably under half an hour, the audience will lose interest.’ As usual, we sent both speeches to Hitler in manuscript, with a note to the effect that mine was going to be condensed by a third. While I was sitting by, he read the drafts Bormann handed to him. With what seemed to me eagerness, he ruthlessly cut Goebbels speech by half within a few minutes. ‘Here, Bormann, inform the Doctor (Goebbels) and tell him that I think Speer’s speech excellent.’” Speer concluded: “In the presence of the arch-intriguer Bormann, Hitler had thus helped me to increase my prestige vis-à-vis Goebbels. It was a way of letting both men know that I still stood high. I could count on Hitler supporting me, if need be, against his closest associates.”

Subordinate and others nothing without the dictatorial CEO

The longer a person has great power and the more intense that power, the more likely it is that subordinates will be people who are essentially dependent him or her; not only has the holder of power removed the more independent minded, but those who remain get used to the idea of being told what to do. Without their ‘relationship’ with the holder of power, these subordinates know they would have much less – whether it be status, money, power to boss others, or the opportunity to influence significant events.

This does not mean that such subordinates are incompetent; they may, in fact, be very competent and talented in a variety of fields. There will rarely be a legitimate field marshal’s baton in their knapsack – although Germany’s Field Mashal Keitel managed to reach this rank by simply being loyal! Like Keitel, all such lieutenants will be very loyal to the holder of great power.

Yugoslavia’s Milovan Djilas, who spend significant time with Stalin, wrote that Vyacheslav Molotov (Politburo member and Minister of Foreign affairs) was “indispensable to Stalin in many ways”. Yet he also put the view that Molotov, despite his role as Stalin’s “practical executive”, was essentially “impotent without Stalin’s leadership”. And writer Falih Rifki Atay made a similar point about the highly intelligent Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inonu who “had a definite need for Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk)’s authority”.

Napoleon’s chief-of-staff at every major battle prior to Waterloo was Louis-Alexander Berthier. Even more than Molotov and Ismet, Berthier owed his fame and fortune to his relationship with the leader; he was loyal and competent as long as he did not attempt to lead. He was – as in the words of Hitler when describing Keitel– a reliable “assistant”.

“I have heard it said,” wrote Meneval, Napoleon’s second secretary, that Berthier “was a model of chief- of-staff”. “Nature had intended him for this part; he never raised himself above it. He was considered to be weak of mind and wavering in character. The First Consul (Napoleon) had entrusted him with various missions in which he had acquitted himself well under his direction. Napoleon, who held him in true affection, loaded him with gifts and honours.” Later, Napoleon claimed that Berthier was a “true gosling whom I had made into a kind of eagle” – saying that “there was not in the world a better chief-of-staff; that is where his true talent lay, for he was not capable of commanding 500 men”.

Berthier paid a price for latching onto the coattails of the holder of great power, as did Field Marshal Keitel (who was executed after the 1945 Nuremburg trials). According to Meneval, while in Russia in 1812, Napoleon would often criticise Berthier “for his carelessness”, saying, “not only are you no good, but you are actually in my way” – although Napoleon would later offer one of his indirect apologies to his “habitual” dinner-companion. Meneval recalled finding Berthier in a bedroom of a house “with his head in his hands, and his elbows on the table. When I asked him what was grieving him he broke into bitter complaint on the wretchedness of his position. ‘What is the good’, he said, ‘of having given me an income of 60,000 a year, a magnificent mansion in Paris, a splendid estate, in order to inflict the tortures of Tantalus upon me. I shall die here with all this work. The simplest private is happier than I am’.”

When Count Klemens Metternich, the Austrian Foreign Minister, tried negotiating with Napoleon in June 1814 as allied armies approached Paris, Napoleon later remained defiant: “So you want war. Good. You shall have it!” But Metternich noticed that there was a “painfully anxious look on the faces” of Napoleon’s lieutenants. Berthier, unable to directly differ with Napoleon, took the indirect approach, and “whispered” to Metternich: “Don’t forget that Europe needs peace, France especially – that’s all she wants.” After refusing to join Napoleon on his return from his first exile on the Mediterranean Sea island of Elbe, Berthier was killed when he fell, jumped, or was pushed, from a window in 1815.

Dr Li Zhisui wrote of the position of the politically ambitious Jiang Qing, Mao Zedong’s wife, in China’s internal power struggle in 1965: “At this turning point in his career, Mao needed Jiang Qing. Even her political ambitions were of use. She was, as she claimed, the most loyal lieutenant he had, because without Mao, Jiang Qing was no-one.”

Dr Li, too, was “no-one’ without Mao. In mid-1968, during the Cultural Revolution when students were seeking and persecuting people in authority, Dr Li had a mild falling out with Mao – which left him exposed to the wrath of Jiang Qing who had sided with the students. Dr Li thus found himself hiding from her in the Beijing Textile Factory. “I was not fully back in Mao’s favour. He did not actively intervene on my behalf, and Wang Dongxiang (chief of security for Mao and China’s leaders) was certain Jiang Qing would persist in trying to get rid of me.” “Mao did not always know what Jiang Qing was doing then, and she could easily direct others to abduct me and later deny responsibility, claiming not to know.” Mao, however, eventually become concerned that the Cultural Revolution’s Red Guards were getting out of control, and so ordered the workers in the factory to take over a university. This led to conflict with the students, and Dr Li got lost in the commotion.

Dr. Li later wrote about getting rescued and his very positive reaction to Mao: “Suddenly, I realised that my name was being called. It was Mao’s driver. ‘Hurry, he’s looking for you Dr Li.’ Mao was waiting for me. He stood up as soon as he saw me and came forward to greet me. I rushed toward him. He took both my hands in his and looked at me closely before speaking. I sensed that he really did like me, despite the strains in our relationship and Jiang Qing’s repeated accusations against me. ‘What a sorry situation you’re in’, he said. ‘Why don’t you change your clothes and get some rest now?’ he suggested.”

Dr Li recalled that “many members of Mao’s inner circle, those closest and most loyal to him, had once been saved” by him. “Loyalty” to Mao, wrote Dr Li with the additional benefit of personal experience, “was based less on trust than on dependence”.

Although previously a successful businessman which was assisted by his marriage to the daughter of a wealthy wine producer, Joachim Ribbentrop was next to nothing in the field of politics without Hitler. German Foreign Ministry official, Studnitz wrote that Ribbentrop’s “decisions, like his hesitations, are accompanied by a constant fear of how the Fuhrer will react.” “The Foreign Minister has put all he possesses on one card – Hitler. A single frown from Fuhrer Headquarters, and his whole world tumbles about his ears. His greatest agony occurs when he has been unable for some time to obtain an audience with Hitler. Over him, as over all the other paladins, hangs the Damoclean sword of disfavour; but his skin in thinner than the others.”

Despite his own illusions, and the belief of many others, the feared SS chief Heinrich Himmler was nothing without Hitler. He was, according to Speer, not without “remarkable qualities: the quality of patience to listen; the quality of long reflection before coming to decisions; a talent for selecting his staff, who on the whole turned out to be highly effective people”. Yet, despite have some of the qualities of a good HR manager, he was a failure when in dispute with powerful personalities.

Ernst Kaltenbrunner, head of the Gestapo, who reported to Himmler, later described him as a “stingy, small person”. Walter Schellenberg, an influential subordinate, described him as “a coward, not a brave man”; and General Guderian recalled Himmler’s “lack of self-assurance and courage in Hitler’s presence.”

Himmler even behaved like a wimp when directly taken-on by Guderian, an admittedly powerful personality. In early 1945, Hitler had insisted that Himmler take charge of Army Group Vistula which was facing the advancing Russians. Himmler was initially enthusiastic but performed badly. Guderian did not hide his contempt for Himmler, looking directly at him while telling Hitler: “The man can’t do it. How could he do it?” Himmler polished his glasses and said nothing. Weeks later Guderian finally persuaded Himmler to give up the position of Commander-in-Chief of Army Group Vistula on the grounds that he was overworked with this and the jobs of Reichsfuhrer of the SS, chief of all German police (including the Gestapo), Minister of the Interior, and Commander-in Chief of the Replacement Army.

Himmler asked Guderian: “But how can I go and say that to the Fuhrer? He wouldn’t like it if I came up with such a suggestion.”

Guderian: “Would you authorise me to say it for you?”

Himmler nodded.

Excitement, ambition, money, prestige, power to boss others

 For the very ambitious, being near the holder of great power is the place to be. It is here that there is money, prestige, and power to boss others. Such people will be very alert for any sign that the holder of power is failing – in terms of his control of the “two levers for moving men” – and will readily swear allegiance to someone new if they feel the need.

As Napoleon said of Charles-Maurice Tallyrand: “With him, as with many people, one would need to be always successful.” Talleyrand himself wrote of the excitement: “Carried away by the rapidity of events, by ambition, by the interest of each day, placed in that atmosphere of war and political change which brooded over the whole of Europe, people found it impossible to pay due regard to their private affairs; public life occupied so great a part of their minds that private life was never given a single thought. One came to one’s house like a visitor owing to the necessity of resting somewhere, but nobody was prepared to stay permanently at home.”

“Ambition! That had a lot to do with it”, noted Hans Frank when asked about his motives for supporting Hitler who appointed him Bavarian Minister of Justice and later, Governor-General of Poland. “Just imagine – I was a Minister of State at thirty; rode around in a limousine, had servants (and much more).”

Albert Speer, who was born in 1905, wrote of how ambition bound him to Hitler in the early-mid 1930s: “My position as Hitler’s architect had soon become indispensable to me. Not yet thirty, I saw before me the most exciting prospects an architect can dream of.” After visiting Paris in 1940 following the French defeat, Hitler said to Speer: “Draw up a decree in my name ordering full-scale resumption of work on the Berlin buildings. Wasn’t Paris beautiful? But Berlin must be made far more beautiful. In the past, I have often considered whether we would not have to destroy Paris. But when we are finished in Berlin, Paris will only be a shadow. So why should we destroy it?” Speer later wrote of the effect of this on his pride and ambition: “I was once again seduced by Hitler’s brilliant victories and by the prospect of soon resuming work on my building projects. Now it was up to me to surpass Paris.”

Hermann Goering thought that ambition was also the driving force for Josef Goebbels, telling the prison psychiatrist at Nuremberg that Goebbels “saw his big chance to become powerful by using the press for anti-Semitic reasons. Personally, I think Goebbels was using anti-Semitism merely as a means of achieving personal power. Whether he had any deep-seated hatred against the Jews is questionable. I think he was too much of a thief and dishonest opportunist to have any deep-seated feelings for or against anything.”

Sometimes, of course, a subordinates’s ambition is seen as the result of a little prodding. When French Ambassador Poncet asked German Defence Minister Blomberg whether the 1934 appointment of Joachim Ribbentrop as Special Commissioner of the Reich Government for Disarmament Questions meant a new phrase in German policy, Blomberg replied: “The reality is far simpler. Ribbentrop wanted a title, an office, a position; or rather his wife, a vain, ambitious women, pressed him to demand something.” This may have, at least in part, been the source of what Paul Schmidt, the German Foreign Ministry interpreter, described as Ribbentrop’s “own vanity” and his “abnormal desire for rank and position”.

Once the subordinate has risen as far as he can, his ambition can result in a slightly more cautious approach. Why risk what you have if you can avoid doing so? In response to Marshal Graziani’s reluctance to launch an offensive in Africa in 1940 because it might fail, Mussolini told Galeazzo Ciano: “One should not give jobs to people who aren’t looking for at least one promotion. Graziani has too many to lose.”

Napoleon made a similar point 1814. “He found fault with himself for having made so much use of the marshals in these later days”, recorded General Caulaincourt, “since they had become too rich, to much the grand seigneurs and had grown war weary. Things, according to him, would have been much better if he had placed good generals of division, with their (marshals) batons yet to win, in command.”

A long-time successful holder of power knows the value of money to each member of his executive team; and often, as did Napoleon, finds a number of different ways to provide it.

Napoleon had his “extraordinary domain” which consisted of the “the total resources supplied by conquest”. Napoleon had sole power to use these assets and their revenues as he wished – on the army, or for the encouragement and reward of civil or military services; and, of course, ensuring loyalty to himself.

Napoleon’s third secretary after Bourienne, Fain, later wrote about the ‘extraordinary domain’ which Napoleon tightly and personally controlled: “My work was divided between two large books he always kept on a corner of his table, the list of holdings and the list of individuals. The list of holdings contained the gross total worth, in land and revenues, attributed to the extraordinary domain of Pomerania, Poland, … Belgium, … the French canals, the tolls on the Rhine, … and the Great Book of France. Next to the gross worth, the concessions deducted off the top were noted exactly, and what was left in available net worth appeared. The list of individuals was a sort of dictionary of grants. An account had been opened for each recipient and indicated there was not only the income that had been granted to him, but also the holdings from which this income had been derived. When the Emperor wanted to grant endowments, he calculated them himself.”

One day, according to Fain, “the Emperor, at his desk, had the Great Book of endowments open before him. I was putting in the allotments he had just dictated to me. After turning several pages of the large book, he stopped while looking at me. ‘Ah, I’ve found you! Here you are! Ten thousand francs in revenue from Pomerania. At least no one will say that I forget my secretaries.’

This endowment was troubling me. The Emperor’s playful address made me decide and I rose.

‘Will Your Majesty permit me to say a word on this subject?’

‘What is it then?’

‘Assuredly Your Majesty wished to treat me with infinite generosity, and 10,000 francs in revenue would be well beyond my merits. I am as grateful as if your good intentions had been borne out, but the grant is nothing but figures; I’ve never touched a sou of it, and I am ashamed to be carried on your books for a benefit I do not make use of. I would ask for permission to delete my record’.

‘Ah! But this is too much!’ replied the Emperor, getting up abruptly from his armchair. ‘It is not enough? It will become so. Furthermore, I take nothing back; what is given is given. I will erase nothing, do your hear? I prefer to give you a second one; then will you be content? And also to Meneval (Napoleon’s second secretary after Bourreine) who is there in a corner and says nothing. Ten thousand francs each, do you understand? Arrange it.”

Fain may have been reluctant, but few others were. According to Meneval, in 1807 Napoleon distributed “sums of from two hundred thousand to one million francs to each of nine marshals, sums of one hundred thousand francs to each of thirty nine generals”.

Theophile Berlier, who initially thought Napoleon “the man sent by providence to consolidate our republican institutions”, opposed Napoleon’s rise to First Consul for Life and his later rise to hereditary Emperor, but he remained a lieutenant: “I was prevailed upon to consider it a duty dictated by liberalism not to abandon positions from which patriots could still render service to the state and to liberty.” However, he also noted that the salary was important because he was “without patrimonial fortune”, and “was a very advanced age (forty-five) for resuming pleading as a barrister, yet perhaps not sufficient to secure a comfortable existence in the simple work of a practice, which is ordinarily fruitful only for older legal consultants.”

Berlier’s motives are a good example of the way the mix of factors binding a subordinate to a dictatorial holder of power can change over time: from believing in goodness and righteousness of Napoleon, he moved on to money and prestige. “In 1802 I had combated the establishment of the Legion of Honour; and when it became law I was called to become part of it with the rank of commander. (Then in 1808) I found myself enrolled in a new nobility by virtue of the functions that I exercised (in the Council of State).” “Caught up in the general movement, I yielded to it.”

But Berlier could only pass on his title to his eldest son if he could also guarantee, via a majorat (a form of inherited property) or entail (another form of inherited property), sufficient wealth to enable that son to maintain the dignity of the title. Berlier, like some others, did not have such wealth, so Napoleon stepped in “by personally providing to (certain) title holders the capital necessary to establish their majorats from the immense reservoir of his domaine extraordinaire”.

Napoleon could also use various concessions to bind others to him, such as that flowing from gaming tables. Louis Bourienne, Napoleon’s first secretary, wrote that when Napoleon told Joseph Fouche that he intended to abolish the office of Minister of Police, Fouche recommended a delay of two years. Fouche, “as avaricious for money as Bonaparte of glory, consoled himself by thinking that for these two years the administration of the gaming tables would still be for him a Pactolus flowing with gold”. “For Fouche, already the possessor of an immense fortune, always dreamed of increasing it, though he himself did not know how to enjoy it.” Fouche, as already noted was eventually sacked – for the first time – in 1802.

By 1812, General Savary was in charge of the police and Napoleon – who claimed Savary would “murder his wife and children” if so ordered – commented on one source of his loyalty: “Savary clings to his ministry and the salary. He is afraid of losing his post, although, so far as that goes, he no longer needs it, as I have given him plenty of money. Whether as aide- de-camp or as a cabinet minister, he was always asking for money, and this displeased me. Not that he was alone in this, for never did (Marshal) Ney or (Marshal) Oudinot or many another open or finish a campaign without coming to me for cash.”

Sometimes Napoleon’s lieutenants just took what they wanted, and Napoleon turned a blind-eye. When Napoleon was told that one of his marshals had walked into an Italian pawnshop and stuffed his pockets with jewels, he retorted: “Don’t talk to me about generals who love money. It was only that which enabled me to win the battle of Eylau. (Marshal) Ney (mentioned again!) wanted to reach Elbing to procure more funds.”

Like Napoleon, Mao Zedong knew that many of his lieutenants liked money, and was not particularly concerned how they got it. Dr Li Zhisui wrote that “the honesty of his staff was not a major concern. If an underling was useful, no matter what his other failings, Mao would protect and keep him safe.”

Mussolini, who was little interested in money or luxury for himself, similarly turned a blind eye to the financial doings of his lieutenants. In 1941, Galeazzo Ciano wrote of the dismissal of Achille Starace as head of the fascist black shirt militia. Mussolini had complained that “Starace sends a militiaman to walk his four dogs!” However, “The Duce’s most serious complaint is that Starace wears a distinguished service medal without authorisation. The criticism regarding financial doings finds fewer echoes in Mussolini’s mind.”

Hitler also knew the value of money to his lieutenants. According to Hans Lammers, Hitler’s Chancellery Chief-of-Staff, “bonuses were granted in land and property, chiefly however in cash to ‘deserving men’”; with recipients including Ribbentrop, Keitel, Guderian, and Lammers himself. He noted: “Category of bonus eligibles whom the Fuhrer (Hitler) personally designated: Minister, State Secretaries, General of the Army, Generals, Reichleiters (regional representatives of the central government), Gauleiters (regional Nazi party leaders), etc. Usual amount of the bonus in these cases: between one hundred thousand Reichsmark and a million Reichsmark. Occasion for granting the bonus: birthdays (fiftieth, fifty-fifth and sixtieth), special anniversaries, retirement from work etc.”

Hermann Goering was like a pig in mud with the possibilities of his position. The fanfare accompanying his 1935 marriage led the British Ambassador to comment: “A visitor to Berlin might well have thought that the monarchy had been restored and that he had stumbled upon the preparations for a royal wedding.” In late 1942 Goering journeyed to Italy with Field-Marshal Rommel, ostensibly to help co-ordinate operations in North Africa where the German and Italian forces were under pressure. However, Goering showed little interest in the task at hand. Instead he went shopping for art works, flaunted his diamond ring – “one of the most valuable stones in the world” – and bragged to Rommel: “They call me the Maecenas of the Third Reich.”

While the subordinates desire to be personally special to the holder of great power is often tied to the desire to be special to someone who has the admiration of others and who is feared by others. In the lieutenant’s mind there will be little prestige in being the lieutenant to a hated thug – he wants to feel pride, and to feel what it is like to have some of the aura the person in charge!

Louis Bourienne, Napoleon’s first secretary, later wrote: “I was so closely employed that I scarcely ever went out but my zeal carried me through every difficulty, and I cannot express how happy I was in enjoying the unreserved confidence of the man on whom the eyes of all Europe were filed.”

On the evening of Josef Goebbels’ thirty ninth birthday, Hitler held a rally at the Sportpalast stadium in his honour, lavishing him with praise and calling on the crowd to join in shouting “Heil” to him. Hitler was, for a moment at least, allowing Goebbels to feel like his equal. Goebbels wrote in his diary: “This I didn’t expect. How grateful I am to him.”

Speer later wrote of being Armaments Minister in the first part of 1944: “Even though I was only shining in the reflected light of Hitler’s power – and I don’t think I ever deceived myself on that score – I still found it worth striving for. I wanted, as part of his following, to gather some of his popularity, his glory, his greatness, around myself.”

Following the defeat of France, Hitler dished out a round of promotions, with Goering promoted from Field-Marshal (a five-star general) to Reich Marshal of the Greater German Reich (a six-star general). The American journalist, William Shirer, noted that Goering “acted like a happy child playing with his toys on Christmas morning”.

Napoleon could have explained why Goering was so happy! “Men well deserve the contempt I feel for them”, he told Louis Bourienne: “I have only to put some gold lace on the coats of my virtuous republicans and they immediately become just what I wish them.”

To critics of the Legion of Honour, introduced in 1802, Napoleon argued: “I defy you to show me a republic, modern or ancient, that did without distinctions. You call them ‘baubles’, but let me assure you it is with baubles that men are led!” And, in 1808 Napoleon established the titles of Duke, Count, Baron, and Chevalier of the Empire. Jean-Jacques Cambaceres, Napoleon’s Arch-Chancellor, indicated that “such titles will henceforth serve only to mark for public recognition those already noted for their services, for their devotion to the prince (Napoleon) and the fatherland”.

Cambaceres himself was a prime beneficiary. A contemporary wrote: “Never did titles, crosses, and ribands give anyone more pleasure than they did him. His whole delight lay in displaying them.” Like Goering, the food loving Cambaceres had a more than ample frame, and hence uniform material, to hang these ‘baubles’ on. And, both liked fancy titles. Cambaceres told his aides that in public they should address him as “Your Most Serene Highness” rather than the official “Your Grandeur”.

In September 1928, Marshal Badoglio wrote to Mussolini: “Because Your Excellency’s generosity in rewarding all your faithful collaborators is well known, I take the liberty of applying to Your Excellency to suggest to the King that he should grant me an hereditary title. As I told you verbally yesterday, Your Excellency can count on my complete and absolute devotion now and always.” Badoglio eventually got a title, but then fell out with Mussolini because of his opposition to the alliance with Germany.

Although it is not often directly admitted, the power of a lieutenant over others is an obvious attraction of the job. Albert Speer was most honest about it. By early 1944, “I had been bribed and intoxicated by the desire to wield pure power, to assign people to this and that, to say the final word on important questions, to deal with expenditures in the billions. I thought I was prepared to resign, but I would have sorely missed the heady stimulus that comes with leadership.”

While, as we have seen, Galeazzo Ciano emphasised that he stayed on as Foreign Minister after the 10 June 1940 Italian attack on France in order to “risk something to bring it to an end”, a friend and fellow diplomat had a slightly different but not mutually exclusive view: “That day Ciano, for his own good, for his personal satisfaction, for his future ambitions, should have resigned. Why didn’t he do it? He just could not face the idea of not having bells to push, secretaries to bully, people coming to him to ask for services he invariably rendered in his own grand and generous style; he liked the glamour that went with his charge. So he stayed on” – and was later executed for it!

You can learn more about Putin by reading “PUTIN and his Lieutenants compared to: Mao, Napoleon, Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, Ataturk” which can be purchased in e-book form on Amazon here:
https://www.amazon.com.au/gp/product/B0DBGYB3RR

 

Russian Censorship Comes to Australia via Jews!

Russian Censorship Comes to Australia via Jews!

I lived in Russia until October 2022 – ie eight months after the February invasion of Ukraine after which it became illegal to refer to it other than as a “special military operation” (SMO). Almost immediately people I knew were fearful of what they might be heard saying, whether it be on WhatsApp, Zoom, on the street, or even sitting alone with me in a restaurant. Even when I used the term “invasion” or “war” people would invariably reply referring to the SMO. It soon became clear to me that it was not only fear of being heard and arrested because of that particular conversation with me, but also people were also practicing using the SMO term so that they did not mistakenly use the terms “war” or “invasion” on some other occasion.

I have also worked and lived in China and was conscious of the need to be careful what I said, but in Russia it was different because I had also lived in Russia before Vladimir Putin became president in 2000 and subsequently for many years on and off until 2022. In 2016 I wrote a research report for a Russian university and was advised to remove the term “annexation” when referring to the Russian takeover of Crimea in 2014, but in the following year some of my Masters degree students in my course in the Higher School of Economics — where I taught a course on Russian foreign policy — were still prepared to openly say in class that “we do not trust our government.” They would not do that now!

Nor would these students now walk down a street waving an Ukrainian flag. This is not only because they might be arrested but because many Russians do regard Ukraine as a terrorist state and thus supported the SMO and would take offence. This is not only due to Putin’s propaganda, but around 15,000 people had been killed in Eastern Ukraine between 2014 and 2022 by Ukrainian nationalists. Many of these dead – including women and children (even babies) – identified themselves as Russian rather than Ukrainian and had relatives in Russia.

On 4 July 2024, Sir John Sawers — a former head of M16, Britain’s secret intelligence agency and former Ambassador to Egypt — told Gideon Rachman of the Financial Times that Israel is now a different country from being a “bit like an extension of Europe in the decades of the 70s, 80s and 90s” and that now “more and more a sense within the Israeli mainstream parties” is that “the solution to Israel’s Palestinian problem is to expel the Palestinians” from Gaza.

Australian politicians such as Peter Dutton and Chris Minns are very ignorant of the wider world and might be surprised that the psychology of many Australian Jews and their indignant supporters would easily fit into a Russian milieu, and how their own psychology of censorship has much in common with dictators who want to eliminate people and views that they don’t like.