Book
Iran Conference, 14 July 2026
Sharif Policy Research Institute (SPRI), Sharif University of Technology (SUT),
Tehran, Conference, 14 July 2026
Description: This panel explores Iran’s post-war economic reconstruction through the lens of China’s industrial development experience. It examines how reconstruction can serve as a foundation for restoring productive capacity and enabling long-term industrial transformation. Drawing on China’s experience, the discussion focuses on industrial policy, financing mechanisms, and state capacity as key drivers of successful post-crisis recovery. It also highlights the importance of adapting lessons from China to Iran’s specific economic and geopolitical context.
Main Topics:
Please note that the moderator may prioritize or omit certain topics based on time and relevance.
1. The Post-War Economic Context of Iran and Reconstruction Priorities
How the war has affected Iran’s infrastructure, industrial base, production networks and economic stability, and what the immediate reconstruction priorities are.
2. Reconstruction as a Foundation for Long-Term Industrial Development in Iran
Why post-war recovery should be designed not only for rebuilding, but for enabling structural economic transformation and industrial upgrading.
3. Lessons from China’s Post-Crisis Industrial Reconstruction Experience
How China approached early-stage industrial recovery, including rebuilding production capacity, restoring supply chains, and restarting industrial growth.
4. The Role of Industrial Policy in Post-War Economic Recovery
How strategic sector selection, state coordination, and targeted industrial support can guide reconstruction in Iran.
5. Financing Reconstruction and Industrial Reactivation in Iran
Investment mobilization, development finance, and state-led credit systems can support rebuilding industrial capacity.
6. Institutional Capacity and Governance for Effective Reconstruction
How state capacity, planning institutions, and coordination mechanisms determine the success or failure of post-war economic recovery.
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BACKGROUND PAPER prepared by Jeff Schubert and Mohsen Abdollahzadeh
“Lessons from Chinese (and Russian) Industrial Development Experience for Iran’s Post-War Economic Reconstruction” (DRAFT 6 July 2026)
Jeff Schubert,
Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
https://russianeconomicreform.com/
https://www.linkedin.com/in/jeff-schubert-81977092/
Email: schubert@jeffschubert.com
Mohsen Abdollahzadeh
Professor of Data Science
Irkutsk, Russia
Email: mohsen@istu.edu
A. INTRODUCTION
We start this paper by giving an detailed overview and examples of China’s “Made in China 2025” (MIC2025) program as a foundation for later analysis. We look at some aims or goals of MIC2025 with associated successes and what might be called failures. We also briefly try to understand how these aims or goals were originally determined because if Iran is to gain useful policy insights it needs a sensible process for choosing and implementing policy.
We did not feel the need to provide a detailed examination of China’s development policies during the decades prior to MIC2025 because Iran actually already has in place the intellectual framework and talent to adopt a much smaller and version of MIC2025 if its political authorities would allow.
Just because Iran could decide that it could adopt some Chinese-type industrial, manufacturing or technological goals does not necessarily mean that it should. To help consider this we look at the example of Russia which, like Iran, is in general terms a natural resource exporter rather than a importer like China. Some might say that both Russia and Iran suffer from a “resources curse” which reduces the need / incentive to diversify economic output and exports.
China’s “terms of trade” improve when the prices for its industrial products rise faster (or fall less) than natural resources that it imports. For, Russia it is the reverse. Historically, terms of trade for such countries fluctuate with no clear trend that is a fit for all. So, a question arises about the extent to which Iran should seek to diversify its economy with “manufacturing upgrading and technological transformation”. It may be that a continual world move to non-fossil energy sources will adversely affect Iran’s terms of trade, but technological advances may also lower the prices of industrial imports.
Finally, we look at the likely willingness and ability of Iran to carry out any process of change and transformation of industry, manufacturing and technological process.
Whatever the case, we think it is clear that Iran does need a substantial period of economic reform – if only to make it a better “user” of industrial products and technology.
B. CHINA
China’s industrial and technological transformation has been many years in the making and is due to a wide variety of factors in economic policy. In order to give a concrete basis for discussion about what Iran might do, this paper starts with a concentration on the “Made in China 2025” (MIC2025) strategy which was implemented to cover China’s 13th and 14th five-year plans. MIC2025 was put in place in 2015 following a report prepared by Ministry and Information Technology led scholars and technical experts. MIC2025 aimed to move China up the global value chain and establish manufacturing dominance by targeting state support in sectors that China considered strategically important yet underdeveloped.
In November 2025 a US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report, “Made in China 2025: Evaluating China’s Performance”, looked at the results of MIC2025 as an example of China’s industrial strategy to “comprehensively mobilize state resources, private enterprise and national priorities”.[1]
According to the Staff Research Report, favoured sectors were:
1) Next-generation information technology (IT) industry, including integrated circuits, information communication equipment, and software;
2) High-end computer numerically controlled (CNC) machines and robotics;
3) Aviation and space equipment, including drone technologies;
4) Offshore engineering equipment and high-tech ships;
5) Advanced rail transportation equipment;
6) Energy-saving and new energy vehicles (NEVs), including electric vehicles (EVs);
7) Electrical equipment, including solar and wind power;
8) Agricultural machinery and equipment;
9) New materials;
10) Biopharma and high-performance medical devices.
NOTE: While Artificial Intelligence was not part of the original MIC2025 program and we have attempted to look at this issue for Iran under the policy section.
Growth targets for “localization of production” were set for most categories, while some also had targets for “global market share” and/or “technology development”.
According to the Review Commission Staff Research Report, “China has met or exceeded many of the very ambitious global market share, local sourcing, and technology development targets it set for itself in 2015. While it has fallen short on others, in most cases it still made significant gains in each sector. The bottom line is that after a decade of state support, China is more innovative, has moved up the global value chain, and has solidified its status as a global manufacturing powerhouse.”
The Staff Research Report does not tell us about extreme failures – ie how many measures and how much money did not contribute to the successes! China’s property sector is a visual illustration of how its governments and various authorities are capable of facilitating projects that yield few or no returns – and then hiding or denying the failures in any way possible. Terms like “localization of production”, “global market share” and “technology development” do not necessarily equate to profitability or rational use of a country’s resources.
A Rhodium Group report for US Chamber of Commerce says “Beijing’s industrial policies have had unintended consequences, particularly for economic growth. China’s industrial policy ecosystem has led to profound waste, as local governments piled in with duplicative and inefficient projects. At the same time, local governments are grappling with the mounting fiscal costs of these policies, forcing difficult trade-offs in their expenditures and further exposing the economic strains of this approach.”[2]
The Staff Research Report says that “given the wide range of industries and technologies targeted by MIC2025, there is no single explanation for why China’s industrial policy met its goals in some areas and lagged in others. Outcomes varied across sectors, reflecting differing market conditions, the complexity of technological innovation, and the specific forms of government support deployed, among other factors.”
The Staff Report says that four recurring fault lines shaped outcomes across the sectors – and it worth looking at these to get a very practical feeling for how such things work.
Barriers to entry: China struggled to catch up in industries where production processes require extensive upfront investment and depend on accumulated Intellectual Property (IP), including trade secrets and technical knowhow. It has generally succeeded in industries where barriers to entry are low and China’s investment and support for vertical integration of the supply chain build economies of scale. This approach enabled Chinese firms to quickly match the technological level of their foreign competitors while offering cheaper products.
An example of “success” is Shipbuilding: China was already the largest shipbuilding country by 2015. MIC2025 enabled Chinese shipyards to underprice and outcompete foreign shipyards and attain dominance in nearly every segment of the global shipbuilding market.
An example of “challenges” is Aviation: China has not yet succeeded in developing the state-of-the-art sub-systems required for commercially competitive jet engines. However, China has mastered many other advanced technical processes in aircraft production and continues to invest significant resources in aviation R&D.
Technology transfer: China struggled to catch up in industries where the most advanced IP was tightly held by a small number of international firms; but China quickly closed the gap in sectors where foreign firms shared technology with local partners.
An example of “success” is High-Speed Rail: China required industry leaders to form Joint-Ventures (JVs) with Chinese train makers. Foreign firms transferred technology and knowhow in a quid pro quo for market access—helping cultivate their top global competitor in the process.
An example of “challenges” is Semiconductors: Progress in advanced and leading-edge semiconductor production was hindered by an inability to compel leading firms to establish high-value manufacturing operations in China and, more recently, US-led restrictions on its acquisition of advanced semiconductor manufacturing equipment. Because foreign-sourced chips were critical to China’s export manufacturing-led growth, Chinese policymakers were unwilling to impose market barriers to force non-Chinese companies to transfer advanced technologies for market access.
Strong Foreign Incumbents: China struggled to catch up in industries where incentives to buy local could not overcome the strong brand incumbency and market position of foreign firms. Chinese firms made inroads when policy coupled extensive supply-side support, such as subsidies, with demand-side inducements to buy Chinese — including explicit local content requirements and other incentives that drove end-user demand for targeted Chinese-made products.
An example of “success” is New Energy Vehicles (NEVs): NEV targets were driven by demand-side policy support for EVs and their batteries. Local governments stimulated demand by procuring electric buses and taxis; the central government required EV makers to use Chinese-made batteries to qualify for subsidies; and consumers were encouraged to switch to EVs through tax incentives, fast-tracked vehicle registrations, and trade-in subsidies. During most of this time, China restricted market presence of foreign-manufactured EVs through tariffs and subsidy exclusions.
An example of “challenges” is Agricultural Machinery: Despite direct subsidies for purchasing alternatives from Chinese companies, high-end foreign-branded farm machinery (such as John Deere) has retained a strong presence in China’s domestic market. Indigenously developed agriculture machinery has failed to match the quality and reliability of established foreign brands and their extensive networks of after-sales services and component parts and suppliers.
Basic Research versus Iterative Innovation: China struggled to catch up in industries where innovation gains are highly dependent on basic research; but it succeeded in industries where technological progress is concentrated in applied, pre-commercial stages and particularly where innovation occurs on the factory floor.
An example of “success” in Electrical Equipment: Success in meeting targets for nuclear, solar, and wind generation equipment was driven not only by subsidies but also by returns to process-level innovation. China has improved on U.S. nuclear power plant designs. While underlying technology for photovoltaic cells and wind turbines was developed abroad, government subsidies coupled with production process innovations by Chinese firms helped China to become the dominant global solar and wind manufacturer.
An example of “challenges” is New Materials: China’s failure to clearly meet its new materials targets is due in part to a lack of basic research and novel and breakthrough discoveries of new materials. Its investment in new materials talent also lags behind other high-tech industries.
What the Review Commission Staff Research Report does not tell us is the methodology used by Chinese policy makers to identify industry sectors and technologies to give MIC2025 support.
We asked Harald Buchmann about this and he surmised it as a “very complex process of negotiation, involving hundreds of top-level professors in economy, technology, and other fields, who are invited to contribute. Further top leaders of major companies, as well as the top leaders of powerful institutions, namely province leaders of top regions like Guangdong, Shanghai, Zhejiang etc. or the Finance ministry, the NDRC, the MIIT etc. There are of course the foundations laid by dedicated massive research institutions like the Chinese Academy of Science, or the Chinese Association of Engineering, who do in-depth frontier research. But their base line is then screened against the social development strategy, which is one or two layers above the industry development strategy, to have the bigger picture of “why do we develop the economy, and for who, to solve what challenge”. This stage happens by political actors. So the process involves literally thousands of relevant people who lead huge organizations, providing inputs, and then feedback on consolidated text drafts and is a constant ongoing process where the change of a single word in a strategy document can have huge implications. I don’t think it can be boiled down to methods that are used, as it’s more of a political negotiation process, but a process of very well- informed experts, rather than political partisans.”
The question at hand is whether MIC2025 offers lessons for Iran. It should be obvious that Iran could never achieve what China has. However, Iran could decide to choose some elements of MIC2025 and try to implement them in a similar fashion on a smaller scale. Decisions would be needed to be made about what elements to choose – and we attempt to address this issue later in this paper.
But, in our view there is another very important question to be tackled before Iran even decides if it can choose some elements of a MIC2025. The question is whether Iran should try something like this. In our view, Russia is an appropriate country to examine in order to answer this question because like Iran its exports are mainly based on natural resources and – despite the so-called “resources curse” – there are likely to be significant advantages in remaining so.
C. RUSSIA COMPARED
The Russian approach it industrial and technological development (and infrastructure) has been quite inconsistent and much less successful than that of China. And any progress – and evaluation of it – has been severely disrupted by the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Nevertheless, there are lessons to be learnt.
In 2009 the Skolkovo innovation center was announced by President Medvedev to boost Russian technology drawing on foreign and domestic sources. This was essentially just a large geographical area on the outskirts on Moscow designed to host domestic and foreign companies, research organizations and educational institutions. It never seemed to show obvious great success – and foreign participation may have ultimately suffered from the fall-out following the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014.
A wide-ranging report on socio-economic development — “Strategy 2020” – was commissioned by President Putin in 2009 and released in 2013 following the work of 1000 experts working in 21 groups. This report was of very high quality with a liberal orientation rather than state involvement in economic activity — and spoke in terms of policy directions rather than numerical-type targets. Putin accepted – at least in theory – most of its recommendations.
In 2014 a National Technology Initiative (NTI)[3] project was announced which aimed to make Russia a leader in Fourth Industrial Revolution sectors – with an implicit target date of 2035 for “technological independence”. This was partly to be achieved by “special mechanisms of support” including “financial instruments to allow Russian investors to obtain foreign technology which is critically necessary for the development of individual companies of the NTI and markets of the NTI”. Russia would also establish leadership of an international technological bloc/alliance of countries and companies.
President Putin, in a speech to the St. Petersburg Economic Forum said: “Our import replacement program is also aimed at manufacturing goods that are competitive on the global market. And in this sense, I would also like to stress that import replacement is an important stage for expanding exports in sectors other than raw materials and finding a place for our companies in global manufacturing and technological alliances – and not in secondary roles, but as strong and effective partners.”
Much of this sounds like the broader goals of “Made in China 2025” (MIC2025) discussed earlier, although the Russian approach to developing NTI details was much simpler than that of China as suggested by Harald Buchmann. Among other things the particular “Rapid Foresight” methodology used for identifying a future “new technology order” or high-tech “national champions” was flawed.
The NTI project did not address the possibility that Russia should mainly aim to become a better “user” of existing and future technologies as they become available rather than attempt to take the lead in developing a wide range of new technologies. There was no recognition that the so-called “resources curse” (too much natural resources reducing incentive for industrial and technological advances) is not always such a bad thing, as Australia has demonstrated by becoming a good high-tech “user” rather than a “producer”. The rapid pace of technology change and falling technology prices means that “users” can often receive greater economic benefits than “producers” because of improvements in their “terms of trade” (export prices compared to import prices).
This possible “terms of trade” effect is also relevant to other countries. China, which lacks a huge natural resource base relative to its population, has decided that being a industrial and technology “producer is to its advantage. Iran, on the other hand, may find that emphasis on being a better “user” is more appropriate.
A 2018 presidential decree on National Projects spending (totalling about 3% of GDP annually) in 2019-2024 covered many of the same socio-economic topics as the earlier “Strategy2020” report but with numerical targets rather than just suggested policy directions. In addition to such things as large-scale modernization and expansion of pipelines, transport and ports infrastructure, the most important National Projects from an international perspective were “International Cooperation and Exports” – with specific numerical export targets for various industry sectors. Again, some elements were much like MIC2025.
We are not aware of the methodology used for determining National Projects targets but it would almost certainly have been more complex than for the National Technology Initiative (NTI). However, some of the targets suggest less discipline than the Made in China 2025 (MIC2025) process. As an illustration of how numerical targets in plans can lead to silly ideas, the yearly targets for the “Science” National Project include the number of articles by Russian researchers published in international scientific journals and the proportion of Russian scientific researchers aged 39 or less, while the “Culture” National Project called for 900 domestically produced pianos to be provided to children’s art schools by 2024.
In April 2023 Prime Minister Mishustin opened a meeting emphasizing “strengthening technological sovereignty”[4]. “In order to keep our key industries operating stably, we must largely ensure our independence in creating technologies, innovations and engineering solutions, as well as master the production of almost all essential products quickly. This work must be carried out with our own resources and, most importantly, our own expertise. Therefore, we have to strengthen the production, personnel and scientific potential of Russia, and in fact, raise it to a completely new level. We will build up industrial capacities, launch the necessary production facilities on a large scale, and open high-tech enterprises; actively develop key industries, such as machine building, the chemical industry, energy, aircraft manufacturing, shipbuilding, agrotechnology and biotechnology; and pursue leadership in artificial intelligence, robotics, unmanned systems and other innovative areas.”
We suspect that this Mishustin listing of needed industrial capacities has just been put together without much organized research, and certainly nothing like MIC2025. As much as anything else, it is a broad policy statement with details to be filled in later. It also rejects many of the internationally orientated ideas of Skolkovo and the National Technology Initiative (NTI)”. This was clearly a reaction to the consequences of the February 2022 large scale invasion of Ukraine.
We have not seen any subsequent report on outcomes of such Russian projects similar to the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report. The February 2022 invasion of Ukraine will have thrown many good plans and implementation into disarray as resources are diverted to the war effort. In fact, there is evidence that political connections and power are increasingly in the economic driver’s seat in Russia — in a way leaning more toward contemporary Iran (to be discussed later in this document) than toward general China MIC2025 practice.
As should be clear from the above discussion, Russia has in the past been more open than China in describing its economic and industrial policies but, as already suggested, is less competent in implementing them. This openness was due to the relative liberal economic and political system in the first two decades after 2000.
In part, the relative Russian lack of focus and competence reflects the real advantages of continuing to do the same as in the past – ie relying on resource exports – and a real difference in psychology. On the Chinese side there is to pride in their recent technological and industrial advances, while on the Russian side there is resentment based on Russia’s historical supremacy. At a political level Russia has become emotionally distracted toward military adventures and exerting its influence in other countries. China has been more cautious while recognizing that military power is increasingly based on broader technological and industrial capacity. There may be lessons for Iran here.
Finally, we want to digress to a comparison that is sometimes made between China and the USA. China is said to be governed by engineers and the USA by lawyers. Iran would be wise to lean toward the practical solutions – following the Chinese example – rather than the evangelist dreaming of Vladimir Putin and many of his supporters.
D. IRAN
(1) Political, Institutional and Economic Background
The Islamic Republic of Iran is an unusual mix internally in terms of both politics and the economy. While few question the role of religious ideology within government structures there are diverse views on the extent to which there must be compromises within society and with other countries. The economy has many of the aspects of a Western-type market structure while being distorted by groups such as the Islamic Republican Guard Corps (IRGC) which seek to monopolise power and by sometimes arbitrary interventions by the Supreme Leader. All this exists together in a often vague way which can within limits change depending on circumstances and over time.
The BTI 2026 Country Report on Iran[5], says that “lack of clear delineation of responsibilities among the various bodies involved in policymaking means that duties overlap, thus contributing to inefficiencies, delays and, at times, conflicting policy outcomes. Ministries, commissions and state-linked organizations may compete or fail to coordinate effectively, undermining the overall impact and implementation of policies. Compounding this issue is the frequent interference by the supreme leader. He and his office hold significant sway over the policy process through their representatives in all relevant public bodies.”
Despite the above, in someways Iran is governed quite well. Its highly centralized administrative structure consists of 31 provinces, as well as cities, divisions, municipalities and villages. The state provides basic services, including electricity, natural gas, education and health care. WHO data for 2022 show high rates of access to basic services.[6]
A 2024 Clingendael article by Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, “The limit of Iran’s industrial resilience”[7], paints a picture of adaptation – internally and internationally – to foreign sanctions which have prevented industrial decline but have not offered much prospect of growth and technological development.” He writes that “Made in Iran” goods used to be of “similar quality and sophistication as those produced in other developing economies, like Turkey or Brazil, but this is no longer the case. Iran’s factories continue to produce trucks, cars, appliances, electronics, and a wide range of fast-moving consumer goods. But the manufacturing processes and industrial designs that underpin the production of these goods are often decades old.”
The Iranian idea of a “resistance” or “resistive” economy to counter the effect of international sanctions is in no sense forward looking in a similar way to the industrial and technological plans of China – or even Russia! The only similarity would seem to be attempts at import replacement, while other Iranian endeavours such as smuggling and barter trade are also involved in attempts to little more than survive.[8]
A June 2026 article David Jalilvand[9] brings us to the present situation: “The war with Israel and the United States caused widespread damage not only to military assets but also to the country’s economic infrastructure. Energy facilities, industrial sites, and transportation networks have been severely hit. Preliminary assessments suggest that the damage could run into several hundred billion dollars with some projections exceeding half of Iran’s annual pre-war GDP. For an economy already weakened by decades of mismanagement, inflation, underinvestment, and sanctions, this translates into enormous reconstruction needs. While this represents a challenge for Iran as a whole, it also creates a major opportunity for one actor in particular: the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) and its ever-expanding economic conglomerate.” “Their footprint is especially strong in construction and engineering, defense, the oil and petrochemical industries, ports and logistics, telecommunications, and, increasingly, banking.”
David Jalilvand sys that “the IRGC’s key role in national defense and wartime governance combined with the elimination of significant leadership figures from Iran’s political class, such as Supreme Leader Khamenei and Ali Larijani, has elevated the organization’s political position. That influence can be used post-war to shape the reconstruction process and channel contracts and funds toward the organization’s business networks. The consolidation and expansion of the IRGC’s economic profile will further sideline the formal state companies and the private sector. As the IRGC’s business networks become the main beneficiaries of reconstruction, more companies may, out of sheer economic necessity, be forced to work with the IRGC as subcontractors or suppliers.”
A 23 June 2026 article in Amwaj Media, “Iran’s post-war pivot to ‘economy first’ stirs hardline backlash”[10], shows how complicated the internal debate in Iran is. It quoted Iran’s Parliament Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf as calling for a shift from wartime mobilization to economic development following the war with Israel and the US, urging business leaders to take over from the “boys at the launchers”. According to the article, “Qalibaf’s remarks, coupled with his defense of the recent Iran-US memorandum of understanding (MOU), have triggered a backlash from hardliners and highlighted emerging tensions over the direction of post-war Iran”. According to Arman Mahmoudian at the Global and National Security Institute, “although Qalibaf remains a conservative figure, in the present debate he appears increasingly aligned with the pragmatic side.”[11]
Arman Mahmoudian at the Global and National Security Institute[12] provides a more detailed look at Iran’s internal divisions: “For decades, politics inside the Islamic Republic has been divided between two broad camps: the reformists, and the conservatives and hardliners. These camps have differed sharply over domestic politics, social and political reform, liberalization, and, most importantly, foreign policy — particularly Iran’s relationship with the United States. Over the past several months, Iran’s internal polarization has reached a new peak. The recent experience of war, particularly the episodes of conflict in June 2025 and February 2026, intensified political tensions and sharpened the debate inside Tehran. A perhaps more consequential factor is the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who in disputes between reformists and conservatives, pragmatists and hardliners, ultimately made the final decision; the rest of the political spectrum either aligned with his position or faced marginalization and isolation. The fundamentalist camp is opposed to concessions to Washington and some within this faction seem willing to risk another war rather than accept compromises they view as politically or ideologically unacceptable. The reformists and pragmatists regard some form of understanding with the United States as vital to Iran’s national survival. While Iranian conservatives are ideologically opposed to compromise, a position tied to their political worldview, they also have practical concerns. Most leading figures in the conservative camp come from IRGC circles, meaning military issues are their top concern. In their view, the rounds of conflict from the past year demonstrate that another war remains likely. Conservatives also fear that an agreement involving major concessions would make the Islamic Republic appear weak and embolden protesters and opponents, both inside and outside the country. The war has allowed the IRGC to expand its influence inside the country, increasing its role within Iran’s intelligence and administrative structures, so another war is therefore not viewed as the worst possible outcome. Reformists have historically favored détente with the West. Former President Hassan Rouhani made de-escalation with the United States over the nuclear issue one of the central promises of his 2013 presidential campaign. That position contributed to the negotiation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal two years later. The current economic turmoil is also hitting Iran’s middle class especially hard. Historically, the middle class has served as one of the reformists’ main social bases, giving them another incentive to seek a deal that could ease economic pressure. Reformists may also believe that, in the absence of Ali Khamenei and an alternative strong supreme leader, a deal with the United States could improve both their domestic position and international standing, while strengthening their influence within the state. The reformists also differ from conservatives in how they understand war. Most reformist figures are civilians, and they tend to view war through its impact on Iran’s civilian infrastructure, industrial capacity, and society. They know that Iran has already been significantly damaged by the war, in ways that military leaders do not always appreciate. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founding father of the Islamic Republic, argued that preserving the regime is above all other objectives. The desire to shore up the regime may lead conservatives to adopt reformist positions, as the elder Khamenei did during JCPOA negotiations, or it may lead reformists to take a stronger line against the West if the regime appears in danger of collapse. Both camps will ultimately adjust their positions based on what they believe is necessary for the Islamic Republic’s survival.” “In the end, the divide between hardliners and pragmatists is not simply an ideological struggle over whether Iran should compromise with the United States. It is a struggle over how best to preserve the Islamic Republic under pressure. The hardliners see resistance, military leverage, and internal consolidation as the safest path to survival. The reformists and pragmatists see economic relief, diplomatic compromise, and de-escalation as necessary to prevent a deeper domestic crisis. Yet despite their differences, both camps are operating under the same ultimate logic: the survival of the regime comes first.”[13]
(2) Planning the Future
In our view Iran should try to gain “analytical insights” for its “future development strategies” from China but it needs to be very selective because it does not have the technological base nor the large domestic market which helps Chinese companies excel at import replacement and exports. Moreover, Iran has a strong natural resource base – particularly hydrocarbon – which makes its economy more similar to that of Russia and able to export these resources to import industrial and manufactured items and technologies.
Over the longer term an increasing use of renewable energy technology – perhaps boosted by the conflict in the Persian Gulf region — will work to reduce the value of Iran’s natural resource but there are still many decades to go in which Iran can profit these. Also, technological advances are reducing the costs of many manufactured products and technologies that a growing economy would need, so it is unclear that the terms of trade (import prices relative to export prices) trend will necessarily be adverse to Iran. Thus, in our view, Iranian planning should prioritise becoming a better “user” of technologies. Iran should not follow Russia’s more recent focus on “technological sovereignty” which is politically driven and associated with the conflict with Ukraine rather economically rational.
According to the BTI 2026 Country Report[14]: “Theoretically, Iran has a robust institutional framework designed to evaluate and advance policies. The Statistical Center tracks a broad range of economic, societal and political indicators, while the parliament’s research service produces scientific reports on relevant issues. Additionally, various government ministries and institutions typically have affiliated think tanks or research institutes. This setup, in principle, should enable the incorporation of both internal and external expert opinions into policymaking. In practice, however, policy learning is severely hampered by the politicization of academic and scientific endeavors, persistent political infighting, and the influence of entrenched interests within Iran’s political class. Furthermore, because of ongoing sanctions and the state’s confrontational policies, Iran is under-represented in relevant international forums for expert exchanges, which exacerbates the problem. As a result, a significant gap exists between Iran’s policies and global best practices. Although reliable information is scarce, Iran has expanded international exchanges with other authoritarian regimes to share ‘best practices’ for consolidating power, including instruments and strategies aimed at maintaining authoritarian rule.”
Iran has a rolling five-year development planning process, with the current plan adopted in 2023. The five-year development plans are drafted by the Plan and Budget Organization (PBO), an institution situated under the presidency that also prepares the annual government budget, which is intended, in theory, to be a yearly reflection of the medium-term plans. The BTI 2026 country report[15] says that “in practice, successive Iranian governments have consistently failed to meet these development goals. The plans outline broad trajectories rather than detailed action plans, and policymaking is often reactive, shaped by immediate challenges and intense political infighting. Additionally, the government’s limited power further weakens policy implementation because the supreme leader and other bodies frequently intervene in decision-making.”
“Institutionally, a persistent power struggle remains ongoing between the government and other entities controlled by the supreme leader. This significantly limits the government’s room to maneuver. The supreme leader also seeks to avoid responsibility for unpopular reforms, shifting the burden to the government while at the same time restricting the government’s ability to act. Additionally, various state and state-linked institutions operate outside government oversight, further weakening executive authority.
Moreover, international sanctions have created powerful interest groups within the state that profit from maintaining the status quo (e.g., by controlling clandestine oil exports, smuggling routes and other shadow economies) and thereby resist reforms. Widespread corruption and clientelism further erode policy effectiveness. In Iran’s state institutions, political loyalty often outweighs technocratic expertise.”[16]
Bijan Khajehpour noted in a 2023 article, should “Iran’s complicated governmental structures mean that many measures are implemented in the form of regulations instead of parliamentary decisions.”[17]
There can also be strong criticisms. Khajehpour noted that: “Mohammad Qassemi, head of the research office of the Tehran Chamber of Commerce, Industries and Mines, has described the Seventh FYP as a document detached from reality, saying, ‘No remedy has been clarified in the 7th Five-Year Development Plan. Wherever an issue is identified, the plan (only) proposes to gather a group and draft documents that will be implemented in the form of strategic documents, supporting documents, etc.’”
Bijan Khajehpour, in a July 2025 article, noted that a group of 180 economists and university professors — including former ministers, central bank governors as well as heads of the management and planning organization — published an open letter to President Pezeshkian calling for a paradigm shift in the current governance structures to overcome the ongoing crises. “The letter refers to the ‘heavy costs of war’ but also to the ‘structural crises in the fields of economy, politics, and foreign relations’, and identifies a number of key reforms in the governance approach, ending media monopoly, strengthening meritocracy and releasing political prisoners as necessities for ensuring Iran’s security, stability and development. Additionally, the open letter calls for the withdrawal of military forces from the economy and a revision of monetary and fiscal policies to combat rent-seeking, corruption and to restore public trust.”
Data issues make estimating the share of Iran GDP controlled by the IRGC difficult but – combined with bonyads (revolutionary-religious foundations) – it was probably more than 50% a decade ago and will now be considerably more.[18] Kayhan Valadbaygi writes that “the IRGC’s engineering arm, Khatam al-Anbiya Construction Headquarters (Ghorb), doesn’t just execute development strategy. It effectively authors sectoral priorities through contracting power, operating as a state within a state accountable only to the Supreme Leader.”
Bijan Khajehpour, “Deep Dive: Is Iran really a ‘trillion-dollar opportunity’?”[19] writes: “Compared to 2016, when the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) went into effect, market conditions in Iran have changed. Local companies have developed further, and their needs and expectations have evolved. Importantly, ownership of economic players has shifted away from the government, moving towards what observers call quasi-state entities. Some of these actors are sanctioned and foreign companies must therefore appreciate the various risks of their partnership strategies. A host of political and socio-economic reasons will compel Iranian stakeholders to insist on partnerships between local and foreign companies. Adding further complexity, there is a degree of intended ambiguity in the ownership structures of corporate Iran which will render due diligence processes challenging. It will be key to build local capacities — if not through creating joint ventures, then through knowledge transfer in other spheres such as universities and research institutes. Corruption is certainly a major impediment to any investor in Iran, and it is a topic where the government and especially the judiciary will have to act to give assurances to foreign investors and enterprises. For western companies, the current level of corruption is unacceptable — a fact that will slow down the process of establishing partnerships.”
So, where to now for Iran in and economic and industrial transformation attempt? We now consider –often with the Chinese experience in mind – what industrial and technology development policies that Iran might adopt. In thinking about policies Iran should keep in mind basic market conditions. For example, China generally “struggled to catch up in industries where any incentives to buy local could not overcome the strong brand incumbency and market position of foreign firms”. In the Chinese case it was agricultural machinery. On the other hand, Chinese successes – such as electric vehicles – have been achieved with a combination of policies that encouraged both domestic demand and domestic supply. There is rarely a single policy silver bullet.
(3) Policy Options
Education and R&D
In 2025 Apple CEO Tim Cook said that the real reason why Apple chooses China for manufacturing is because of “the skill, the quantity of skill in one location, and the type of skill it is”. Not because of labor costs since China “stopped being a low labor cost country many years ago”. Cook gave an example of the tooling expertise needed to produce Apple products, saying that a meeting of tooling engineers in the USA may not fill the room he was in whereas “in China you could fill multiple football fields”. Russia is probably in much the same skill position as the USA and it is partly the reason that its present close political relationship between China has not led to a surge in Chinese industrial and manufacturing investment.
Cook’s comments are particularly interesting is that, as already noted’, China’s “success in meeting targets for nuclear, solar, and wind generation equipment was driven not only by subsidies but also by returns to process-level innovation. China has improved on U.S. nuclear power plant designs. While underlying technology for photovoltaic cells and wind turbines was developed abroad, government subsidies coupled with production process innovations by Chinese firms helped China to become the dominant global solar and wind manufacturer.” As we have already suggested, it is not necessary for a country to be at the forefront of scientific and new technologies. A lot can be achieved by just doing something better – or just be being a better “user” of what essentially already exists.
This does not mean that basic research is not desirable. China “struggled to catch up in industries where innovation gains are highly dependent on basic research – such as new materials.
According to the BTI 2026 country report Iran[20], by regional standards, Iran has a comprehensive education system covering basic, secondary and tertiary education levels, and is complemented by various R&D facilities. According to the World Bank government spending on education amounted to 2.9% of GDP in 2023 – a significant figure, though a decline from its 4.7% peak in 2007. Judged by regional standards, Iran’s research and development system produces robust output in STEM fields, while government interference and societal norms force the arts and social sciences to underperform. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that a growing number of university graduates are either unemployed or are working in jobs below their qualifications. An indication of this disconnect is Iran’s significant brain drain.”
In our view, Iran desperately needs political and economic reform to stop – and hopefully reverse – the brain drain.
Artificial Intelligence (AI)
AI was note directly identified in “Made in China 2025” so here we are only looking at the situation in Iran which has a National Artificial Intelligence Plan.[21] A big issue in “AI policies” in many countries is that of “national sovereignty”. We are uncertain whether this is an achievable policy goal in any real sense unless a country has its own massive data centers and forces its own software producers to cut themselves off from the wider world.
Iran has clearly demonstrated AI cyber abilities in a number of national security fields but we question future AI capacity in hardware of data centers. There is not only the question of access to “chips” but the cost and diversion of resources – including water for cooling – that makes data centers problematic.
As already discussed, sometimes it is more economically effective to be a “user” of technologies rather than trying to be at the forefront as a producer.
Market Entry Barriers
Market entry barriers are formal and informal market access restrictions that create an uneven playing field that favors domestic firms over foreign firms. They often impose onerous inspection and permitting requirements on foreign firms, adding costs and creating delays in introducing products to market. As noted earlier, China’s success in shipbuilding in MIC2015 was based on already established capabilities whereas it commercial aviation (particularly jet engines) have been much less successful because of little established capability.
Iran has myriad market entry barriers – “complex and opaque customs regulations along with bureaucratic hurdles”[22] — as should be clear from the earlier description of its complex political-economic structure. They they are more defensive – part of the “resistance” economy – than rationally aimed at further development of a modernized and internationally competitive economic structure.
Choosing what area to support in the future requires significant analysis. We suggest that Iran only equivalent to Chinese ship-building might be – oddly enough – in aspects of aviation (missiles, drones etc) as a military equipment exporter. Defence is one area which Russian technology exports have had some success. On the other hand an sector such as fast developing medical technology should certainly be ruled out as being beyond Iran’s technological capacity.
According to the BTI 2026 Country Report:[23] “The latest available World Bank data for 2020 show that Iran’s simple average tariff rate was 15.2% – significantly higher than key trading partners such as Türkiye, China and Russia.” To the extent that such data remains accurate Iran would do well to move to lower tariffs.
Forced Technology Transfer Policies
Chinese forced technology transfer policies include compelling foreign firms to form Joint-Ventures (JVs) with state connected Chinese partners, requiring technical information disclosures to license technology, and cyber and corporate espionage. This was successful for China in the case of high-speed rail because foreign firms wanted access to the expanding Chinese market. Such a policy did not work well for semiconductors because China had was more motivated to buy these than foreign firms were motivated to sell.
There would need to be a massive change in internal Iranian government structures for it to apply such policies against foreign firms. As far as foreign investment is concerned Iran’s biggest hurdle over the next few years will likely be attracting foreign investment without giving large concession to foreign companies.
Subsidies, Tax Breaks, and Financial Incentives
These include direct government subsidies, below-market loans made through government-controlled banks, tax credits, and below-market land sales. For example, China used such methods to boost both demand and supply in its electric vehicle industry.
As reported earlier, subsidies, tax breaks and financial incentives are used in Iran but in a seemingly defensive – or “resistance” – way. There should be more tightly focussed role for these in Iran, but we would certainly rule out Iran taking significant steps to promote domestic electric vehicle production. Chinese producers are simply too competitive and Iran should continue to take advantage of its abundant oil and gas reserves for internal combustion engines.
Government Guidance Funds (GGF)
Government Guidance Funds (GGF) are state backed financial instruments that have become one of China’s primary means for directing financial resources to high-tech firms – including to the semiconductor industry.
As already noted, Iran provides favourable financing to some sectors and companies, but all too often those receiving this are politically connected – such as IRGC – rather than rationally thought out future development orientated entities.
Procurement
Procurement is used as a lever in markets where Chinese (State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) dominate, often through discriminatory policies that prevent foreign firms from competing for public contracts. For example, China’s airline industry is dominated by state-owned firms, and China has used airline procurement to support its internationally uncompetitive jet models. Despite its regional jet model — the C909 — having inferior range and fuel consumption to comparable models, Chinese airlines have not purchased foreign-branded regional jets since C909 deliveries began in 2015, causing Brazilian competitor Embraer to close its Chinese plant. Russia is making a similar effort – for a while jointly with China – to develop this aviation sector but is finding it difficult despite its historical military aviation record.
A more internationally engaged Iran should have no difficult sourcing such foreign aircraft for its requirements.
Privatization
“China privatized tens of thousands of SOEs in the 1990s to raise revenue, reduce fiscal burdens, and reorient the economy toward a more productive, competitive market structure. Since the last effort at SOE rationalization between 2013 and 2015, the public sector has been ascendent. SOEs’ share of aggregate market capitalization among China’s 100 largest listed firms has increased from roughly 31% in 2021 to around 54% in 2024. SOEs account for 85% of all bond issuance in China.”[24]
A February 2025 article by Bijan Khajehpour looks a Iranian privatization.[25] “Despite different waves of privatization and promotion of private enterprise since the early 2000s, Iran is still awaiting the consolidation of a strong and genuine private sector. So far, the so-called privatization program has mainly led to government assets being transferred to semi-state actors such as revolutionary, religious and military foundations as well as pension funds. This process has not generated any positive dynamism in the Iranian economy. The semi-state sector has not been equipped to manage strategic entities such as power plants, refineries and petrochemical complexes, giving rise to a greater degree of mismanagement and corruption in key sectors. Moreover, through a flawed process, government monopolies have essentially become semi-state monopolies. This dynamic is epitomized by the telecommunications sector, which is heavily controlled by affiliates of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).”
Iranian privatization has thus exhibited some of the features of the flawed Russian privatization of the 1990s.
In our view, Iran would benefit greatly from modern foreign management practices and should actively seek foreign professionals and courage Iranian mangers to have contact with them. This would help Iran to become a better “user” of existing and future technologies.
Competition Policy
Domestic business competition policies are generally aimed at increasing consumer (and country) welfare by forcing companies to be as efficient as possible.
According to a January 2026 article in the International Journal of Industrial Organization[26], “China’s industrial policy has evolved significantly since the 1980s, serving as a key driver for its technological catch-up and transition from a planned to market economy. Although government-backed sectors have achieved notable economic successes, these policies have also led to negative effects, including overcapacity, ineffective innovation support, and repeated investments ignoring comparative advantages. Looking ahead, China is expected to better coordinate industrial and competition policies, while developing strategic emerging industries and strengthening supply chain resilience through independent innovation and high-standard opening-up measures.”
But, according to Don Rosenberg in a January 2025 article, “China’s anti-monopoly law (AML) is often wielded as a tool of industrial policy, rather than a means of ensuring fair competition. For instance, China’s National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) has required foreign owners of intellectual property to set royalty rates below market value, effectively devaluing their R&D investments.”[27]
Things have been quite different in Iran and need to change. According to the BTI 2026 Country Report on Iran[28]: “Iran’s Competition Council was established to promote competition and prevent monopolies. It has broad powers, including unlimited time to initiate reviews, and it nominally operates independently. In practice, the Council’s impact is close to zero. State-linked entities – especially those controlled by the supreme leader, including IRGC-affiliated businesses and religious foundations – regularly escape scrutiny. These institutions enjoy numerous privileges, such as tax exemptions, the ability to avoid paying taxes without consequences, and exclusive access to lucrative government contracts. This reflects the broader problem of rampant nepotism, which puts genuinely private companies without political connections at a severe disadvantage.”
Foreign Investment
“China remained one of the world’s most closed major economies, ranking 17th most restrictive out of 104 countries surveyed in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) December 2024 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) Regulatory Restrictiveness Index. Inbound FDI fell 27.1 percent to $114.8 billion in 2024, according to statistics from China’s Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM).”[29] “China continued to employ an investment regime that restricted and guided inbound and outbound foreign direct investment in furtherance of the industrial policy, technology self-reliance, and supply chain dominance goals of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Despite rhetoric from China’s leadership, the country’s legal framework retained separate and discriminatory regimes for domestic investors and investments, and foreign investors and investments.”[30]
“Foreign ownership is heavily restricted in Iran and foreign investors typically rely on partnerships with regime insiders, further entrenching economic favoritism”, according to the BTI 2026 Country Report.[31] “Foreign direct investment remains negligible. This reflects the far-reaching impact of sanctions as well as Iran’s weak legal framework, which, compounded by corruption and nepotism, deters investment.”
Finance
“Since 2010 China has transformed from a net capital importer to a strategic creditor. According to Udaibir Das[32], writing in May 2025, the “financial system operates with a distinct duality: functioning as a macroeconomic stabiliser and a policy-driven geoeconomic lever. This creates tensions between market signals and administrative control, liberalisation goals and geopolitical buffers.” The “macroprudential toolkit has matured, with the People’s Bank of China deploying instruments under the Macroprudential Assessment regime. Regulatory oversight now extends to systemically important fintech and nonbank financial conglomerates. Capital markets have deepened, the investor base has broadened and digital finance increasingly intermediates through regulated channels.”
However, according to Udaibir Das, “China’s macroprudential regime continues to operate under institutional constraints. Due to administrative overrides and conflicting policy mandates, countercyclical capital buffers, systemic risk surcharges and borrower-based tools work less effectively. Unlike other G20 jurisdictions, China lacks legal independence and transparent, rule-based triggers in macroprudential governance, undermining credibility and market expectations.”
According to the BTI 2026 Country Report[33], “Iran’s banking sector is also severely underdeveloped, with weak institutions and inadequate regulation. State-owned banks dominate the sector, while private banks play only a marginal role. Iran struggles with high levels of non-performing loans, extreme inflation rates and politically driven or potentially corrupt lending. The Central Bank of Iran (CBI) regulates the system, but enforcement of international banking standards such as Basel III remains limited. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has placed Iran on its blacklist, and has repeatedly urged the country’s banking system to comply with global standard against money-laundering and terrorist financing. Iran also remains disconnected from the SWIFT network, further isolating its financial sector. The Tehran Stock Exchange (TSE) and Iran Fara Bourse (IFB), the country’s main financial trading platforms, have grown somewhat but remain highly volatile and subject to government interference.”
In our view, Iran needs urgent positive action in this area.
E. CONCLUSION
Iran has enormous industrial and technological development potential if it can become better at basic governance. This does not necessary mean that it needs to adopt a mini-MIC2025 (Made in China 2025) policy agenda.
In fact, our view is that Iran should mainly aim to be an effective “user” of advanced industrial and high-tech products rather than attempt any large-scale industrial transformation such as happened practice in China. While Australia has become a highly successful – “resource cursed” – user of advanced industrial products and technology, Russia has failed because of weak governance and focus in international conflict.
To the extent that Iran wishes to adopt a mini-MIC2025 approach to the future it needs to study Chinese successes and failures in some detail – not to copy, but to learn to objectively analyse reasons for particular results. Whatever the case with particular industrial and technology sector, success as a whole depends on good understandable governance starting from the top leadership and flowing down.
[1] US-China Economic and Security Review Commission Staff Research Report, “Made in China 2025: Evaluating China’s Performance”
[2] “Was Made in China 2025 Successful” by the Rhodium Group for the US Chamber of Commerce.
https://www.uschamber.com/assets/documents/Was-Made-in-China-2025-Successful-Summary.pdf
[3] Jeff Schubert, “Russia’s National Technology Initiative” or “Waiting for the High-Tech Tooth-Fairy”!
[4] Russia’s Crazy New Religion of Economic Sovereignty
https://www.etterretningen.no/2023/05/04/russias-crazy-new-religion-of-economic-sovereignty/
[5] BTI 2026 Country Report: Iran
https://bti-project.org/fileadmin/api/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2026_IRN.pdf
[6] BTI 2026 Country Report: Iran
https://bti-project.org/fileadmin/api/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2026_IRN.pdf
[7] Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, “The limit of Iran’s industrial resilience”, Clingendael, March 2024
https://www.clingendael.org/publication/limit-irans-industrial-resilience
[8] Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, “The limit of Iran’s industrial resilience”, Clingendael, March 2024
https://www.clingendael.org/publication/limit-irans-industrial-resilience
[9] David Jalilvand, “The wartime economic takeover of the Iranian state”, Clingendael, 2 June 2026
https://www.clingendael.org/publication/wartime-economic-takeover-iranian-state
[10] “Iran’s post-war pivot to ‘economy first’ stirs hardline backlash”, Amwaj Media, 23 June 2026
https://amwaj.media/en/media-monitor/irans-post-war-pivot-to-economy-first-stirs-hardline-backlash
[11] Arman Mahmoudian, “Compromise or Resistance? Iran’s Elite Divide Over the War”, Global and National Security Institute, May 2026
https://gulfif.org/compromise-or-resistance-irans-elite-divide-over-the-war/
[12] Arman Mahmoudian, “Compromise or Resistance? Iran’s Elite Divide Over the War”, Global and National Security Institute, May 2026
https://gulfif.org/compromise-or-resistance-irans-elite-divide-over-the-war/
[13] Arman Mahmoudian, “Compromise or Resistance? Iran’s Elite Divide Over the War”, Global and National Security Institute, May 2026
https://gulfif.org/compromise-or-resistance-irans-elite-divide-over-the-war/
[14] BTI 2026 Country Report: Iran
https://bti-project.org/fileadmin/api/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2026_IRN.pdf
[15] BTI 2026 Country Report: Iran
https://bti-project.org/fileadmin/api/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2026_IRN.pdf
[16] BTI 2026 Country Report: Iran
https://bti-project.org/fileadmin/api/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2026_IRN.pdf
[17] Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, “The limit of Iran’s industrial resilience”, Clingendael, March 2024
https://www.clingendael.org/publication/limit-irans-industrial-resilience
[18] Kayhan Valadbaygi, “Beyond the IRGC: The rise of Iran’s military-bonyad complex”, https://www.clingendael.org/publication/beyond-irgc-rise-irans-military-bonyad-complex
[19] Bijan Khajehpour, “Deep Dive: Is Iran really a ‘trillion-dollar opportunity’?”, Amwaj Media, June 2026
https://amwaj.media/en/article/deep-dive-is-iran-really-a-trillion-dollar-opportunity
[20] BTI 2026 Country Report: Iran
https://bti-project.org/fileadmin/api/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2026_IRN.pdf
[21] Silvia Boltuc, “Iran’s Narrowing Window of AI Leadership and Regional Tech Realignments”,
https://www.specialeurasia.com/2025/05/20/iran-ai-technology/
[22] BTI 2026 Country Report: Iran
https://bti-project.org/fileadmin/api/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2026_IRN.pdf
[23] BTI 2026 Country Report: Iran
https://bti-project.org/fileadmin/api/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2026_IRN.pdf
[24] Rhodium Group, “Fire Sale: Prospects for SOE Privatization in China”, 9 May 2025
https://rhg.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/Fire-Sale-Prospects-for-SOE-Privatization-in-China.pdf
[25] Bijan Khajehpour, “How Iranian-style ‘privatization’ stunts the real private sector”, Amwaj Media, 14 February 2025
https://amwaj.media/en/article/how-iranian-style-privatization-stunts-the-real-private-sector
[26] Xiao Fu, Ping Lin and Gaofen Ye, “Industrial policy in China: Its development and ongoing transformation”, International Journal of Industrial Organization Volume 104, January 2026, 103229
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167718725000955
[27] Don Rosenberg, “Industrial Policy and Antitrust: A Crossroads of U.S. Competitiveness”, January 2025
[28] BTI 2026 Country Report: Iran
https://bti-project.org/fileadmin/api/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2026_IRN.pdf
[29] “2025 Investment Climate Statements: China”, USA Department of State
https://www.state.gov/reports/2025-investment-climate-statements/china
[30] “2025 Investment Climate Statements: China”, USA Department of State
https://www.state.gov/reports/2025-investment-climate-statements/china
[31] BTI 2026 Country Report: Iran
https://bti-project.org/fileadmin/api/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2026_IRN.pdf
[32] Udaibir Das, “The arc of ascent of China’s financial system”, 14 May 2025
https://www.omfif.org/2025/05/the-arc-of-ascent-of-chinas-financial-system/
[33] BTI 2026 Country Report: Iran
https://bti-project.org/fileadmin/api/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2026_IRN.pdf
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